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Abstrat
We onsider in this thesis the seurity goals ondentiality of messages and
authentiity of entities in eletroni ommuniation with speial fous on appli-
ations in environments with restrited omputational power, e.g., RFID-tags
or mobile phones. We introdue the onept of stream iphers, desribe and
analyze their most important building bloks, analyze their seurity features,
and indiate ways to improve their resistane against ertain types of attaks.
In the ontext of entity authentiation, we desribe speial protools based on
randomly hoosing elements from a seret set of linear vetor spaes and relate
the seurity of these protools to the hardness of a ertain learning problem.
iv
Zusammenfassung
Wir betrahten in dieser Arbeit die Siherheitsziele Vertraulihkeit von Nah-
rihten und Authentizität von Kommunikationspartnern im Umfeld elektro-
nisher Kommunikation mit besonderem Shwerpunkt auf Anwendungen auf
ressourenbeshränkten Endgeräten wie RFID-Tags oder Mobiltelefonen. Wir
betrahten insbesondere Stromhiren, beshreiben und analysieren ihre wih-
tigsten Bestandteile, untersuhen ihre Siherheitseigenshaften und zeigen Mög-
lihkeiten auf, wie sih ihre Resistenz gegenüber bestimmten Angristehniken
verbessern lässt. Im Zusammenhang mit der Authentikation von Kommuni-
kationspartnern beshreiben wir spezielle Authentikationsprotokolle, die auf
der zufälligen Auswahl von Elementen aus einer geheimen Menge von linea-
ren Vektorräumen beruhen, und führen die Siherheit dieser Protokolle auf die
Komplexität eines bestimmten Lernproblems zurük.
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Chapter 1
Introdution
1.1 What this Thesis is about
In this thesis, we onsider two important seurity goals in eletroni ommuni-
ation: ondentiality of messages and authentiity of entities.
While many algorithms and systems have been proposed for a variety of
appliation senarios, we fous our attention on methods that are partiularly
useful for devies with rather little omputational power. This haraterization
is not entirely sharp  for example, it is arguable whether a modern smartphone
is rather a partiularly omplex mobile phone or a small omputer equipped
with a telephone funtion  but will serve as a guideline to distinguish RFID
tags and Bluetooth devies from personal omputers and grids.
By ondentiality of messages, we mean that messages whih are exhanged
over a publily observable hannel should only be meaningful to legitimate om-
muniation partners. This is probably the most prominent servie that ryp-
tographi systems are expeted to provide, ommonly by enrypting (or eni-
phering) messages. In the rst part of this thesis, we therefore introdue the
onepts of blok iphers and stream iphers and devote our main attention to
hardware-oriented stream ipher onstrutions. We desribe and analyze their
most important building bloks, onsider generi attak strategies  partiularly
the BDD-based attak orrelation attaks and algebrai attaks  and indiate
design priniples that provide a ertain resistane against these attaks. Further-
more, we review the design and seurity features of pratially used algorithms
suh as the A5/1 algorithm used in the GSM standard and the E0 ipher used
in Bluetooth. In the ase of E0, we indiate possible design improvements in
the light of the presented attaks.
In human fae-to-fae ommuniation, authentiation is impliitly and with-
out further ado performed through fae (and sometimes additionally voie)
reognition. In eletroni ommuniation, e.g. on the internet, it is often not
so easy to verify that a ommuniation partner is in fat who she laims to
be. Authentiation of entities is therefore another important task of modern
ryptographi systems. We address this seurity goal in the seond part of this
thesis by investigating lightweight authentiation protools that are based on
randomly hoosing elements from a set of L linear subspaes of GF(2)n+k, re-
late their seurity to the hardness of a ertain learning problem and indiate
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possible improvements and further researh diretions.
1.2 Publiations
This thesis is based on the following publiations.
Fully reviewed Publiations
1. Design Priniples for Combiners with Memory, Proeedings of the 6th In-
ternational Conferene on Cryptology in India (INDOCRYPT 2005), vol-
ume 3739 of LNCS, pages 104117, Springer, 2005, with Frederik Armkneht
and Matthias Krause
Lower bounds on the omplexities of algebrai attaks and orrelation
attaks, appliation to E0 and proposal of a more seure E0 variant
2. Reduing The Spae Complexity of BDD-based Attaks on Keystream Gen-
erators, Proeedings of Fast Software Enrpytion, 13th InternationalWork-
shop (FSE 2006), volume 4047 of LNCS, pages 163178, Springer, 2006,
with Matthias Krause
Divide-and-onquer strategies for reduing the memory requirements of
BDD-attaks, appliation to E0, A5/1 and the Self Shrinking Generator
3. Extended BDD-based Cryptanalysis of Keystream Generators, Proeedings
of the 14th International Workshop on Seleted Areas in Cryptography
(SAC 2007), volume 4876 of LNCS, pages 1735, Springer, 2007
Extension of the BDD-attak to NFSRs and arbitrary ompression fun-
tions, appliation to Trivium, Grain and F-FCSR
4. More on the Seurity of Linear RFID Authentiation Protools, Proeed-
ings of the 16th International Workshop on Seleted Areas in Cryptogra-
phy (SAC 2009), volume 5867 of LNCS, pages 182196, Springer, 2009,
with Matthias Krause
Generalization of the CKK-protool, seurity analysis in the ative attak
senario, denition of linear (n, k, L) protools and the LULS problem
5. Some Remarks on FCSRs and Impliations for FCSR-based Stream Ci-
phers, Journal of Mathematial Cryptology, volume 3, pages 227236,
2009, with Simon Fisher and Willi Meier
Simplied desription of the sequenes produed by a single ell of a Galois
FCSR given that the register's initial state is periodi, mappings between
periodi states of the Fibonai and the Galois representation of an FCSR,
expliit determination of the autoorrelation of an l-sequene
Workshop Reords and Tehnial Reports
1. Equivalent Representations of the F-FCSR Keystream Generator, Work-
shop Reord of the State of the Art of Stream Ciphers (SASC 2008), with
Simon Fisher and Willi Meier
2. Building Stream Ciphers from FCSRs, Workshop Reord of the 2nd GI-
Kryptowohenende, 2008
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3. Some Remarks on FCSRs and Impliations for FCSR-based Stream Ci-
phers, Workshop Reord of the Seond Workshop on Mathematial Cryp-
tology (WMC '08), 2008, with Simon Fisher and Willi Meier
4. Algebrai Attaks against Linear RFID Authentiation Protools, Dagstuhl
Seminar on Symmetri Cryptography, Workshop Reord, 2009, with Matt-
hias Krause
During my time as PhD student, I also ontributed to a few other publiations
that are not mentioned in this thesis.
• Seurity Challenges of Loation-aware Mobile Business, Proeedings of
the 2nd IEEE International Workshop on Mobile Commere and Servies,
pages 8493, IEEE Computer Soiety, with Emin Islam Tatl and Stefan
Luks
• Dynami Anonymity, The 4th World Enformatika Conferenes, Interna-
tional Conferene on Information Seurity (ICIS '05), 2005, with Emin
Islam Tatl and Stefan Luks
• Dynami Mobile Anonymity with Mixing, Tehnial Report, University of
Mannheim, 2006, with Emin Islam Tatl and Stefan Luks
• Workshop Reord of the 2nd GI-Kryptowohenende (editor), 2006, with
Frederik Armkneht
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Part I
Condential Communiation
with Stream Ciphers
Chapter 2
Algorithms for Condential
Communiation
2.1 Seurity Denitions and Attaker Models
Often people want systems to be seure without having a preise idea of what
they mean by seurity.
In a ommuniation senario in whih two parties (usually alled Alie and
Bob), ommuniate over an inseure hannel (e.g., a telephone land line or
a TCP/IP onnetion), most people would agree that seurity means (possi-
bly among other things) that an eavesdropper on the ommuniation hannel
(wiretapping the telephone line or observing the messages when passing a router)
should not be able to understand what Alie and Bob are talking about, or more
formally, that the exhanged messages should remain ondential.
Many people have ome aross this problem already at some point in their
hildhood and most probably tried to solve it by eniphering the messages in
one way or another, i.e., by transforming the plaintext messages into some
meaningless-looking strings and having the reeiver reverse the transformation
in order to reover the plaintext.
This idea is probably almost as old as mankind, and the rst doumented
ideas for eniphering methods date bak to anient times. Sine then, ipher
systems have been built and used for ritial governmental and military appli-
ations with varying suess, thereby inuening the ourse of history at quite
a few points (Kahn, 1996).
Surprisingly enough, it was not until World War Two that a formal model
and analysis of ipher systems was developed in a famous seminal paper by
Shannon (1949), whih is now onsidered one of the foundations of modern
ryptography.
Sine then, we typially assume a ommuniation model onsisting of a reli-
able but publily observable ommuniation hannel, a sender who is equipped
with an enryption algorithm E, a reeiver running a deryption algorithm D,
and a key soure that provides enryption keys ke and deryption keys kd (see
Fig. 2.1).
A ipher system is alled symmetri if ke = kd and asymmetri if ke 6= kd.
We usually relate the seurity of a ommuniation system to an attaker
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Figure 2.1: The Shannon ommuniation model
that is dened by
• his goal
• his omputational power
• the information available to him
and haraterize the attaker by his suess probability and his resoure on-
sumption in terms of time, memory and amount of utilized information. The
most ommon goal is to obtain the seret key (leading to key reovery attaks),
but also weaker goals suh as deduing partial information about the exhanged
information are often onsidered.
Depending on whether the attaker has unlimited or limited omputational
power (i.e., time and memory resoures at his disposal), we talk about an in-
formation theoreti or a omplexity theoreti seurity setting.
Conerning the amount of available information, we typially distinguish the
following lasses.
• iphertext-only : The attaker has only aess to the publi hannel.
• known plaintext : The attaker additionally knows a number of plaintexts
and their enryptions under the unknown key.
• hosen plaintext : The attaker may have a number of plaintexts of his
hoie enrypted under the unknown key and obtain the orresponding
iphertexts.
• hosen iphertext : The attaker may have a number of iphertexts de-
rypted under the unknown key and obtain the orresponding plaintexts.
Note that we always assume the attaker to be able to eavesdrop on the
publi hannel and, following Kerkhos' priniple (Kerkhos, 1883), to know
the omplete speiation of the ipher system. The only information about the
system that he does not have is the seret key in use.
Performing a seurity analysis in this setting means to investigate how muh
eort it takes the attaker to reah his goal. Consequently, the more eort is
required, the more seure we onsider the system. Or put another way, the more
powerful the attakers that a system is able to resist (i.e., whom the system is
able to prevent from reahing their goal), the better.
2.2 Blok Ciphers 9
One of Shannon's most important observations is the fat that the one-time
pad (enrypting by XOR-synthesis of a binary message with an equally long
random bit string) is information-theoretially seure, i.e., an attaker annot
reover the plaintext from the iphertext even with unlimited omputational
power.
While this system is used to the present day by intelligene agenies for
highly ritial information, the requirement that the seret information (that
has to be exhanged ondentially between sender and reeiver in advane)
has to be as long as the message makes it impratial for many important
appliations.
The way out is to trade o seurity and usability (in fat, a very ommon
strategy in pratial IT seurity), i.e., to relax the requirements of the system
while hoping not to lose too many of its seurity properties.
In the ase of ipher systems, the relaxation onsists in limiting the seret
information (most ommonly alled the key) to a size that is small enough to be
eiently exhanged between sender and reeiver, and at the same time large
enough for the system to resist attakers equipped with a realisti amount of
resoures.
Symmetri-key ipher implementations that are based on this idea an be
lassied into two ategories, blok iphers and stream iphers, whih we de-
sribe in more detail in the following.
2.2 Blok Ciphers
Suppose for the moment that we want to enrypt a plaintext blok-wise (or
word-wise) with a xed blok length l. In order to be able to derypt, we use a
bijetive mapping (i.e., a permutation) E : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l for enryption and
its inverse D = E−1 for deryption.
Ideally, we would like to hoose E from all 2l! possible permutations for a
xed blok length l prior to the ommuniation. However, only with very low
probability, our hoie will have a representation that is more eient than a
list of input-output pairs with 2l entries, whih is learly too ineient to be
exhanged between sender and reeiver for reasonable blok sizes.
The ompromise between seurity and usability in this ase is to pik a set
of 2n permutations that an be eiently implemented using a devie that is
parametrized with an n-bit string (the key) to determine whih permutation it
atually realizes. Suh a devie is ommonly alled a blok ipher.
Denition 2.1. A blok ipher onsists of two mappings
E : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l
(x, k) 7→ y
and
D : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l
(y, k) 7→ x
that satisfy D(E(x, k), k) = x for all x ∈ {0, 1}l and all k ∈ {0, 1}n. We all
E the enryption funtion, D the deryption funtion, l the blok length, and n
the key length of the blok ipher.
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Note that for a xed k ∈ {0, 1}n, E(·, k) and D(·, k) are permutations (i.e.,
bijetive mappings) and inverse to eah other, and we may view the key as an
identier of a partiular permutation. In this sense, piking a key means to x
a partiular permutation, and hoosing a partiular blok ipher of blok length
l means hoosing 2n out of the 2l! possible permutations of {0, 1}l.
On the seurity side, we demand that an attaker annot distinguish the
blok ipher setting from the ideal ase, more preisely that the permutations
provided by the blok ipher be indistinguishable from a permutation that was
randomly hosen from all possible permutations.
We note that an attaker who an distinguish a blok ipher based permuta-
tion from a randomly hosen permutation may not neessarily be able to dedue
information about the enrypted messages nor the key. But onversely, we an
be sure that an attaker who annot tell whether a random permutation or a
blok ipher is used annot dedue any nontrivial information.
Blok iphers are among the most widely used ryptographi primitives, with
the Data Enryption Standard (DES) and the Advaned Enryption Standard
(AES) being partiularly prominent examples (see Menezes et al. (2001) for
detailed desriptions and seurity onsiderations).
Care has to be taken when a sequene of bloks b1, b2, . . . , bm ∈ {0, 1}l has
to be enrypted. For ommon blok lenghts of 128 bits or more, this is the
ase in virtually any pratial appliation. The most straightforward proe-
dure, the Eletroni Codebook (ECB) mode, whih omputes the iphertexts
as ci := E(bi, k), implies that oiniding plaintext bloks will have oiniding
orresponding iphertext bloks and is therefore not reommended.
A more suitable mode is the Cipher Blok Chaining (CBC) mode (Ehrsam
et al., 1976), whih is dened by ECBC((b1, . . . , bm), k, IV) := (c1, . . . , cm) with
ci :=
{
E(IV ⊕ b1, k) for i = 1
E(ci−1 ⊕ bi, k) for 1 < i ≤ m
. (2.1)
and a (usually publily known) initialization vetor IV ∈ {0, 1}l.
Many more blok ipher modes of operation for dierent purposes exist, see
Menezes et al. (2001) for an introdution and overview.
2.3 Dediated Stream Ciphers
Besides blok iphers, dediated onstrutions exist for (immediately, i.e., not
waiting for the next blok to be lled) enrypting data streams. These on-
strutions are typially alled stream iphers.
In this thesis, we want to fous on onstrutions that try to approximate the
one-time pad by produing from a short, xed-length seret information a long
random-looking sequene that is XOR-ombined with the plaintext in order to
obtain the iphertext.
Consequently, the heart of most suh stream iphers is a keystream genera-
tor, whih is initialized at the beginning of the onversation with a seret key K.
Many modern onstrutions aept an additional initialization vetor IV that
an be seen as a pointer into the keystream produed for K. Cipher designs nor-
mally assume the IV to be publi, suh that it an be easily exhanged between
sender and reeiver.
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Hene, the keystream generator produes keystream bits (zt)t≥0 that are
added to the plaintext stream (pt)t≥0 on the sender's side in order to obtain
the iphertext stream (ct)t≥0 as ct := pt ⊕ zt for all t ≥ 0. The reeiver uses
the same ipher and the same initialization data K and IV as the sender in
order to ompute the keystream (zt)t≥0 himself and to reover the plaintext as
pt = ct ⊕ zt for all t ≥ 0 (see Fig. 2.2).
Keystream Generator
key
⊕
z0, z1, z2,
IV
z3, z4, . . .
(pi) p3, p4, . . .
stream cipher
p0, p1, p2,
=
c3, c4, . . .c0, c1, c2,
(ci)
Keystream Generator
key
⊕
z0, z1, z2,
IV
z3, z4, . . .
c3, c4, . . .
stream cipher
c0, c1, c2,
=
p3, p4, . . .p0, p1, p2,
(pi)
Sender Receiver
Figure 2.2: Stream ipher ommuniation senario
The keystream generator itself is often split into two omponents, a key/IV
setup proedure and a nite state mahine (FSM). The key/IV setup (or rather
initial state setup) transforms the key and the IV into the initial state of the
FSM. The FSM usually operates in a loking-based manner, outputting a piee
of keystream and updating its state in eah lok yle, hene produing the
keystream sequene (zt)t≥0 (f. Fig. 2.3).
More formally, the FSM is dened by a state update funtion δ : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n and a keystream funtion g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗. In eah lok t,
keystream bits are produed aording to g(ω(t)) from the urrent state ω(t),
and the internal state is updated to ω(t + 1) = δ(ω(t)). Hene, the output of
the generator is ompletely determined by the starting state ω(0).
key/IV setup
key
IV
initial state
FSM z0, z1, z2, . . .
Keystream Generator
Figure 2.3: Common onstrution of the keystream generator
Denition 2.2. We all an FSM-state periodi if, when running, the FSM will
return to the same state after a nite number of steps.
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We will later need the notion of equivalent FSMs, whih we dene as follows.
Denition 2.3. The FSMsM1 andM2 are alled equivalent if for eah possible
starting state of M1 there exists a orresponding starting state of M2 and vie
versa suh that, when running, M1 and M2 produe the same output.
Denition 2.4. We all a sequene u = (ui)i≥0 stritly periodi (or simply
periodi) with period T if ui+T = ui for all i ≥ 0. We all a sequene u
eventually periodi if there exists a t ≥ 0 suh that u′ = (ui)i≥t is periodi.
Denition 2.5. For a (deterministi) nite state mahine we an dene a (di-
reted) state transition graph as follows. The vertex set onsists of the set of
possible states, and there exists an edge from state u to state v if and only if v
is the image of u under the state transition funtion.
In order to approximate the one-time pad and its seurity features, the
output of the keystream generator should look random, or more formally, the
output should not be eiently distinguishable from a truely random sequene.
Therefore, the sequene should share as many properties with truely random
sequenes as possible.
The National Institute of Standards and Tehnology (NIST) maintains a
olletion of suh properties and provides infrastruture for heking pseudo-
random number generators against these properties (Rukhin et al., 2010).
We will exemplarily onsider as properties the period length of the sequene,
the number of ourrenes of a partiular blok in one period of the sequene,
and its autoorrelation.
Denition 2.6. The autoorrelation θτ (u) of a binary sequene u = (ui)i≥0
with shift τ is the orrelation of the sequenes (ui)i≥0 and (ui+τ )i≥0, i.e.,
θτ (u) :=
∑
i≥0
(−1)ui⊕ui+τ
= |{i : ui ⊕ ui+τ = 0}| − |{i : ui ⊕ ui+τ = 1}|
= |{i : ui = ui+τ}| − |{i : ui 6= ui+τ}| .
(2.2)
Observation 2.7. A truely random sequene is aperiodi, the probability of a τ-
bit blok's ourrene at position i in the sequene is 2−τ , and its autoorrelation
is zero-valued for all shifts τ .
Consequently, we require that a keystream generator's output bitstream u
satisfy the following postulates.
Pseudorandomness Postulate 1. A keystream sequene should have a large
period T (for many appliations at least T ≥ 250).
Pseudorandomness Postulate 2. A keystream seqeune should ontain a given
τ-bit blok around T · 2−τ times.
Pseudorandomness Postulate 3. For a keystream sequene u,
|θτ(u)|
T should
be small for any shift τ < T .
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2.4 Asymmetri Ciphers
It was assumed for a long time that a reasonable ipher system ould only be
symmetri, i.e., the enryption key ke and the dereption key kd had to be
equal. Only in the 1970s, the rst pratial asymmetri ipher systems based
on dierent keys for enryption and deryption were proposed, with the RSA
ryptosystem being one of the most prominent examples (see, e.g., Vaudenay
(2006) for an introdution).
In systems in whih deduing the deryption key from the enryption key is
infeasible (whih is the ase for pratial asymmetri iphers), there no need to
keep the enryption key seret any more. Therefore, the enryption key ke is
often alled the publi key and the deryption key kd is alled the private key,
and ipher systems that allow for publishing the enryption key are also alled
publi key (ipher) systems. The reeiver an publish his publi key, and any
potential sender an enrypt messages using this publi key without the need
for establishing a ommon key as in symmetri ipher systems.
However, asymmetri ipher systems usually require muh more omputa-
tional eort for enryption and deryption than symmetri ipher systems for
omparable seurity levels, whih limits their suitability for low-end devies.
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Chapter 3
Stream Cipher Building
Bloks
We now present the most important building bloks for stream iphers, with a
speial fous on omponents that are partiularly useful for hardware-oriented
iphers.
3.1 Boolean Funtions
Denition 3.1. We all a funtion
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
(x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (y1, . . . , ym)
an m-output Boolean funtion in n variables. We say that f depends on the
input xi if
f(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn) 6= f(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi ⊕ 1, xi+1, . . . , xn) .
Denition 3.2. We all a Boolean funtion f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} balaned if
|f−1(0)| = |f−1(1)|.
Observation 3.3. Eah Boolean funtion f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} an be equiva-
lently represented in algebrai normal form, i.e., as a polynomial
F (w1, . . . , wn) =
⊕
j∈M
mj with monomials mj =
∧
l∈Mj
wl and M
j(f) ⊆ {1, . . . , n} .
|M j(f)| is alled the degree of the monomial mj . The degree of the polynomial
F (abbreviated by deg(F )) is dened to be the maximum over the degrees of the
monomials ouring in F .
We all a Boolean funtion F with deg(F ) = 1 a linear funtion.
Denition 3.4. For a binary vetor x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n, we denote
by the Hamming weight of x (abbreviated by wt(x)) the number of non-zero
omponents in x, i.e.,
wt(x) := |{i ∈ {1, . . . , n}|xi 6= 0}| .
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For ease of notation, we will often impliitly identify a vetor (u0, . . . , uk−1) ∈
{0, 1}k with the integer u =
∑k−1
i=0 ui2
i
.
3.2 Feedbak Shift Registers
Feedbak shift registers have turned out to be partiularly useful devies for
produing bitstreams with good pseudorandomness properties.
Denition 3.5. A Feedbak Shift Register (FSR) in Fibonai arhiteture
onsists of an n-bit register a = (a0, . . . , an−1) and a state update funtion
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Starting from an initial onguration a0, in eah lok a0 is
produed as output and the register is updated aording to a := (a1, . . . , an−2, f(a0, . . . , an−1)).
Depending on whether f is a linear funtion, we all the register a Linear Feed-
bak Shift Register (LFSR) or a Nonlinear Feedbak Shift Register (NFSR).
The FSR-onstrution is illustrated in Fig. 3.1.
The denition implies that the output bitstream (wt)t≥0 produed from an
initial onguration a0 = (a00, . . . , a
0
n−1) an be expressed as
wt =
{
a0t for t ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}
f(wt−n, . . . , wt−1) for t ≥ n
,
while the state of the FSR after t lokings orresponds to (wt, . . . , wt+n−1).
Surprisingly, even after many deades of researh, the properties of general
FSRs and the sequenes they produe are hardly understood. We therefore fous
on two speial ases, linear feedbak shift registers and feebak shift registers
with arry, whih are muh less resistant to analysis and have found their way
into pratial appliations.
3.2.1 Linear Feedbak Shift Registers (LFSRs)
Fibonai and Galois representations of LFSRs
Denition 3.6. An n-stage Linear Feedbak Shift Register (LFSR) in Fibonai
arhiteture (see Fig. 3.2) ontains a main register with n binary ells (y0, . . . , yn−1)
and xed binary feedbak taps (d0, . . . , dn−1). From an initial state y, the LFSR
outputs in eah lok t the value y0, omputes the sum σ =
∑n−1
i=0 yidn−i−1 over
the integers and updates the register aording to y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn−1, σ mod 2).
an−1 a0· · ·
F
a1
Figure 3.1: Feedbak shift register (FSR) of length n
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σ
mod2
yn−1 yn−2 · · · y0
dn−1d0 · · ·d1
Figure 3.2: LFSR in Fibonai arhiteture
Based on an initial onguration y0, we an desribe the output bitstream
(wt)t≥0 of a Fibonai LFSR by
wt =
{
y0t for t ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}
σt mod 2 for t ≥ n
,
where σt =
∑n
i=1 wt−idi−1 for t ≥ n.
Note that for performane reasons, the feedbak bit (σ mod 2) is usually
omputed as
σ mod 2 =
n−1⊕
i=0
yidn−i−1 .
Additionally to the (most ommonly used) Fibonai arhiteture, there ex-
ists a Galois arhiteture for LFSRs.
Denition 3.7. An n-stage LFSR in Galois arhiteture (see Fig. 3.3) on-
tains n binary main register ells (x0, . . . , xn−1) with xed binary feedbak taps
(d0, . . . , dn−1), dn−1 6= 0. Starting from an initial state x, the Galois LFSR
outputs in eah lok the value x0, omputes the sums σi = xi+1 + x0di for
0 ≤ i < n (with xn = 0) and updates xi to σi mod 2 for all 0 ≤ i < n− 1.
xn−1 σ
dn−2
· · · σ
d1
x1 σ
d0
x0
dn−1
Figure 3.3: LFSR in Galois arhiteture
Again, we may equivalently ompute the update value for xi as xi+1⊕ x0di.
Algebrai model: Formal Power Series and F2n
We denote the ring of formal power series α(X) =
∑∞
i=0 uiX
i
with ui ∈ {0, 1}
(i.e., with oeients in the integers modulo 2) by F2[[X ]], and the Galois eld
with 2n elements by F2n .
Theorem 3.8 (Golomb (1981)). There is a one-to-one orrespondene be-
tween quotients of polynomials α(X) = h(X)q(X) ∈ F2[[X ]] and eventually peri-
odi binary sequenes u whih assoiates to eah suh quotient its oeient
sequene u = (u0, u1, . . .). The sequene u is stritly periodi if and only if
deg(h(X)) < deg(q(X)).
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For both the Fibonai and the Galois arhiteture, we dene the onnetion
polynomial q(X) by
q(X) := dn−1X
n + dn−2X
n−1 + . . .+ d0X − 1
and assoiate a Fibonai state (y0, . . . , yn−1) with the polynomial
h(X) =
n−1∑
k=0
k∑
i=0
di−1yk−iX
k
, where d−1 = 1 , (3.1)
and a Galois state (x0, . . . , xn−1) with the polynomial
h(X) = −
(
x0 + x1X + . . .+ xn−1X
n−1
)
. (3.2)
Theorem 3.9 (Golomb (1981)). The output sequene of an LFSR with feed-
bak tap vetor orresponding to the onnetion polynomial q(X) and an initial
state orresponding to h(X) is the oeient sequene of α(X) = h(X)q(X) .
Corollary 3.10. The LFSR's output sequene is stritly periodi for any initial
state.
Proof. Sine by the denition of h(X), deg(h(X)) ≤ n − 1 < n = deg(q(X)),
the laim follows from Theorem 3.8. 2
The Fibonai and Galois arhitetures an be related in the following way.
Suppose that deg(q) = n and q is irreduible, let α denote a root of q(X) in F2n ,
express a p ∈ F2n as linear ombination of the elements in {1, α, α2, . . . , αn−1},
and dene
T : F2n → {0, 1}
p0 + p1α+ . . .+ pn−1α
n−1 7→ p0 .
(3.3)
For periodi Galois states x, we dene a mapping E by
E : {periodi Galois states} → F2n
(x0, . . . , xn−1) 7→ x0 + x1α+ x2α2 + . . .+ xn−1αn−1 ,
(3.4)
For an element p ∈ F2n , we dene a mapping S by
S : F2n → {periodi Fibonai states}
p 7→
(
T (α1−np), T (α2−np), . . . , T (α−1p), T (p)
)
,
(3.5)
i.e., yi = T (α
−ip).
Theorem 3.11 (Goresky and Klapper (2002)). The mappings E and S are
one-to-one, i.e., there exist inverse funtions E−1 and S−1 that map elements
of F2n to the set of periodi Galois states and periodi Fibonai states to F2n ,
respetively.
We note that sine {1, α−1, . . . , α1−n} is a basis for F2n over F2, E−1 and
S−1 may be eiently omputed by solving systems of linear equations in
{x0, . . . , xn−1} and p, respetively.
We an now desribe the evolution of the LFSR states (resp. their F2n-
representations) in the following way.
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Theorem 3.12 (Golomb (1981), Goresky and Klapper (2002)). For an
initial LFSR state orresponding to p ∈ F2n , the sequene (pt)t≥0 of F2n-
representations of the register state at time t is given by pt = α−tp ∈ F2n,
and the t-th output bit of the register an be omputed as zt = T (α−tp) ∈ {0, 1}.
The period of the sequene (pt)t≥0 equals the order of α in F2n .
Corollary 3.13 (Golomb (1981), Goresky and Klapper (2002)). If q(X)
is not only an irreduible but also a primitive polynomial, α has the maximum
possible order 2n − 1 and hene the period, too, reahes its maximum 2n − 1.
Consequently, we all LFSRs with primitive onnetion polynomialsmaximum-
lengh LFSRs and the sequenes they produe m-sequenes.
Remark 3.14. There are
ϕ(2n−1)
n primitive polynomials of degree n ≥ 1 over
F2, where for m ∈ N, ϕ(m) = {i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}|gcd(i,m) = 1}.
Sequenes produed by individual Register Cells
We now want to desribe the sequenes of values taken by a partiular LFSR reg-
ister ell. In the ase of Fibonai LFSRs, the following observation is straight-
forward to make.
Theorem 3.15. For an n-stage Fibonai LFSR with onnetion polynomial
q(X) and initial state y0, the sequene of values (yti)t≥0 taken by the i-th register
ell yi is the original sequene shifted by i positions, i.e., given by the Fibonai
LFSR-sequene with onnetion polynomial q(X) produed from the initial state
S(α−iS−1(x)) with α a root of q(X).
A similar orrespondene holds for Galois LFSRs.
Theorem 3.16. For an n-stage Galois LFSR with onnetion polynomial q(X)
and initial state polynomial h(X), the sequene of values taken by the i-th regis-
ter ell xi is the sequene produed by a Galois LFSR with onnetion polynomial
q(X) and initial state polynomial
hi(X) = xi(0) · q(X) +X · (hi+1(X) + dih0(X)) with hn(X) ≡ 0.
Proof. Obviously, h0(X) = h(X). Sine deg(q) = n, we have dn−1 = 1, whih
implies xn−1(t+ 1) = x0(t). We obtain for i = n− 1
hn−1(X)
q(X)
=
∞∑
t=0
xn−1(t) ·X
t = xn−1(0) +X ·
∞∑
t=0
xn−1(t+ 1)X
t
= xn−1(0) +X ·
∞∑
t=0
x0(t) ·X
t
= xn−1(0) +X ·
h0(X)
q(X)
,
and therefore
hn−1(X) = xn−1(0) · q(X) +X · h0(X) .
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For 0 ≤ i < n− 1, we have
hi(X)
q(X)
=
∞∑
t=0
xi(t) ·X
t = xi(0) +X ·
∞∑
t=0
xi(t+ 1) ·X
t
= xi(0) +X ·
∞∑
t=0
(xi+1(t) + dix0(t)) ·X
t
= xi(0) +X ·
(
hi+1(X)
q(X)
+ di
h0(X)
q(X)
)
,
whih implies
hi(X) = xi(0) · q(X) +X · (hi+1(X) + dih0(X)) . 2
We an write the relation for hi(X) in losed form as follows.
Lemma 3.17. The reurrene relation
hi(X) = xi(0) · q(X) +X · (hi+1(X) + dih0(X)) with hn(X) ≡ 0
an be expressed as hi(X) = Fi(x) · q(X) +Mi · h0(X) with
Mi = X ·
n−1∑
j=i
djX
j−i
and Fi(x) =
n−1∑
j=i
xj(0)X
j−i .
Proof. The laimed formula is straightforwardly obtained by indution. 2
Mappings between periodi Galois and Fibonai states
Proposition 3.18. There exists a bijetive mapping between periodi initial
Galois LFSR states and periodi initial Fibonai LFSR states suh that the
registers produe the same output (see Fig. 3.4).
Proof. Aording to Theorem 3.11, the mapping
Φ : {periodi Galois states} → {periodi Fibonai states}
x 7→ S(E(x))
with E and S dened as in Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5) is one-to-one. 2
periodic
Galois
x
F2n
periodic
Fibonacci
y
∑
n−1
i=0
xiα
i
S−1
(
T (α1−np), T (α2−np), . . . , T (α−1p), T (p)
)
E−1
Figure 3.4: Mapping between periodi Galois and Fibonai LFSR states
Lemma 3.19. The value xi of the i-th ell in the main register of a Galois
LFSR an be omputed in polynomial time from the state y of the orresponding
Fibonai LFSR as the i-th omponent of the vetor E−1(S−1(x)).
Proof. The laim follows immediately from Theorem 3.11. 2
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Statistial Properties of m-Sequenes
m-sequenes are statistially very similar to truely random sequenes. Conern-
ing the three properties that we seleted in Setion 2.3, their behaviour an be
haraterized as follows.
Observation 3.20 (Golomb (1981)). Consider an m-sequene u produed by
an n-stage LFSR.
• The period of u is T = 2n − 1.
• Any τ-bit blok B ours in one period of u exatly 2n−τ times if B 6= 0
and 2n−τ − 1 times if B = 0.
• The autoorrelation θτ (u) satises
|θτ(u)|
T =
1
2n−1 .
The denition of LFSRs suggests another pseudorandomness ritereon, the
linear omplexity.
Denition 3.21. The linear omplexity of a binary sequene u = (ui)i≥0 (ab-
breviated by lc(u)) is the length of the shortest LFSR that generates the sequene.
Lemma 3.22. A sequene u = (ui)i≥0 with period T satises lc(u) ≤ T .
Proof. The T -stage Fibonai LFSR with feedbak taps (0, . . . , 0, 1) ∈ {0, 1}T
will obivously generate u from the initial state y = (u0, . . . , uT−1). 2
Remark 3.23. There exists an algorithm that omputes for a given sequene
u with l = lc(u) in time O(l3) and from the rst 2l bits of u the value l and
the feedbak tap vetor of an l-stage LFSR that generates u. This algorithm
is known as the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm for register synthesis (see, e.g.,
Menezes et al. (2001) for a desription).
We onlude that the linear omplexity of a keystream sequene should be
large enough suh that a generating LFSR annot be determined with realisti
resoures.
Pseudorandomness Postulate 4. The linear omplexity lc(u) of a keystream
sequene u should be reasonably large.
We note that although the period of an m-sequene is T = 2n− 1, its linear
omplexity is only n, i.e. logarithmi in T , and therefore muh lower than the
upper bound given by Lemma 3.22. Conversely, if an LFSR is to produe a
sequene with linear omplexity l∗, its required minimum size is exponential in
l∗, whih is impratial for most appliations. In fat, this is the main reason
why LFSRs  despite their many other desirable statistial properties  are not
suitable for diret use as keystream generators.
3.2.2 Feedbak Shift Registers With Carry (FCSRs)
Feedbak with arry shift registers (FCSRs) have been disussed sine the mid-
1990s in the ontext of eient pseudorandom number generation, partiularly
as an alternative to LFSRs (Couture and L'Euyer, 1994, Klapper and Goresky,
1997, Marsaglia and Zaman, 1992).
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Analogously to Setion 3.2.1, we desribe the struture of FCSRs and make
some observations on the properties of their output sequenes. All our results
have been experimentally onrmed with the omputer algebra systemMagma
(Bosma et al., 1997).
Fibonai and Galois representations of FCSRs
Denition 3.24. An n-stage FCSR in Fibonai arhiteture (see Fig. 3.5)
ontains a main register with n binary ells (y0, . . . , yn−1) and xed binary feed-
bak taps (d0, . . . , dn−1) as well as an additional memory b. From an initial
state (y, b), the FCSR outputs in eah lok t the value y0, omputes the sum
σ = b +
∑n−1
i=0 yidn−i−1 over the integers and updates the register and memory
aording to b = σ div 2 and y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn−1, σ mod 2).
b
σ
div 2 mod 2
yn−1 yn−2 · · · y0
dn−1d0 · · ·d1
Figure 3.5: FCSR in Fibonai arhiteture
Based on an initial onguration (y0, b0), we an desribe the output bit-
stream (wt)t≥0 of a Fibonai FCSR by
wt =
{
y0t for t ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}
σt mod 2 for t ≥ n
,
where σt = b
t−n+
∑n
i=1 wt−idi−1 and b
t−n+1 = σt div 2 for t ≥ n, whih implies
σt = (σt−1 div 2) +
n∑
i=1
wt−idi−1 with σn−1 = 2b
0 . (3.6)
We note that in general, b may be an arbitrarily large value. However, if the
register's state is periodi, b may be bounded as follows.
Proposition 3.25 (Klapper and Goresky (1997)). If the Fibonai FCSR
is in a periodi state, the value of the memory b satises 0 ≤ b < wt(d+ 1).
Corollary 3.26. A Fibonai FCSR with a periodi initial state will not require
more than ⌊log2(wt(d+ 1)− 1)⌋+ 1 bits to store the value b at any time.
Similarly to the Galois arhiteture for LFSRs, there exists a Galois arhite-
ture for FCSRs, whih was rst observed by Noras (1997) and further analyzed
by Goresky and Klapper (2002).
Denition 3.27. An n-stage FCSR in Galois arhiteture (see Fig. 3.6) on-
tains n binary main register ells (x0, . . . , xn−1) with xed binary feedbak taps
(d0, . . . , dn−1), dn−1 6= 0, and n− 1 memory ells (a0, . . . , an−2). Starting from
an initial state (x, a), the Galois FCSR outputs in eah lok the value x0, om-
putes the sums σi = xi+1+aidi+x0di for 0 ≤ i < n (with xn = 0 and an−1 = 0)
and updates xi to σi mod 2 and ai to σi div 2 for all 0 ≤ i < n− 1.
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We will assume that memory ells are only present at those positions with
feedbak taps, i.e., ai = 0 if di = 0 for all 0 ≤ i < n − 1, sine ai = 0 for all i
with di = 0 is a neessary ondition for periodi states (x, a).
xn−1 σ
dn−2
an−2
· · · σ
d1
a1
x1 σ
d0
a0
x0
dn−1
Figure 3.6: FCSR in Galois arhiteture
Implementors will often prefer the Galois arhiteture to the Fibonai ar-
hiteture sine the size of the memory is intrinsially limited and the memory
bits an be updated in parallel, with eah addition involving at most three bits.
Algebrai model: 2-adi Numbers and Z2
The algebrai struture that is assoiated with FCSRs is the ring of 2-adi
numbers. A 2-adi integer is a formal power series α =
∑∞
i=0 ui2
i
with ui ∈
{0, 1}. The olletion of all suh formal power series forms the ring of 2-adi
numbers. This ring espeially ontains rational numbers p/q, where p and q
are integers and q is odd. 2-adi numbers and eventually periodi sequenes are
linked by the following Theorem.
Theorem 3.28 (Klapper and Goresky (1997)). There is a one-to-one or-
respondene between rational numbers α = p/q (with odd q) and eventually pe-
riodi binary sequenes u whih assoiates to eah suh rational number α the
bit sequene u = (u0, u1, . . .) of its 2-adi expansion. The sequene u is stritly
periodi if and only if α ≤ 0 and |α| ≤ 1.
For both FCSR arhitetures, we dene the onnetion integer q as q =
1− 2d. We identify a Galois state (x, a) with the integer
p = x+ 2a (3.7)
and a Fibonai state (y, b) with the integer
p = b2n −
n−1∑
k=0
k∑
i=0
qiyk−i2
k . (3.8)
Theorem 3.29 (Klapper and Goresky (1997)). The output sequene of an
FCSR with feedbak tap vetor orresponding to the onnetion integer q and an
initial state orresponding to p is the 2-adi expansion of α = pq .
Corollary 3.30. The output sequene of an FCSR with feedbak tap vetor or-
responding to q will be stritly periodi if and only if the integer p that orre-
sponds to the initial state satises 0 ≤ p ≤ |q|.
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Proof. The laim is an immediate onsequene of Theorem 3.28. 2
Theorem 3.29 justies the following denition.
Denition 3.31. We all two Galois states (x, a) and (x′, a′) equivalent if
x+ 2a = x′ + 2a′ .
Similarly, we all two Fibonai states (y, b), (y′, b′) equivalent if
b2n −
n−1∑
k=0
k∑
i=0
qiyk−i2
k = b′2n −
n−1∑
k=0
k∑
i=0
qiy
′
k−i2
k .
Note that although equivalent states produe the same output, the sequene
of states ((x(t), a(t))t≥0 in the Fibonai ase and (y(t), b(t))t≥0 in the Galois
ase) obtained by running the FCSR from equivalent starting states may be
dierent.
Similarly to the LFSR-ase, we an now desribe the evolution of the FCSR
states based on their representations in the set Z/(qZ) of integers modulo q,
whih we denote for simpliity by Zq.
Theorem 3.32 (Klapper and Goresky (1997)). For an initial state or-
responding to p ∈ Z|q|, the sequene of integer representations of the states
(pt)t≥0 is given by p
t = 2−tp mod q and the t-th output bit an be omputed as
zt = pt mod 2 = (2−tp mod q) mod 2. If 0 < p < |q|, q odd, and p and q are
oprime, then the period of the sequene (pt)t≥0 equals the order of 2 modulo q .
For p = 0 and p = |q|, the FCSR produes the 2-adi expansions of 0/q = 0 and
|q|/q = −1, respetively, whih both have period one. If 0 < p < |q|, q odd, and
p and q are oprime, then the period of the sequene (pt)t≥0 equals the order of
2 modulo q.
Corollary 3.33. If q is a (negative) prime for whih 2 is a primitive root, the
period reahes its maximum |q| − 1.
Consequently, we all FCSRs with prime onnetion integers for whih w
is a primitive root maximum-length FCSRs and the sequenes they produe
l-sequenes.
In ontrast to the number of primitive polynomals in the LFSR-ase, the
number of onnetion integers q produing l-sequenes is not known with er-
tainty. However, there exists the following onjeture.
Conjeture 3.34 (Hooley (1967), Klapper (2004)). The number of primes
q of bitlength n for whih the order of 2 modulo q is q−1 is asymptotially cnlog(n) ,
where c ≈ 0.37 is a onstant.
For a maximum-length Galois FCSR with onnetion integer q, the state
transition graph (see Denition 2.5) has exatly three onneted omponents,
i.e., the two xed points (0, 0) and (2n−1, d−2n−1) (orresponding to p = 0 and
p = |q|) and a omponent ontaining all the remaining states. This omponent
onsists of a main yle of length |q| − 1 and paths of lengths at most n + 4
leading to it (Arnault et al., 2008). In other words:
Observation 3.35. An n-stage maximum-length Galois FCSR will be in a pe-
riodi state after at most n+ 4 lokings.
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Sequenes produed by individual Register Cells
As for LFSRs, the sequenes produed by individual main register ells of an
FCSR are again FCSR-sequenes.
Theorem 3.36. For a Fibonai FCSR with onnetion integer q and an initial
state orresponding to the integer p, the sequene (yti)t≥0 of values taken by the
main register ell yi is the FCSR sequene given by the 2-adi expansion of pi/q
with pi = 2
−ip.
Theorem 3.37 (Arnault and Berger (2005a), Theorem 4). For a Galois
FCSR with initial state (x, a) and p = x+2a, the sequene (xti)t≥0 of values taken
by the main register ell i is again an FCSR-sequene, more preisely the 2-adi
expansion of pi/q with pi = Fi(x, a) · q+Mi · p, Fi(x, a) =
∑n−1
j=i (xj +2aj)2
j−i
,
and with onstants Mi = 2
∑n−1
j=i dj2
j−i
.
It is interesting to note (and will prove useful in Setion 3.2.2) that if the
initial state (x, a) is periodi, this expression an be further simplied as follows.
Proposition 3.38. For a maximum-length Galois FCSR with onnetion inte-
ger q, a periodi initial state (x0, a0), and pt = xt+2at, the sequene (xti)t≥0 of
values taken by a xed main register ell i orresponds to (pt+si mod 2)t≥0 with
si = − log2(Mi) mod q and Mi = 2
∑n−1
j=i dj2
j−i
.
Proof. If (x0, a0) is periodi, the 2-adi expansions of pi/q have to be stritly
periodi for all i. Theorem 3.28 implies that 0 ≤ pi < |q|, hene pi = pi mod q =
Mi · p0 mod q. In a maximum-length Galois FCSR, eah possible value of
pi mod q is passed after si iterations, hene pi = 2
−sip0 mod q, and we have
Mi = 2
−si
mod q. 2
Proposition 3.38 implies that the sequene (xti)t≥0 orresponds to the se-
quene produed by the whole FCSR (i.e., (xt0)t≥0) shifted by si positions.
Note that the phase shifts si are independent of the initial state p and depend
on i (and q) only.
Example 3.39. Consider the toy example of Arnault and Berger (2005a) with
q = −347, hene n = 8 and d = 174. The output of the FCSR is stritly periodi
with period −q − 1 = 346. We nd M0 = 1, M1 = 174, M2 = 86, M3 = 42,
M4 = 20, M5 = 10, M6 = 4, M7 = 2. The phase shifts are s0 = 0, s1 = 1,
s2 = 23, s3 = 250, s4 = 67, s5 = 68, s6 = 344, s7 = 345.
Mappings between periodi Galois and Fibonai States
There is an onto funtion
E : {periodi Galois states}\{(1, . . . , 1; a0, . . . , an−2)} → Z|q|
(x, y) 7→ x+ 2a mod q
(3.9)
that assigns to a Galois state an element of Z|q|.
Moreover, there exists a one to one mapping S from Z|q| onto the set of
stritly periodi states of the Fibonai FCSR with onnetion integer q exept
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for the state (1, . . . , 1; wt(q + 1)− 1), namely
S : Z|q| → {periodi Fibonai states}\{(1, . . . , 1; wt(q + 1)− 1)}
p 7→ (y, b)
(3.10)
with
yi = ((2
−ip mod q) mod 2) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
and
b =
1
2n

p+ n−1∑
k=0
k∑
j=0
dj−1yk−j2
k

 .
Conversely, for a given periodi Fibonai state (y, b) the orresponding integer
p will satisfy 0 ≤ p < |q|.
Hene, for an arbitrary initial state of a Galois FCSR with onnetion integer
q, we an ompute a periodi initial state of a Fibonai FCSR with onnetion
integer q and vie versa suh that the two registers will produe the same output
(Goresky and Klapper, 2002).
Obviously, the mapping E from the Galois states to Z|q| is not one to one,
i.e., generally more than one state is mapped to the same p ∈ Z|q|. However,
the following Proposition shows how to ompute for given p ∈ Z|q| the uniquely
determined orresponding periodi state (x, a).
Proposition 3.40. For all p ∈ Z|q|, the only stritly periodi state (x, a) with
x+2a = p of a maximum-length Galois FCSR of size n with onnetion integer
q is given by xi = Mi · p mod q mod 2 and a = (p− x)/2 with Mi dened as in
Proposition 3.38.
Proof. We rst observe that x+ 2a = x+ 2 p−x2 = p, hene (x, a) orresponds
to p. If p = 0, we have (x, a) = (0, 0) at all times, so (x, a) is periodi. Similarly
for p = |q|, the only possible state (x, a) is (2n − 1, d − 2n−1), and this state
is periodi (see Setion 3.2.2). If p 6= 0, the state transition graph representing
the evolution of the states onsists of a main yle of length |q| − 1 and paths
onverging to it. Hene, for eah initial state (x′, a′) with x′ + 2a′ = p, there
exists exatly one state (x˜, a˜) with x˜ + 2a˜ = p that lies on the main yle.
For this state (x˜, a˜), the sequenes (x˜ti)t≥0 have to be stritly periodi. Due to
Proposition 3.38, the rst bit of the 2-adi expansion of pi/q and hene x˜i is
equal to pi mod 2 with pi = Mi · p mod q. Moreover, a˜ is uniquely determined
by x˜ and p, whih implies (x˜, a˜) = (x, a). 2
Proposition 3.40 provides a possible answer to the open question raised by
Goresky and Klapper (2002) how to intrinsially haraterize the periodi states
orresponding to a partiular p ∈ Z|q| and allows us to link periodi Fibonai
and periodi Galois states similarly to the LFSR-ase.
Corollary 3.41. There exists a bijetive mapping between periodi initial Ga-
lois FCSR states and periodi initial Fibonai FCSR states suh that registers
produe the same output (see Fig. 3.7).
Proof. Proposition 3.40 implies a mapping E˜ of periodi Galois states onto
Z|q|. With E and S dened by Eqs. (3.9) and (3.10), the laim follows. 2
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periodic
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(x, a)
Z|q|
periodic
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(y, b)p = x + 2a
p = b2n −
∑n−1
k=0
∑k
j=0
qjyk−j2
k
yi = ((2
−ip mod q) mod 2)
b = 1
2n
(
p +
∑n−1
k=0
∑k
j=0
qjyk−j2
k
)
E˜−1
Figure 3.7: Mapping between periodi Galois and Fibonai FCSR states
Example 3.42. Continuing Example 3.39, let q = −347. For p = 100, we
ompute xi = Mi · p mod q mod 2, whih yields x = (01010000)2 = 64 + 16 =
80, and obtain a = (p − x)/2 = 10. Hene, the stritly periodi initial state
orresponding to p = 100 is (x, a) = (80, 10). Plugging the values of p and q
into Eq. (3.10) yields the orresponding periodi Fibonai state (y, b) = (148, 2).
Finally, we may obtain the sequene produed by a Galois main register ell
from a Fibonai FCSR as follows.
Lemma 3.43. The value xi of the i-th ell in the main register of a Galois
FCSR an be omputed from the stritly periodi state (y, b) of the orresponding
Fibonai FCSR by
xi = Mi

b2n − n−1∑
k=0
k∑
j=0
dj−1yk−j2
k


mod q mod 2 .
Proof. The laimed formula is an immediate onsequene of Eq. (3.8) and Propo-
sitions 3.38 and 3.40. 2
Statistial properties of l-sequenes
The period T of an l-sequene produed by an n-stage FCSR with onnetion
integer q is |q| − 1 (Klapper and Goresky, 1997), i.e., 2n−1 − 1 < T < 2n − 1.
The linear omplexity of l-sequenes is lose to |q|−12 (Tian and Qi, 2009).
Theorem 3.44 (Blum et al. (1986), Goresky and Klapper (2006)). Let
u be an l-sequene with onnetion integer q. The number of ourrenes of any
blok e = (e0, e1, . . . , eτ−1) of size τ in u varies at most by 1 as the blok varies
over all 2τ possibilities. That is, there is an integer w′ so that every blok of
length τ ours either w′ times or w′ + 1 times in u. The number of bloks of
length τ that our w′ + 1 times is (q − 1)mod 2τ , and the number of bloks of
length τ that our w′ times is 2τ − ((q − 1)mod 2τ ).
We are espeially interested in the ourrenes of a partiular blok B =
(b0, . . . , bτ−1) in one period of a sequene u with period length m, i.e., in the
indies i, 0 ≤ i < m, suh that
ui mod m = b0, u(i+1) mod m = b1, . . . , u(i+τ−1) mod m = bτ−1 .
Theorem 3.45. Let u be an l-sequene with onnetion integer q. Then for
all 0 < τ < q, the number of ourenes of any blok B = (b0, . . . , bτ−1) in a
period of u is ⌊(q − 1− v)/2τ⌋+ 1 if v 6= 0 and ⌊(q− 1− v)/2τ⌋ if v = 0, where
v = (−q ·
∑τ−1
i=0 bi2
i)mod 2τ .
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This result was essentially observed by Klapper (2004). We provide an al-
ternative proof illustrating some methods that will be useful in the remainder
of this setion.
Proof (Theorem 3.45). Identify the blok B with the integer β :=
∑τ−1
i=0 bi2
i
,
0 ≤ β < 2τ . The number of ourrenes of B in a period of u equals the number
of shifts of u starting with B, whih in turn equals the number of integers u
with −u/q ≡ β mod 2τ and 0 < u < q. Sine q is invertible mod 2τ , we have
u ≡ −qβ mod 2τ . Set v = −qβ mod 2τ ∈ {0, . . . , 2τ − 1}. If v ≤ q − 1, the set
of integers u fullling this ondition an be written as
{v, v + 2τ , . . . , v + ⌊ q−1−v2τ ⌋ · 2
τ} for v 6= 0
{v + 2τ , . . . , v + ⌊ q−1−v2τ ⌋ · 2
τ} for v = 0
.
The size of this set is ⌊(q− 1− v)/2τ⌋+1 if v 6= 0 and ⌊(q− 1− v)/2τ⌋ if v = 0.
If v > q − 1, the blok B will not appear in u. In this ase, we have
−2τ ≤ q − 1 − v < 0, whih means ⌊(q − 1 − v)/2τ⌋ = −1 and therefore
⌊(q − 1− v)/2τ⌋+ 1 = 0. 2
The expeted autoorrelation of l-sequenes an be shown to be zero (Xu
and Qi, 2006). For any given shift τ , the autoorrelation is in O(ln2 q) (Xu et al.,
2009), but how to ompute its exat value is believed to be diult (Goresky
and Klapper, 1997) and is only known for q = pe, where p is prime and e ≥ 2,
and τ of a speial form (Xu and Qi, 2006).
We now desribe a method for omputing the exat value of the autoor-
relation whih is based on ounting the number of ourrenes of partiular
(τ + 1)-bit bloks B = (bτ , bτ−1, . . . , b0) in the sequene. The main idea is to
x the rst and the last bit in B and to ompute the orrelation based on how
often these restrited bloks our in the sequene. Hene, we dene
Bγij := number of bloks B = (i, bτ−1, bτ−2, . . . , b1, j) that our γ times
for (i, j) ∈ {0, 1}2 and ompute the orrelation as
θτ =
(∑
γ
γ ·Bγ00 +
∑
γ
γ · Bγ11
)
−
(∑
γ
γ ·Bγ10 +
∑
γ
γ ·Bγ01
)
. (3.11)
Theorem 3.45 implies that a given (τ+1)-bit blok Bγij ours either w times
or w+ 1 times in a period of u, whih means that γ ∈ {w,w+ 1} in Eq. (3.11).
We now want to haraterize more preisely the sets of τ -bit bloks that
our equally often.
Lemma 3.46. The blok B = (b0, b1, . . . , bτ−1) ours w + 1 times in a period
of u if β =
∑τ−1
i=0 bi2
i
fullls 0 < −qβ mod 2τ ≤ q − 1 mod 2τ , and w times
otherwise, where w = ⌊2k−τ ⌋+ ((q mod 2k) div 2τ ) and k = ⌊log2(q)⌋
Proof. Let v = −qβ mod 2τ , hene 0 ≤ v < 2τ . We rst onsider the ase
τ ≤ k and dene e = q mod 2k, x = e div 2τ and y = e mod 2τ . Sine q is odd,
we have y > 0 and (y − 1) mod 2τ = (y mod 2τ )− 1 and therefore
q − 1− v = 2k + x · 2τ + y − 1− v︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
.
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Sine 0 ≤ y − 1 < 2τ , we have −2τ < S < 2τ , and S ≥ 0 if and only if
y − 1 ≥ v. Hene,⌊
q − 1− v
2τ
⌋
=
{
2k−τ + x for S ≥ 0
2k−τ + x− 1 for S < 0
.
We have v = 0 if and only if β = 0, and v = 0 implies S ≥ 0. We obtain the
result by applying Theorem 3.45.
In ase τ > k, we have 0 ≤ q−1 < 2k+1 ≤ 2τ and therefore −2τ < q−v−1 <
2τ , whih implies ⌊(q − 1− v)/2τ⌋ ∈ {−1, 0}, i.e., the blok orresponding to v
ours either 0 = w or 1 = w + 1 times in u. It is q − 1 = q − 1 mod 2τ sine
τ > k, and we have ⌊(q − 1 − v)/2τ⌋ = 0 if and only if v ≤ q − 1. Hene, by
Theorem 3.45, the blok orresponding to v ours w + 1 = 1 times in u if and
only if 0 < v ≤ q − 1 mod 2τ . 2
Note that sine there are q−1 mod 2τ elements β ∈ Z2τ fullling 0 < −qβ ≤
q − 1 mod 2τ , Lemma 3.46 implies similarly to Theorem 3.44 that the number
of τ -bit bloks ouring w + 1 times in a period of u is q − 1 mod 2τ and the
number of bloks ouring w times is 2τ − ((q − 1) mod 2τ ).
Based on our observations, we an reformulate Eq. (3.11) as
θτ = (B00 +B11)− (B01 +B10) with Bij = w ·B
w
ij + (w + 1) ·B
w+1
ij .
Before we derive an expliit formula for θτ , we state a preliminary Lemma
that is useful for speeding up the omputation.
Lemma 3.47. For a blok B of length τ orresponding to β =
∑τ−1
i=0 bi2
i ∈ Z2τ
and v = −qβ mod 2τ , we have β ≡ v mod 2.
Proof. We have
β mod 2 =
(
v · (−q)−1 mod 2τ
)
mod 2 = v · (−q)−1 mod 2
=
{
0 v ≡ 0 mod 2
1 v ≡ 1 mod 2
,
sine q−1 mod 2τ is odd if and only if q is odd. 2
Hene, in order to ompute Bw+100 , it sues to ompute the number of bloks
orresponding to even β ∈ Z2τ that our w + 1 times, whih, by Lemmas 3.46
and 3.47, is equal to the number of β ∈ Z2τ−1 suh that 0 < 2β(−q) mod 2
τ+1 ≤
q − 1 mod 2τ+1, whih is equivalent to
2βq mod 2τ+1 ≥ −q mod 2τ+1 .
The bloks orresponding to the remaining β will our w times. By similar
arguments, we obtain Bwij +B
w+1
ij = 2
τ−1
for all pairs (i, j) ∈ {0, 1}2.
From the omplement property of l-sequenes we know that Bw+100 = B
w+1
11
and Bw+101 = B
w+1
10 . Moreover, we have B
w+1
00 + B
w+1
01 + B
w+1
10 + B
w+1
11 =
q − 1 mod 2τ+1 due to Theorem 3.44. Hene,
B01 = w(2
τ−1 −Bw+101 ) + (w + 1)B
w+1
01
= w2τ−1 +Bw+101
= w2τ−1 +
q − 1 mod 2τ+1
2
−Bw+100 ,
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and therefore
θτ = (B00 +B11)− (B01 +B10)
= 2(B00 −B01)
= 2
(
wBw00 + wB
w+1
00 − w2
τ−1 −
q − 1 mod 2τ+1
2
+ 2Bw+100
)
= 2w(Bw00 +B
w+1
00 − 2
τ−1)− (q − 1 mod 2τ ) + 4Bw+100
= 4Bw+100 − (q − 1 mod 2
τ+1) .
Altogether, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.48. Let u denote an l-sequene with onnetion integer q. Then
for a given shift τ > 0 the autoorrelation θτ (u) is equal to 4B(τ, q) − (q −
1 mod 2τ+1), where B(τ, q) denotes the number of β ∈ Z2τ−1 suh that
2βq mod 2τ+1 > −q mod 2τ+1 .
The eort required for omputing θτ (u) is dominated by the omputation of
B(τ, q). The straightforward approah to test all β ∈ {0, . . . , 2r−1 − 1} an be
performed by evaluating the funtion
f(β) = 2qβ mod 2τ+1 =
{
f(β − 1) + 2q mod 2τ+1 for β > 0
0 for β = 0
for β ∈ {0, . . . , 2r−1−1}, whih needs little memory, butO
((
2τ−1 − 1
)
log2 2
τ
)
=
O (τ · 2τ ) operations. Hene, our method is only pratial for small shifts τ .
Example 3.49. For q = −347 and the orresponding l-sequene u, we ompute
for the shift τ = 6 the values B(τ, q) = 8 and q − 1 mod 2τ+1 = 26, whih
implies θτ (u) = 4 · 8− 26 = 6. Similarly for τ = 8, we obtain B(τ, q) = 24 and
q − 1 mod 2τ+1 = 90, hene θτ (u) = 6.
Analogously to the denition of linear omplexity (Denition 3.21), Klapper
and Goresky (1997) have established the notion of 2-adi span.
Denition 3.50. The 2-adi span λ2(u) of a binary sequene u is the size (in
terms of number of ells) of the smallest FCSR that generates u.
Lemma 3.51 (Klapper and Goresky (1997)). For a sequene u let α =∑∞
i=0 ai2
i = pq be the fration in lowest terms whose 2-adi expansion agrees
with u. Then
|(λ2(u)− 2)− ϕ2(u)| ≤ log2(ϕ2(u)) ,
where ϕ2(u) = log2(max(|p|, |q|)).
Remark 3.52. Let u be an eventually periodi sequene with 2-adi span λ2.
Then it is possible to ompute integers p, q suh that the 2-adi expansion of p/q
is u in time O((λ2)2) while using only the rst 2λ2 +1 bits of u. This algorihm
resembles the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm for LFSR synthesis and is desribed
by Arnault et al. (2004), Klapper and Xu (2004).
This suggests to add the 2-adi span to our list of pseudorandomness postu-
lates.
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Pseudorandomness Postulate 5. The 2-adi span λ2(u) of a keystream se-
quene u should be reasonably large.
We onlude that similarly to the LFSR-ase, the output of maximum-length
FCSRs is not diretly suitable as keystream due to its low 2-adi span. How-
ever, their otherwise desirable statistial properties reommend both LFSRs
and FCSRs, when ombined with other devies, as building bloks for stream
iphers.
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Chapter 4
Stream Ciphers based on
Feedbak Shift Registers
4.1 Generi Construtions
We have seen in the previous hapter that both LFSRs and FCSRs may provide
sequenes with good pseudorandomness properties, but the LFSRs' low linear
omplexity and the FCSRs' small 2-adi span prevent both devies from being
diretly used as keystream generators. Nevertheless, many stream iphers try
to benet from the desirable properties of FSR-sequenes and ombine one or
more FSRs with other omponents in order to ompensate their weaknesses.
We onsider in this hapter several generi strategies, namely running FSR
sequenes through additional Boolean funtions before outputting keystream
(ombination generators and lter generators), adding a small number of mem-
ory bits that are updated in a nonlinear way, and state-dependent loking of
the FSRs.
4.1.1 Combination Generators and Filter Generators
A ombination generator (more preisely, the FSM of a ombination genera-
tor) onsists of a small number of feedbak shift registers R0, . . . , Rk−1 and a
Boolean funtion C : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} that ombines the output sequenes of the
internal registers in order to produe the output keystream (Rueppel (1992), see
Fig. 4.1). More preisely, in eah lok yle t, eah FSR Rj provides a bit xjt and
the generator produes a keystream bit zt = C(xt), where xt = (x
0
t , . . . , x
k−1
t ).
A lter generator (again, the FSM of a lter generator to be preise) ontains
only one feedbak shift register R of length n and a Boolean lter funtion
C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} that produes the output keystream from the urrent
ontents of ertain register ells (Rueppel (1992), see Fig. 4.2).
Some ombination or lter generators (e.g., the F-FCSR stream ipher family
to be disussed in Setion 4.2.6) produe more than one output bit per lok
yle, i.e., the keystream funtion C maps into {0, 1}∗ instead of {0, 1}.
Theorem 3.11 and Corollary 3.41 have shown that for both LFSRs and FC-
SRs, there exist one-to-one mappings between periodi Fibonai states and pe-
riodi Galois states suh that the output sequenes produed from these states
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Figure 4.1: FSR-based ombination generator
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FSR R
z0, z1, . . .
FSM
Figure 4.2: FSR-based lter generator
oinide. Moreover, the sequenes produed by individual main register ells
are again LFSR/FCSR-sequenes (Theorem 3.16 and Proposition 3.38).
These observations imply that we an transform a Galois LFSR/FCSR-based
lter generator into a Galois LFSR/FCSR-based ombination generator that
ontains as many registers (with appropriate starting states) as the lter fun-
tion has inputs. Furthermore, Galois registers in the ombination generator may
be arbitrarily replaed by Fibonai registers with equivalent starting states.
Finally, we may even build an equivalent lter generator based on a Fibonai
LFSR/FCSR (with modied lter) based on Lemmas 3.19 and 3.43. Figure 4.3
summarizes these equivalenes.
Note that if all operations of the generator's FSM are linear, its initial state
an be eiently determined from a number of keystream bits by solving a
system of linear equations. Therefore, espeially in the ase that all FSRs are
LFSRs, a non-linear funtion should be hosen as keystream funtion C.
4.1.2 Additional Memory
In order to improve resistane against orrelation attaks and algebrai attaks
(to be disussed in Setions 6.1 and 6.2), the keystream generation omponent
of a ombination generator is sometimes equipped with a few bits of additional
memory, thereby beoming a keystream-FSM. The keystream-FSM takes k bits
as input from the FSRs and onsists of l memory bits, a keystream funtion
C : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}∗ ,
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Fibonacci LFSR/FCSR
Figure 4.3: Equivalent representations of ombination and lter generators
and a memory update funtion
δ : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l .
In eah lok t, it produes from the urrent input xt = (x
0
t , . . . , x
k−1
t ) and
the urrent memory state qt = (q
0
t , . . . , q
l−1
t ) the keystream output C(xt, qt) and
updates the memory to qt+1 := δ(xt, qt).
A regularly loked keystream generator with a keystream-FSM of the de-
sribed form is ommonly alled regularly loked (k, l)-ombiner (with memory).
Observe that in this notation, the memoryless ombination generator desribed
in Setion 4.1.1 orresponds to a (k, 0)-ombiner.
LFSR-based ombiners with memory were originally introdued by Rueppel
(1986). Sine then, they have been widely examined in ryptography and have
found their way into pratial appliations. The perhaps best known example
used in pratie is the E0 keystream generator, whih is in the set of example
iphers that we are going to examine more losely in the remainder of this thesis.
4.1.3 Irregular Cloking
Another way to introdue nonlinearity into a keystream generator is to lok
the FSRs in an irregular manner. This is often aomplished by a lok ontrol
mehanism whih determines based on the urrent FSM state how often eah
register's update funtion is applied before the next keystream bits are produed.
Examples for this desgin inlude the A5/1 generator (to be desribed in
Setion 4.2.3) and the shrinking generator (Coppersmith et al., 1994).
4.2 Example Ciphers
In the ECRYPT stream ipher projet eStream (eStream), a number of new
iphers have been proposed and analyzed in the past few years. Many of these
reent designs partly replae LFSRs by other feedbak shift registers suh as
nonlinear feedbak shift registers (NFSRs) and feedbak shift registers with
arry (FCSRs) in order to prevent standard ryptanalysis tehniques like alge-
brai attaks and orrelation attaks. Moreover, ombinations of dierent types
of feedbak shift registers permit alternative ompression funtions.
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As examples for these reent proposals, we onsider the iphers Trivium,
Grain and the F-FCSR family along with the more aged self-shrinking generator,
the E0 generator, and the A5/1 generator.
4.2.1 Self-Shrinking Generator
The self-shrinking generator was proposed by Meier and Staelbah (1994) and
onsists of only one LFSR and no memory. Every two lok yles of the LFSR,
the generator produes a keystream bit aording to the funtion
shrink : {0, 1}2 → {0, 1, ǫ}
(a, b) 7→
{
b if a = 1
ǫ otherwise
,
where ǫ denotes the empty word. For an internal bitstream w = (w0, . . . , w2m−1),
the self-shrinking generator produes the keystream z = (z0, . . . , zm−1) aord-
ing to
shrinkstream : {0, 1}2m → {0, 1, ǫ}m
(w0, . . . , w2m−1) 7→ (shrink(w0, w1), . . . , shrink(w2m−2, w2m−1)),
i.e., zt = shrink(w2t, w2t+1) for t ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}.
The designers proposed a short-keystream attak requiring about 20.75n op-
erations, whih was improved to 20.694n by Zenner et al. (2001). The urrently
best short-keystream attak is a guess-and-determine attak due to Hell and
Johansson (2006) requiring around 20.65n operations and an amount of mem-
ory that is polynomial in n. The BDD-Attak on the self-shrinking generator,
whih we will desribe in Setion 5.5.1, needs roughly as many operations, but
exponentially more memory.
The long-keystream attak by Mihaljevi¢ (1996) needs at least 20.3n keystream
bits in order to ompute the initial state in less than 20.6563n polynomial-time
operations. Its asymptoti runtime was improved by Hell and Johansson (2006),
Zhang and Feng (2006) for the ase that up to 20.5n keystream bits are available,
while even an improved tradeo is possible if the weight of the LFSR feedbak
polynomial is at most 5 (Debraize and Goubin, 2008).
4.2.2 E0 Generator
The Bluetooth stream ipher has key length 128 bits and IV-length 128 bits.
It onsists of a key/IV setup proedure and the keystream generator E0 (The
Bluetooth SIG, 2001).
E0 is a regularly loked (k, l) = (4, 4) ombiner. It onsists of four LFSRs
R0, . . . , R3 of lenghts (n0, . . . , n3) = (25, 31, 33, 39) and a four-bit memory unit.
We denote by xt = (x
0
t , . . . , x
3
t ) ∈ {0, 1}
4
the bits read from the LFSRs and by
qt = (q
0
t , . . . , q
3
t ) ∈ {0, 1}
4
the memory state at time t.
The keystream funtion g : {0, 1}4 × {0, 1}4 → {0, 1} is dened as
g(xt, qt) :=
3⊕
i=0
xit
3⊕
i=0
ciqit ,
where (c3, . . . , c0) = (0, 1, 0, 0).
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The memory update funtion δ : {0, 1}4 × {0, 1}4 → {0, 1}4 is given by
δ(xt, qt) := (q
3
t+1, q
2
t+1, q
1
t+1, q
0
t+1)
where
(q1t+1, q
0
t+1) := (q
3
t , q
2
t )
(q3t+1, q
2
t+1) := st ⊕ T1(q
3
t , q
2
t )⊕ T2(q
1
t , q
0
t )
st :=
⌊x3t + x2t + x1t + x0t + 2 · q3t + q2t
2
⌋
∈ {0, 1}2
T1(q
3
t , q
2
t ) := (q
3
t , q
2
t )
T2(q
3
t , q
2
t ) := (q
2
t , q
3
t ⊕ q
2
t ) .
Figure 4.4 illustrates the design of E0.
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Figure 4.4: The E0 keystream generator
Note that we may write st as
st = ⌊
s′t + 2 · q
3
t + q
2
t
2
⌋ with s′t :=
3∑
i=0
xit . (4.1)
Hene, the memory update funtion depends only on the sum s′t. Similarly, the
keystream funtion g depends only on the value
⊕3
i=0 x
i
t = s
′
t mod 2, whih
implies
g(xt, qt) = (s
′
t mod 2)⊕
3⊕
i=0
ciqit . (4.2)
Sine the Bluetooth tehnology so far is most often applied in wireless voie
transmission and data exhange between personal information managers and
other mobile devies, ondentiality of the ommuniation is one of the most
important seurity requirements.
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Consequently, the seurity of the Bluetooth enryption has been analyzed
in several papers (Armkneht and Krause, 2003, Courtois, 2003, Ekdahl, 2003,
Fluhrer and Luks, 2001, Goli¢ et al., 2002, Hermelin and Nyberg, 1999, Jakob-
sson and Wetzel, 2001, Krause, 2002, Lu and Vaudenay, 2005, 2004, Saarinen,
2000). Armkneht et al. (2004) showed that an eient attak on E0 implies
an eient attak on the whole ipher. Therefore, improving the seurity of E0
is a natural demand.
The best urrently known long-keystream attaks against E0 are algebrai
attaks (Armkneht and Krause, 2003) and orrelation attaks (Lu and Vau-
denay, 2004, Lu et al., 2005). However, all these attaks need a large amount
of keystream (228 to 239 in the ase of orrelation attaks), and even in terms
of time and memory requirements, the attak by Lu et al. (2005) is the only
feasible one among them.
We note that, when applied to the Bluetooth setting, the orrelation attaks
by Lu and Vaudenay (2004), Lu et al. (2005) depend on the linearity of the
key-shedule and other spei properties of the Bluetooth enryption system.
4.2.3 A5/1 Generator
The A5/1 keystream generator is used in the GSM standard for mobile tele-
phones. The initialization proedure transforms a 64-bit seret key and a 22-bit
publi frame number into the 64-bit initial state of the generator. Aord-
ing to Brieno et al. (1999), who obtained the A5/1 design by reverse en-
gineering, the generator onsists of 3 LFSRs R0, R1, R2 of lengths n0, n1,
n2, respetively, and a lok ontrol ensuring that the keybits do not lin-
early depend on the initial states of the LFSRs. For eah r ∈ {0, 1, 2}, a
register ell qNr , N
r ∈ {⌈nr2 ⌉ − 1, ⌈
nr
2 ⌉}, is seleted in LFSR R
r
as input
for the lok ontrol. The GSM standard uses the parameters (n0, n1, n2) =
(19, 22, 23) and (N0, N1, N2) = (11, 12, 13).
Let vi and v
′
i denote the bits at the ontrol and at the output positions in
register Ri for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. In eah master lok of the generator, the keystream
bit zi = f(v
′
0, v
′
1, v
′
2) := v
′
0 ⊕ v
′
1 ⊕ v
′
2 is produed, and register R
i
is loked if
and only if vi = maj3(v0, v1, v2), where
maj3 : {0, 1}
3 → {0, 1}
(a, b, c) 7→
{
1 if a+ b+ c ≥ 2
0 otherwise
The A5/1 onstrution is illustrated in Fig. 4.5.
The rst short-keystream attak on A5/1 was given by Goli¢ (1997) and
needs 242 polynomial time operations. Afterwards, several long-keystream at-
taks on A5/1 were proposed. Biryukov et al. (2000) present an attak that
breaks A5/1 from 215 known keystream bits within minutes after a preproess-
ing step of 248 operations. Ekdahl and Johansson (2001), Maximov et al. (2005)
exploit the linearity of the initialization proedure and manage to break the i-
pher within minutes, requiring only a few seonds of onversation and little
omputational resoures. A reent eort by a researh group around Nohl and
Kriÿler (2010) has reeived muh attention for implementing a distributed, time-
memory tradeo-based brute-fore attak that produed a 2-terabyte rainbow
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Figure 4.5: The A5/1 keystream generator
table for A5/1, suh that the session key of any onversation an be easily de-
rived. A5/1 is supposed to be replaed by A5/3, but only reently, Dunkelman
et al. (2010) have published a pratial attak on its underlying blok ipher.
4.2.4 Trivium
Trivium (de Cannière and Preneel, 2005) is a regularly loked ombination
generator that onsists of three interonneted NFSRs R0, R1, R2 of lenghts
93,84,111, respetively. The 288-bit initial state of the generator is derived from
an 80-bit key and an 80-bit IV by 1152 initialization rounds. The keystream
funtion omputes a keystream bit zt by linearly ombining six bits taken from
the registers, with eah NFSR ontributing two bits.
More preisely, from an initial state (s1, . . . , s288) the algorithm produes
keystream bits zt as follows.
for t = 0 to N − 1 do
t1 ← s1 ⊕ s28
t2 ← s94 ⊕ s109
t3 ← s178 ⊕ s223
zt ← t1 ⊕ t2 ⊕ t3
u1 ← t1 ⊕ s2s3 ⊕ s100
u2 ← t2 ⊕ s95s96 ⊕ s202
u3 ← t3 ⊕ s179s180 ⊕ s25
(s1, . . . , s93)← (s2, . . . , s93, u3)
(s94, . . . , s177)← (s95, . . . , s177, u1)
(s178, . . . , s288)← (s179, . . . , s288, u2)
end for
Due to its simpliity, espeially its low non-linearity, Trivium has reeived
muh ryptanalyti attention (see, e.g., Aumasson et al. (2009), Eibah (2008),
eSTREAM Disussion Forum (2005), Maximov and Biryukov (2007)). While
the best key reovery attak, whih is due to Dinur and Shamir (2009), is able
to takle 767 out of 1152 initialization rounds with 245 to 236 operations, the
full ipher still remains unbroken.
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4.2.5 Grain-128
The regularly loked ombination generator Grain-128 (Hell et al., 2005) sup-
ports keys of size 128 bits and IVs of size 96 bits. The design is based on two
interonneted FSRs, an LFSR R0 and an NFSR R1, both of lenghts 128 bits,
and a non-linear keystream funtion. We denote the ontent of the LFSR by
(st, st+1, . . . , st+127) and the ontent of the NFSR by (bt, bt+1, . . . , bt+127).
In eah lok yle, the registers are updated aording to
st+128 = st ⊕ st+7 ⊕ st+38 ⊕ st+70 ⊕ st+81 ⊕ st+96
bt+128 = st ⊕ bt ⊕ bt+26 ⊕ bt+56 ⊕ bt+91 ⊕ bt+96 ⊕ bt+3bt+67 ⊕ bt+11bt+13
⊕ bt+17bt+18 ⊕ bt+27bt+59 ⊕ bt+40bt+48 ⊕ bt+61bt+65 ⊕ bt+68bt+84 ,
and a keystream bit zt is derived as
zt =

⊕
j∈A
bt+j

⊕ bt+12st+8 ⊕ st+13st+20 ⊕ bt+95st+42
⊕ st+60st+79 ⊕ bt+12bt+95st+95
with A = {2, 15, 36, 45, 64, 73, 89}.
Besides a generi time-memory-data-tradeo attak (Biryukov and Shamir,
2000) that reovers the key with time and keystream around 2128, the related-
key hosen-IV attak due to Lee et al. (2008) is able to reover the key with
226.59 hosen IVs, 231.39 keystream bits and 227 operations.
4.2.6 Filtered FCSRs
In order for the initial state not to be reoverable from a number of observed
keystream bits by solving a system of linear equations, we have to demand that
keystream generators ontain nonlinear operations to a ertain extent. Sine all
LFSR-operations are linear by denition, nonlinearity must be introdued into
an LFSR-based ombination or lter generator by a arefully hosen keystream
funtion C.
FCSRs, on the other hand, have a nonlinear update funtion, whih suggests
hoosing a simple XOR operation (whih is F2-linear) as keystream funtion.
This has been done in the ase of the F-FCSR stream ipher family.
The F-FCSR Stream Cipher Family
F-FCSR-H is an FCSR-based lter generator that onsists of a single Galois
FCSR of length n = 160 with arry ells present at l = 82 positions. The
onnetion integer is hosen as
q = −1993524591318275015328041611344215036460140087963 ,
whih implies
d =
(
1− q
2
)
= (ae985dff 26619fc5 8623dc8a af46d590 3dd4254e)16 .
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At eah lok, the generator uses the stati lter d = F to extrat a pseu-
dorandom byte. The lter splits into 8 sublters (sublter j is obtained by
seleting the bit j in eah byte of F )
F0 = (0011 0111 0100 1010 1010)2, F4 = (0111 0010 0010 0011 1100)2
F1 = (1001 1010 1101 1100 0001)2, F5 = (1001 1100 0100 1000 1010)2
F2 = (1011 1011 1010 1110 1111)2, F6 = (0011 0101 0010 0110 0101)2
F3 = (1111 0010 0011 1000 1001)2, F7 = (1101 0011 1011 1011 0100)2 .
The bit bi (with 0 ≤ i ≤ 7) of eah extrated byte is expressed by
bi =
19⊕
j=0
f
(j)
i x8j+i where Fi =
19∑
j=0
f
(j)
i 2
j ,
and where the xk are the bits ontained in the main register.
The ipher is initialized with an 80-bit keyK and an IV of length 0 ≤ v ≤ 80
aording to Algorithm 1. After the setup phase, the output stream is produed
by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 F-FCSR-H-KeyIVSetup(K, IV)
x := K + 280 · IV = (080−v||IV||K)
a := 0 = (082)
for i = 0 to 19 do
Clok the FCSR automaton
Extrat a pseudorandom byte Si using the lter F
end for
x :=
∑19
i=0 Si · 8
i = (S15|| . . . ||S0)
Clok the FCSR automaton 162 times (disard output in this step)
Algorithm 2 F-FCSR-H-KeystreamGeneration
while true do
Clok the FCSR
Extrat a pseudorandom byte S using the lter F
Output the value S as keystream byte
end while
F-FCSR-16 works analogously to F-FCSR-H, only with larger parameters.
It onsists of a Galois FCSR of length n = 256 with arry ells present at l = 130
positions. The onnetion integer is hosen as
q = (1839714408456194711298691618093441316582
98317655923135753017128462155618715019)10 ,
whih implies
d =
(
1−q
2
)
= (cb5e129f ad4f7e66 780caa2e c8c9cedb
2102f996 baf08f39 efb55a6e 390002c6)16 .
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To extrat two pseudorandom bytes, the stati lter F = d is used. The
lter F is split into 16 sublters (sublter j is obtained by seleting the bit j in
eah 16-bit word of F )
F0 = (0110 0011 0001 1000)2, F8 = (1010 0000 1101 1010)2
F1 = (1111 0101 1100 0101)2, F9 = (1101 0101 0011 1101)2
F2 = (1111 1100 0100 1101)2, F10 = (0011 0001 0001 1000)2
F3 = (1110 1111 0001 0100)2, F11 = (1011 1111 0111 1110)2
F4 = (1100 0001 0111 1000)2, F12 = (0101 1000 0110 0110)2
F5 = (0001 0100 0011 1100)2, F13 = (0011 1100 1110 1010)2
F6 = (1011 0011 0010 0101)2, F14 = (1001 1011 0100 1100)2
F7 = (0100 0011 0110 1001)2, F15 = (1010 0111 0111 1000)2
The bit bi (with 0 ≤ i ≤ 15) of eah extrated word is expressed by
bi =
15⊕
j=0
f
(j)
i x16j+i where Fi =
15∑
j=0
f
(j)
i 2
j ,
and where the xk are the bits ontained in the main register.
The ipher is initialized with a 128-bit keyK and an IV of length 0 ≤ v ≤ 128
aording to Algorithm 3. After the setup phase, the output stream is produed
by Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 3 F-FCSR-16-KeyIVSetup(K, IV)
x := K + 2128 · IV = (0128−v||IV||K)
a := 0 = (0130)
for i = 0 to 15 do
Clok the FCSR automaton
Extrat a pseudorandom word Si using the lter F .
end for
x :=
∑15
i=0 Si · 2
16i = (S15|| . . . ||S0)
a := 0 = (0130)
Clok the FCSR automaton 258 times (disard output in this step)
Algorithm 4 F-FCSR-16-KeystreamGeneration
while true do
Clok the FCSR
S = x ∧ F
Split S into 16 words of length 16 bits eah, suh that S =
∑15
i=0 Si2
16i
Output the value
⊕15
i=0 Si as keystream word
end while
Seurity Considerations
Using FCSRs as building bloks for stream iphers had initially been suggested
by Klapper and Goresky (1997, 1994). A few years later Arnault and Berger
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(2005a) revisited the idea by proposing and analyzing a generi lter genera-
tor based on a Galois FCSR and the XOR operation as keystream funtion.
Several onrete instantiations of this idea were proposed (Arnault and Berger,
2005b) and improved in the light of ryptanalysis results (Jaulmes and Muller,
2006, 2005), before the the two iphers F-FCSR-H and F-FCSR-16 in the form
desribed above were speied by Arnault et al. (2006).
In the absene of any apparent weaknesses in these versions, the ECRYPT
stream ipher projet eStream suggested F-FCSR-H and F-FCSR-16 for pra-
tial appliations (Babbage et al., 2008).
Various analyses suggest that the produed keystream has good pseudoran-
domness properties (Arnault and Berger, 2005a, Arnault et al., 2008). The lter
funtion omputes the binary XOR of its inputs, and its initialization proedure
ensures that the initial state of the generator is periodi. Hene, by Proposi-
tion 3.38, the keystream generation proedure is equivalent to taking the bitwise
XOR-sum of dierent parts of the same l-sequene, while the starting position
is given by the initial state and the distanes between the parts are onstant.
This design was motivated by the onjeture that linear and 2-adi operations
are unrelated and that the orrelation between two distant parts of the same
l-sequene is low (Arnault and Berger, 2005a). Our expliit omputation of the
distanes for F-FCSR-H based on Proposition 3.38 shows that the parts of the
sequene are indeed almost evenly distributed over the period (see Fisher et al.
(2008), Appendix A).
However, while Arnault et al. (2008) had shown that the ells of the arry
and the main register will not be zero for several onseutive lok yles, Hell
and Johansson (2008, 2009) observed that the sequene of main register states
(xt)t≥0 that are passed during the operation of the ipher are likely to ontain
suiently long runs of the form (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0), whih turns the state update
funtion into a linear funtion and allows for setting up a system of linear
equations in order to reover the register state. With a few optimizations, Hell
and Johansson show how to reover the state of the register in F-FCSR-H from
around 223.7 bytes of keystream in 10 seonds on average with standard PC
hardware. The same idea yields eient attaks on F-FCSR-16 and X-FCSR
(Stankovski et al., 2009), a software-oriented stream ipher based on FCSRs
(Arnault et al., 2007). Hene, it turns out that the update funtion of FCSRs
does not introdue as muh nonlinearity as originally expeted. In the light of
these attaks, F-FCSR-H and F-FCSR-16 were removed from the eStream list
of reommended iphers.
Finally, we want to note that replaing the Galois FCSR in an F-FCSR-H-
like onstrution by a Fibonai FCSR while keeping the XOR lter funtion
yields an inseure keystream generator. This an be seen as follows.
Consider the F-FCSR-H parameters, i.e., n = 160, l = 82 and with k = 8
linear lters, but applied to a Fibonai FCSR. Initially, there are 160 binary
variables (ignoring the memory), and eah updated bit is represented by a new
variable (ignoring the details of the onstrution and assuming independene).
Eah iteration gives another 8 linear equations in these (initial and newly intro-
dued) state variables. The main register an be reovered by solving the system
of linear equations if the number of equations is at least as large as the number
of variables. This requires r iterations, where 8r ≥ 160 + r. Consequently,
r = 23 iterations are suient, or 184 bits of keystream. Gaussian elimination
of this system requires a omputational eort of about 1843, whih is about 223.
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After reovering the main register, one an reover the ontents of the memory
ells. If the FCSR is in a periodi state (whih an be expeted already after
the initialization phase), then the eetive size of the memory redues to 7 bits.
Consequently, the memory an be guessed or reovered by FCSR-synthesis, and
the whole state an be reovered in about 230 steps and with less than 200 bits
of keystream. A similar attak is possible for any other onstrution of this type
with k > 1.
4.3 Abstration: Internal Bitstream Generators
The keystream generators that we analyze in this thesis are FSR-based in the
sense that their internal state is distributed over a small number of feedbak
shift registers R0, . . . , Rk−1 that provide input for the keystream funtion C.
For our subsequent analysis, it is onvenient to think of these FSRs as a single
entity, the internal bitstream generator, that produes an internal bitstream
(wt)t≥0 dened by
wt := w
r(t)
s(t) with r(t) = t mod k and s(t) = s div k ,
i.e., the t-th internal bit orresponds to the s(t)-th bit in the bitstream pro-
dued by Rr(t) (see Fig. 4.6). Again, the internal bitstream (and hene the
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Figure 4.6: Derivation of the keystream from the internal bitstream
output of the keystream generator) are entirely determined by the generator's
starting state ω(0), and the rst m bits an be omputed as (w0, . . . , wm−1) =
H≤m(ω(0)), where
H≤m : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}m .
Denition 4.1. We all an integer i an initial position in w, if wi orresponds
to a bit from the initial state of some FSR, and a ombined position otherwise.
Correspondingly, we denote by IP(i) the set of initial positions and by CP(i)
the set of ombined positions in {0, . . . , i− 1}. We let IB(w) denote the bits at
the initial positions in w, nmin the maximum i for whih all i
′ ≤ i are initial
positions, and nmax the minimum i for whih all i
′ > i are ombined positions.
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In an FSR-based bitstream generator, the FSRs may be interonneted in
the sense that the update funtion F i of Ri may also depend on the urrent
ontent of the other registers suh that F i : {0, 1}ni → {0, 1}, ni ≤ n, for all
i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
The keystream funtion C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗, whih derives keystream bits
from the urrent state, usually depends on one or more state bits from eah
FSR. For |w| = m we denote the keystream prex that is produed from w by
Cm(w), where Cm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}∗.
Generally, we all a keystream generator regularly loked, if for all j ∈
{0, . . . , k − 1}, the register Rj is loked equally often in eah loking of the
whole generator. This denition translates into our notion of FSR-based internal
bitstream generators as follows.
Denition 4.2. Let D(w, t) := {wi|zt depends on wi}. We all an FSR-based
keystream generator regularly loked if |D(w, t)\D(w, t′)| is onstant for all
internal bitstreams w and all 0 ≤ t′ < t.
Note that this denition orresponds to the notion of an oblivious keystream
generator that was established by Krause (2007).
Two important parameters of FSR-based keystream generators are the best-
ase ompression ratio and the information rate, whih we dene as follows.
Denition 4.3. If γm is the maximum number of keybits that the generator
produes from internal bitstreams of length m, we all γ ∈ (0, 1] the best-ase
ompression ratio of the generator. Moreover, for a randomly hosen and uni-
formly distributed internal bitstream W (m) ∈ {0, 1}m and a random keystream
Z, we dene as information rate α the average information that Z reveals about
W (m), i.e., α := 1mI
(
W (m), Z
)
∈ (0, 1].1
For a randomly hosen and uniformly distributed internal bitstream w ∈
{0, 1}m, the probability of the keybits' Cm(w) being a prex of a given keystream
z ∈ {0, 1}∗ an be expressed as
Pr
w∈{0,1}m
[Cm(w) is prex of z] =
⌈γm⌉∑
i=0
Pr
w∈{0,1}m
[|Cm(w)| = i] · Pr
w ∈ {0, 1}m
|Cm(w)| = i
[Cm(w) = (z0, . . . , zi−1)] .
(4.3)
Conerning this probability, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 4.4 (Independene Assumption). For all m ≥ 1, a randomly
hosen, uniformly distributed internal bitstream w ∈ {0, 1}m, and all keystreams
z ∈ {0, 1}∗, we have Prw[Cm(w) is prex of z] = pC(m), i.e., the probability of
Cm(w) being a prex of z is independent of z.
As shown by Krause (2002), the omputation of α an be simplied as follows
if the generator fullls the Independene Assumption.
Lemma 4.5. If a keystream generator satises the Independene Assumption,
we have α = − 1m log2(pC(m)).
1
Reall that for two random variables A and B, the value I(A, B) = H(A) − H(A|B)
denes the information that B reveals about A.
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Proof. The denitions of information and entropy imply
α =
1
m
I
(
W (m), Z
)
=
1
m
(
H
(
W (m)
)
−H
(
W (m)|Z
))
=
1
m
(
m−H
(
W (m)|Z
))
and
H
(
W (m)|Z
)
=
∑
z∈{0,1}∗
Pr [Z = z]

− ∑
w∈{0,1}m
Pr
[
W (m) = w|Z = z
]
· log2 Pr
[
W (m) = w|Z = z
] .
Under the Independene Assumption (Assumption 4.4), all w ∈ {0, 1}m and
z ∈ {0, 1}∗ satisfy
Pr[W (m) = w|Z = z] =
{ 1
pC(m)·2m
if C(w) is prex of z
0 otherwise
.
With W˜ := {w ∈ {0, 1}m|Cm(w) is prex of z}, we obatin
H
(
W (m)|Z
)
=
∑
z∈{0,1}∗
Pr [Z = z]

− ∑
w∈W˜
(pC(m)2
m)−1 · log2((pC(m)2
m)−1)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
log2(pC(m)2
m)
= log2(pC(m)2
m) ,
and nally
α = −
1
m
(m−log2 (pC(m)2
m)) =
1
m
(m−log2 pC(m)−m) = −
1
m
log2 pC(m) 2
Corollary 4.6. The information rate α of a regularly loked FSR-based key-
stream generator fullling the Independene Assumption is given by α = β(m)m .
Proof. The Independene Assumption and Denition 4.2 imply that the 2β(m)
possible keystream bloks of length β(m) that an be produed from the m-
bit internal bitstream all have probability pC(m). Hene pC(m) = 2
−β(m)
and
therefore α = − 1m log2(2
−β(m)) = β(m)m . 2
Observation 4.7. For a regularly loked FSR-based keystream generator with
k FSRs that uses exatly one bit from eah register for omputing a keystream
bit zt, we have α =
1
k .
Finally, we assume the internal bitstream to behave pseudorandomly, whih
we formalize as follows.
Assumption 4.8 (Pseudorandomness Assumption). Form ≤ ⌈α−1n⌉, let
w and ω(0) denote randomly hosen, uniformly distributed elements of {0, 1}m
and {0, 1}|IP(m)|, respetively. Then, all keystreams z satisfy
Prw[Cm(w) is prex of z] ≈ Prω(0)[Cm(H≤m(ω(0))) is prex of z].
We expet the Pseudorandomness Assumption to hold sine a signiant
violation would imply the vulnerability of the generator to a orrelation attak.
Chapter 5
The BDD-Attak
5.1 Introdution and Overview
Krause (2002, 2007) proposed a Binary Deision Diagram (BDD) attak on
LFSR-based ombination generators. The BDD-attak is a generi attak in
the sense that it does not depend on spei design properties of the respetive
ipher. It only relies on the assumptions that the generator's internal bitstream
behaves pseudorandomly and that the test whether a given internal bitstream
w produes a sample keystream an be represented in a Free Binary Deision
Diagram (FBDD) of size polynomial in the length of w.
The attak reonstruts the seret initial state from the shortest informa-
tion-theoretially possible prex of the keystream (usually a small multiple of
the state size), whereas other generi attak tehniques in many ases require
amounts of known keystream that are unlikely to be available in pratie. Par-
tiularly in the ase of E0 and A5/1, the rst keystream frame already sues
to obtain all the information that is needed to ompute the initial state.
As an extension of the original attak by Krause (2002), we show that the
BDD-based approah remains appliable in the presene of (possibly interde-
pendent) NFSRs and FCSRs ombined with arbitrary keystream funtions, as
long as not too many new internal bits are produed in eah lok yle of the
ipher. Consequently, we apply the attak to the NFSR-based proposals Triv-
ium, Grain, and the F-FCSR family, whih were desribed in Setion 4.2. In
order to avoid redundanies, we diretly outline this more general tehnique and
treat the original attak by Krause as a speial ase.
One drawbak of the BDD-attak is its high memory onsumption. We
approah this problem by presenting various eiently parallelizable divide-
and-onquer strategies (DCS) for E0 and A5/1 that substantially redue the
memory requirements and allow us to takle muh larger key lengths with xed
omputational resoures. In the ase of E0, our DCS lowers the attak's memory
requirements by a fator of 225 and additionally yields a slight improvement of
the theoretial runtime.
Finally, we present omprehensive experimental results for the BDD-attak
on redued versions of the E0, A5/1 and the self-shrinking generator, whih
show that the attak performane in pratie does not seem to substantially
deviate from the theoretial gures.
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5.2 Representing Boolean Funtions with Binary
Deision Diagrams
Boolean funtions an be represented in many ways, e.g., in truth tables or
symbolially as a formula in algebrai normal form (ANF). For our attak, yet
another representation will turn out to be partiularly useful, namely the graph-
based representation in a Binary Deision Diagram (BDD).
BDDs and their variants have reeived muh attention sine the publiation
of the fundamental paper by Bryant (1986). We briey review the denition
of BDDs and their most important algorithmi properties and kindly refer the
reader to Wegener (2000) for a more omprehensive overview.
Denition 5.1. A Binary Deision Diagram (BDD) G over a set of vari-
ables Xn = {x1, . . . , xn} is a direted, ayli graph G = (V,E) with E ⊆
V × V × {0, 1}. Eah inner node v has exatly two outgoing edges, a 0-edge
(v, v0, 0) and a 1-edge (v, v1, 1) leading to the 0-suessor v0 and the 1-suessor
v1, respetively. G ontains exatly two nodes with outdegree 0, the sinks s0 and
s1. Eah inner node v is assigned a label v.label ∈ xn, whereas the two sinks
are labeled s0.label = 0 and s1.label = 1. There is exaly one node with indegree
0, the root of G. We dene the size of G (denoted by |G|) to be the number
of nodes it ontains, i.e., |G| := |V |. Eah node v ∈ V represents a Boolean
Funtion fv ∈ Bn = {f |f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}} in the following manner. For an
input a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ {0, 1}n, the omputation of fv(a) starts in v. In a node
with label xi, the outgoing edge with label ai is hosen, until one of the sinks is
reahed. The value fv(a) is then given by the label of this sink.
Denition 5.2. For a BDD G over xn, let G
−1(1) ⊆ {0, 1}n denote the set of
inputs aepted by G, i.e., all inputs a ∈ {0, 1}n suh that froot(a) = 1.
Note that we may delete all v ∈ V in G that are not reahable from the root
without hanging the funtion froot that G omputes.
We an straightforwardly use BDDs as a data struture for subsets of {0, 1}n.
In order to represent S ⊆ {0, 1}n, we onstrut a BDD GS that omputes the
harateristi funtion fS of S given by fS(x) = 1 if x ∈ S and fS(x) = 0
otherwise. Hene, GS will aept exatly the elements of S. Moreover, we an
ompute a BDD representing the intersetion S ∩ T of two sets S and T from
their BDD-representations GS and GT by an AND-synthesis of GS and GT .
Remark 5.3. Sine general BDDs have many degrees of freedom for represent-
ing a partiular Boolean funtion, many important operations and espeially
those that are needed in our ontext are NP-hard (f. Wegener (2000) for de-
tails).
We therefore onentrate on the more restrited models of Free Binary De-
ision Diagrams (FBDDs) and Ordered Binary Deision Diagrams (OBDDs).
5.2.1 Free Binary Deision Diagrams (FBDDs)
Denition 5.4. An orale graph G0 = (V,E) over a set of variables Xn =
{x1, . . . , xn} is a modied BDD that ontains only one sink s, labeled ∗, and for
all xi ∈ Xn and all paths P from the root in G to the sink, there exists at most
one node in P that is labeled xi.
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Denition 5.5. A Free Binary Deision Diagram G with respet to an orale
graph G0 (abbreviated by G0-FBDD) over a set of variables Xn = {x1, . . . , xn}
is a BDD in whih all inputs a ∈ {0, 1}n satisfy the following ondition. Let the
list G0(a) ontain the variables from Xn in the order in whih they our on the
path dened by a in G0. Similarly, let the list G(a) ontain the variables from
Xn in the order in whih the omponents of a are read in G. If xi and xj are
both ontained in G(a), then they our in G(a) in the same order as in G0(a).
We all a BDD G an FBDD, if there exists an orale graph G0 suh that G
is a G0-FBDD.
Figure 5.1 shows examples for an orale graph G0 and a G0-FBDD.
The denition of FBDDs implies their important read-one property, i.e., on
eah path in an FBDD G, eah variable in Xn is tested at most one.
Figure 5.1: An orale graph G0 over {z0, . . . , z3} and a G0-FBDD
FBDDs possess several algorithmi properties that will prove useful in our
ontext. Let G0 denote an orale graph over Xn = {x1, . . . , xn} and let the G0-
FBDDs Gf , Gg and Gh represent Boolean funtions f, g, h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.
FBDD Property 1. There exists an algorithm MIN that omputes for Gf in
time O(|Gf |) the (uniquely determined) minimal G0-FBDD G that represents
f . Every minimal G0-FBDD G over Xn satises |G| ≤ n · |G
−1
f (1)|.
FBDD Property 2. There exists an algorithm SYNTH that omputes for Gf ,
Gg and Gh in time O(|G0| · |Gf | · |Gg| · |Gh|) a G0-FBDD G of size |G| ≤
|G0| · |Gf | · |Gg| · |Gh| whih represents the funtion f ∧ g ∧ h.
FBDD Property 3. There exists an algorithm SAT-ENUM that enumerates
for a G0-FBDD Gf all elements in G
−1
f (1) in time O(n · |G
−1
f (1)|).
Denition 5.6. We all an algorithm A over the input spae {0, 1}n read-one
algorithm, if it reads eah input bit at most one.
Denition 5.7. Fix a read-one algorithm A over {0, 1}n, an input x ∈ {0, 1}n
and an orale graph G0 over Xn. Let the list π(A, x) ontain the variables from
Xn in the order in whih they are read by A when proesing x, and let the
list π(G0, x) ontain the variables from Xn in the order in whih they our on
the path dened by x in G0. We say that the read-one algorithm A respets
the orale graph G0 (A is G0-respeting) if for all inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n, any two
variables xi, xj from π(A, x) our in the same order in π(G
0, x) as in π(A, x).
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Read-one algorithms orrespond to Eraser Turing Mahines (Eraser-TMs),
whih only dier from general Turing mahines in the property that eah input
bit is deleted immediately after being read (Ajtai et al., 1986, Krause et al.,
1988). We onsider Eraser-TMs that have an assoiated orale graph whih
determines the reading order of the input bits. During the omputation, the
mahine follows the path that the input denes in the orale graph in order to
determine the next bit to read.
The following observation links read-one algorithms to FBDDs and is an
immediate onsequene of the observations by Meinel (1989).
Observation 5.8. Fix a subset F ⊆ {0, 1}n and an orale graph G0 over Xn =
{x1, . . . , xn}. Eah G
0
-respeting read-one algorithm A that deides for an
input x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n whether x ∈ F while using at most p bits of
additional memory an be eiently transformed into a G0-FBDD of size at
most |G0| · 2p.
Proof. Consider the Eraser-TM with p memory ells that orresponds to A.
A onguration of A is given by the tuple (vi, y1, . . . , yp), where vi denotes
the urrent vertex in G0 and (y1, . . . , yp) represents the urrent ontent of the
additional memory ells.
We transform A into a G0-FBDD GA as follows. The verties in GA have
the form [vi, y] ∈ V (G0) × {0, 1}p, and a vertex [vi, y] is labled with vi.label.
If (vi0 , y0) denotes the initial onguration of A, we dene as root of GA the
vertex [vi0 , y0]. For eah transition δ(vi, y, xvi.label) = (v
′
i, y
′) of A, we add to
GA a direted (xvi.label)-edge from vertex [vi, y] to vertex [v
′
i, y
′]. For a stop
onguration δ(vi, y, xvi.label) = (vi, y) of A with output b ∈ {0, 1}, we add a
direted (xvi.label)-edge from vertex [vi, y] to the b-sink.
We observe that sine A is G0-respeting, the reading order on eah path
from the root to a sink in GA is onsistent with G
0
, whih makes GA a G
0
-
FBDD.
For a xed vi ∈ V (G0), A has at most 2p ongurations (vi, y). Therefore,
the maximum size of GA is |G0| · 2p. 2
Many important Boolean funtions an even be eiently represented in
a more restrited BDD variant, so-alled Ordered Binary Deision Diagrams
(OBDDs), whih we are going to desribe next.
5.2.2 Ordered Binary Deision Diagrams (OBDDs)
Ordered Binary Deision Diagrams were rst desribed by Bryant (1986) and
have beome an important tool for iruit veriation, VLSI-design and many
other appliations.
Denition 5.9. A variable ordering π for a set of variables Xn = {x1, . . . , xn}
is a permutation of the index set I = {1, . . . , n}, where π(i) denotes the position
of xi in the π-ordered variable list xpi−1(1), xpi−1(2), . . . , xpi−1(n).
Denition 5.10. A π-Ordered Binary Deision Diagram (π-OBDD) with re-
spet to a variable ordering π is a BDD in whih the sequene of tests on a path
from the root to a sink is restrited by π, i.e., whenever an edge leads from an
xi-node to an xj-node, then π(i) < π(j). A BDD G is alled OBDD, if there
exists a variable ordering π suh that G is a π-OBDD.
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For an OBDD G we dene its width as
w(G) := max
i
{|{v ∈ G|v.label = xi}|} .
Note that we may view any π-OBDD as a degenerated G0-FBDD in whih
the reading order on eah path from the root to one of the sinks is onsistent
with π, i.e., G0 is degenerated into a linear list that orresponds to π.
Conversely, a π-OBDD may at the same time be a G0-FBDD in the following
sense.
Denition 5.11. A variable ordering π for Xn is said to be onsistent with
an orale graph G0 over Xn if for any (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , n}2 with π(i) < π(j), xi
ours before xj on all paths in G
0
.
Observation 5.12. If a variable ordering π is onsistent with an orale graph
G0, then any π-OBDD is a G0-FBDD.
Figure 5.2 shows a π-OBDD that omputes the funtion
f(z0, . . . , z3) = z0z2 ∨ z0z¯2z3 ∨ z¯0z1z3 .
Similarly to FBDDs, OBDDs allow for eient implementations of the op-
erations that we will be interested in. Let π denote a variable ordering for
Xn = {x1, . . . , xn} and let the π-OBDDs Gf , Gg and Gh represent Boolean
funtions f, g, h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.
OBDD Property 1. The size of Gf is bounded by |Gf | ≤ m · w(Gf ).
OBDD Property 2. There exists an algorithm MIN that omputes in time
O(|Gf |) the uniquely determined minimal π-OBDD G with w(G) ≤ |G
−1
f (1)|
that represents f .
OBDD Property 3. There exists an algorithm SYNTH that omputes in time
O(|Gf | · |Gg| · |Gh|) a minimal π-OBDD G with w(G) ≤ w(Gf ) ·w(Gg) ·w(Gh).
OBDD Property 4. There exists an algorithm SAT-ENUM that enumerates
all elements of G−1f (1) in time O
(
n · |G−1f (1)|
)
.
Figure 5.2: A π-OBDD over {z0, . . . , z3} with π(0) = 0, π(1) = 2, π(2) = 1 and
π(3) = 3.
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Denition 5.13. We say that a read-one algorithm A respets a variable or-
dering π (A is π-respeting) if A does not read xi after xj in ase π(i) < π(j)
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . .n}.
Similarly to the orrespondene of read-one algorithms and FBDDs de-
sribed by Observation 5.8, we an transform a π-respeting read-one algorithm
into a π-OBDD.
Observation 5.14. Fix a subset F ⊆ {0, 1}n and a variable ordering π for
Xn = {x1, . . . , xn}. Eah π-respeting read-one algorithm A that deides for
an input x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n whether x ∈ F while using at most p bits
of additional memory an be eiently transformed into a π-OBDD of width at
most 2p.
Proof. The proof is largely analogous to the proof of Observation 5.8, but we
inlude it for ompleteness.
Consider the eraser Turing mahine with p memory ells that orresponds
to A. We an assume w.l.o.g. that the input is π-ordered, i.e., it is given as
xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . , xpi(n). A onguration of A is given by the tuple (i, y1, . . . , yp),
where i denotes the urrent read position in the input and (y1, . . . , yp) represents
the ontent of the p additional memory ells.
We transform A into a π-OBDD GA as follows. The verties in GA have the
form [i, y] ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {0, 1}p, and a vertex [i, y] is labled with xi. If (i0, y0)
denotes the initial onguration of A, we dene as root of GA the vertex [i0, y0].
For eah transition δ(i, y, xi) = (i
′, y′) of A, we add to GA a direted xi-edge
from vertex [i, y] to vertex [i′, y′]. For a stop onguration δ(i, y, xi) = (i, y) of
A with output b ∈ {0, 1}, we add a direted xi-edge from vertex [i, y] to the
b-sink.
We observe that sine A is π-respeting, the reading order on eah path from
the root to a sink in GA is onsistent with π, whih makes GA a π-OBDD.
For a xed i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, A has at most 2p ongurations (i, y). Therefore,
the maximum width of GA is 2
p
. 2
5.3 BDD-based Initial State Reovery
The BDD-based attak on keystream generators is a known-plaintext initial
state reovery attak, i.e., the attaker tries to reonstrut the unknown initial
state ω(0) of the keystream generator from a few known plaintext bits p0, p1, . . .
and their enryptions c1, c2, . . .. In our senario in whih a iphertext bit ci is
omputed from a plaintext bit pi and a keystream bit zi via ci = pi ⊕ zi, the
keystream bit zi an be reonstruted from (pi, ci) by omputing pi ⊕ ci = zi.
We rst observe that for any internal bitstream w ∈ {0, 1}m that yields a
prex of the observed keystream, the following two onditions must hold.
Condition 1. w is an m-extension of the initial state bits in w, i.e., we have
H≤m(IB(w)) = w.
Condition 2. Cm(w) is a prex of the observed keystream z.
We all any w ∈ {0, 1}m that satises these onditions an m-andidate. Our
strategy is now to start with m = nmin and to dynamially ompute the m-
andidates for m > nmin until only one m-andidate is left. The rst bits of
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this m-andidate will ontain the initial state ω(0) that we are looking for. We
an expet to be left with only one m-andidate for m ≥ ⌈α−1n⌉, whih follows
diretly from the following Lemma.
Lemma 5.15 (Krause (2002)). Under Assumption 4.8, all keystreams z and
all m ≤ ⌈α−1n⌉ satisfy |{ω(0) ∈ {0, 1}n : Cm(H≤m(ω(0))) is prex of y}| ≈
2|IP(m)|−αm ≤ 2n−αm. Hene, there exist approximately 2n−αm m-andidates.
The key problem that we have to solve is to ompute and represent the
m-andidates eiently. Our solution is based on the following BDD-based
approah. Let G0m denote the orale graph over {w0, . . . , wm−1} that represents
the order in whih the keystream funtion Cm reads the bits from the internal
bitstream. We represent the bitstreams w fullling onditions 1 and 2 in the
minimal G0m-FBDDs Rm and Qm, respetively. Starting from Pnmin := Qnmin ,
we ompute for nmin < m ≤ ⌈α−1n⌉ the G0m-FBDDs Pm := MIN(Pm−1 ∧
Qm ∧Sm), where the minimum G0m-FBDD Sm tests whether wm−1 is in the m-
extension of IB(w). Note that we have Pm = MIN(Qm∧Rm) with Rm =
∧m
i=1 Si
for allm, and Pm aepts exatly them-andidates. This strategy is summarized
in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 ReoverInitialState
P = Qnmin
for m = nmin + 1 to ⌈α−1n⌉ do
P = MIN(P ∧Qm ∧ Sm)
end for
return the initial state bits ontained in one of the w ∈ P−1(1)
The eieny of Algorithm 5 essentially depends on the sizes of the inter-
mediate results Pm, whih we are going to estimate in the following.
Assumption 5.16 (BDD Assumption). For all m ≥ nmin we assume that
|G0m|, |Sm|, |Qm| ∈ m
O(1)
and that there exists an integer p ≥ 1 suh that |Rm| ≤
|G0m| · 2
p·|CP(m)|
.
Lemma 5.17. Let K denote an FSR-based keystream generator with k FSRs
R0, . . . , Rk−1 of lengths n(0), . . . , n(k−1), and let n =
∑k−1
i=0 n
(i)
. If K fullls
the BDD Assumption and the Pseudorandomness Assumption, we have for all
nmin < m ≤ ⌈α−1n⌉
|Pm| ≤ max
1≤m≤⌈α−1n⌉
{
min
{
ǫ(m)|Qm| · 2
m−|IP(m)|,m · 2|IP(m)|−αm
}}
≤ ǫ(m)|Qm| · 2
p(1−α)
p+α n ≤ nO(1)2
p(1−α)
p+α n
with ǫ(m) = |G0m|
2
. If there exists a variable ordering πm suh that all G
0
m-
FBDDs are πm-OBDDs, ǫ(m) redues to the onstant 1.
The proof borrows from the ideas presented by Krause (2002, 2007) and
works as follows.
Proof. The denitions of Qm and Rm imply that Pm = Qm ∧ Rm for nmin <
m ≤ ⌈α−1n⌉, and therefore |Pm| ≤ |G0m| · |Qm| · |Rm| (FBDD Property 2) in
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the FBDD-ase and |Pm| ≤ |Qm| · |Rm| (OBDD Property 3) in the OBDD-ase.
Under Assumption 5.16 we obtain
|Pm| ≤ ǫ(m)|Qm| · 2
p·|CP(m)| . (5.1)
On the other hand, Lemma 5.15 implies that |Pm| ≤ m · |P−1m (1)| ≈ m ·
2m
∗−αm
for m∗ = |IP(m)| and nmin < m ≤ ⌈α−1n⌉, whih means
|Pm| ≤ m · 2
m∗−αm = m · 2(1−α)m
∗−α·|CP(m)| . (5.2)
Combining Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2), we obtain for nmin < m ≤ ⌈α−1⌉n
|Pm| ≤ min{ǫ(m)|Qm| · 2
p·|CP(m)|,m · 2(1−α)m
∗−α·|CP(m)|}
≤ ǫ(m)|Qm| ·min{2
p·|CP(m)|, 2(1−α)m
∗−α·|CP(m)|}
= ǫ(m)|Qm| ·min{2
p·r(m∗), 2(1−α)m
∗−αr(m∗)} with r(m∗) = |CP(m)|
≤ ǫ(m)|Qm| · 2
p·r∗(m∗) ,
where r∗(m∗) denotes the solution of p · r(m∗) = (1 − α)m∗ − αr(m∗). We
obtain r∗(m∗) = 1−αp+αm
∗
and hene |Pm| ≤ ǫ(m)|Qm| · 2
p(1−α)
p+α m
∗
. With nmin <
m ≤ ⌈α−1n⌉ and therefore ǫ(m)|Qm| ∈ mO(1) ⊆ nO(1) and m∗ = |IP(m)| ≤ n,
we obtain
|Pm| ≤ ǫ(m)|Qm| · 2
p(1−α)
p+α n ≤ nO(1)2
p(1−α)
p+α n
for all nmin < m ≤ ⌈α
−1n⌉ . 2
From this bound on |Pm|, we an straightforwardly derive the time, memory
and data requirements of the BDD-based attak.
Theorem 5.18. Let K denote a regularly loked FSR-based keystream gen-
erator with an unknown initial state ω(0) ∈ {0, 1}n, information rate α and
best-ase ompression ratio γ. If K fullls the Independene Assumption, the
Pseudorandomness Assumption and the BDD Assumption, an initial state s˜0
that yields the same keystream as ω(0) an be omputed with time and mem-
ory requirements in O
(
ǫ(n)|Qn|2
p(1−α)
p+α n
)
from the rst ⌈γα−1n⌉ onseutive
keystream bits of K under ω(0).
Note that by setting p = 1 in Theorem 5.18, we obtain the main Theorem
of Krause (2002).
5.4 Generi BDD Construtions
5.4.1 Keystream Consisteny Chek Qm
In most ases, a BDD Qm that heks Condition 2 an be straightforwardly
derived from the denition of the keystream funtion C. If the omputation of
a keystream bit zt depends on u(j) > 1 bits from an FSR R
j
, a xed bit in
the bitstream produed by Rj will generally appear and have to be read in the
omputation of up to u(j) keystream bits. In this ase, we ompute a keystream
bit zt from a number of new bits whih are being onsidered for the rst time,
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and several old bits that were already involved in the omputation of previous
keystream bits. This would imply (at least in a straightforward implementation)
reading a xed variable more than one on the same path in Qm, whih is
prohibited by the FBDD-denition. The less restritive general BDDs would
permit this onstrution, but ould no longer guarantee the eieny of the
operations that our attak depends on (f. Remark 5.3).
A similar problem has been onsidered by Krause (2002) in the ontext of the
irregularly loked A5/1 generator (f. Setion 4.2.3), whih uses the bits of the
internal bitstream both for omputing keystream bits and as input for the lok
ontrol mehanism. His solution was to inrease the number of unknowns by
working with u(j) synhronized dupliates of the Rj-bitstream at the expense
of a redued information rate α.
We now onsider the more general situation that the keystream funtion
depends on new bits and some funtion(s) g1, . . . , gr in the old bits. In order to
preserve the read-one property, we introdue auxiliary variables for the values
of these funtions suh that zt is omputed only from new bits. This onstrution
is illustrated in the following example.
Example 5.19. Consider the keystream funtion zt = Cm(wt+5, wt+7, wt+9),
where Cm is dened by Cm(x1, x2, x3) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3. Assuming anonial
reading order, wt+9 would be the new bit and wt+5 and wt+7 the old bits. With
the auxiliary variable w˜t := g1(wt+5, wt+7) and g1(x1, x2) := x1 ⊕ x2, we an
express zt as zt = w˜t ⊕ wt+9.
In general, if we add for eah of the r auxiliary variables an FSR to the gen-
erator that outputs at lok t the orresponding value of gj , we an equivalently
ompute zt without onsidering the bits from the internal bitstream more than
one. Obviously, we obtain a generator with a lowered information rate, sine
more bits of the internal bitstream have to be read in order to ompute the
same number of keystream bits.
In the ase of regularly loked keystream generators, we dene the set of
variable indies that the keystream funtion depends on as
I := {i|zt depends on wt+i} ⊆ {0, . . . , n− 1} .
The bits ontributed by register Rj , j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, an be expressed as
Ij := {i ∈ I|i ≡ j mod k} .
Then, the set of new bits is given as
I∗ := {i∗1, . . . , i
∗
k} with i
∗
j = argmaxi∈Ij{πm(i)} for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} ,
and the old bits are those in the set I ′ := I\I∗.
Conerning the information rate of the modied generator, Observation 4.7
implies:
Observation 5.20. Fix a regularly loked keystream generator and denote by
I the set of positions in the internal bitstream that its keystream funtion depends
on. If the keystream funtion an be expressed as a funtion depending on the
k variables in {wt+i|i ∈ I∗} and the values of r subfuntions depending on
the variables in {wt+i|i ∈ I ′}, the keystream funtion an be transformed into
an equivalent read-one keystream generation algorithm suh that the resulting
generator's information rate is α = 1k+r .
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5.4.2 FSR Consisteny Chek Rm
Reall that eah bit wt of an internal bitstream w is either an initial state bit of
some FSR or a ombination of other internal bits. In order to deide for a given
internal bitstream whether it satises Condition 1, we need to hek whether
the update relations imposed on the bits at the ombined positions are fullled.
Hene, if a ombined bit wt is produed by an update relation f(s0, . . . , sn−1),
we need to hek whether f(wi1 , . . . , wip) = wt, whih is equivalent to testing
whether
f˜(wi1 , . . . , wip , wt) := f(wi1 , . . . , wip)⊕ wt = 0 .
The OBDD Sm implements this test for the single ombined bit wm−1 and
represents the onstant-one funtion if wm−1 is an initial bit. The OBDD Rm =∧m
i=1 Si performs the onsisteny tests for the whole internal bitstream.
We rst onsider the ase of FSRs (without additional memory), for whih
we need the following denition.
Denition 5.21. For a polynomial f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} with
f(w1, . . . , wn) =
⊕
j∈M
mj with monomials mj =
∧
l∈Mj
wl and M
j(f) ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
and a reading order π ∈ σn, we dene the set of ative monomials at time t as
AMpi(f, t) := {mj : 0 < |{π
−1(1), . . . , π−1(t)} ∩M j(f)| < |M j(f)|} .
Hene, AM(f, t) ontains all monomials in f for whih at least one, but not all
fators are known after the rst t inputs have been read.
Lemma 5.22. For a polynomial f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} with n > 1 and a reading
order π for the inputs, the set of inputs satisfying f(w1, . . . , wn) = 0 an be
represented in a π-OBDD of width 2max1≤t≤n{|AMpi(f,t)|}+1.
Proof. Let p := max1≤t≤n{|AMpi(f, t)|}. In order to ompute f(w1, . . . , wn),
we may proeed in the following way. We dene p auxiliary variables b1, . . . , bp,
whih will store the intermediate values of partly evaluated monomials, and
an additional variable b0 for the sum of evaluated monomials. We initialize
b0 := 0, bt := 1 for t > 0, and read the variables w1, . . . , wn in the order given
by π. For eah variable wt, we update all auxiliary variables that are assoiated
with monomials ontaining wt. If a monomial beomes ative by reading wt,
we alloate an auxiliary variable bj and dene bj := wt. If a monomial is
entirely evaluated after reading wt, we add its value to b0 and free the assoiated
auxiliary variable. Sine there are at most p ative monomials at any time, no
more than p+ 1 auxiliary variables will be needed simultaneously.
Observation 5.14 implies that this strategy an be transformed into a π-
OBDD of width 2p+1, whih imples the laim. 2
From Lemma 5.22, we an diretly derive an upper bound for the width of
the πm-OBDD Sm for an FSR.
Corollary 5.23. For a given reading order πm, an integer m > 0, an FSR R
with update relation f , and p := max0≤t<m{|AMpim(f˜ , t)|}+1, we an onstrut
a πm-OBDD Sm of width at most 2
p
that tests for an internal bitstream w ∈
{0, 1}m if w fullls the update relation imposed on wm−1.
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Remark 5.24. For the speial ase p = 1, we obtain the LFSR-bound that was
proved by Krause (2002).
We now turn to the ase of Fibonai FCSRs. Eq. (3.6) implies that we
need aess to σt−1 in order to hek whether the update relation holds for
wt. Therefore, we work with a modied FCSR that essentially outputs the
sum σt instead of the bit wt = σt mod 2 in eah lok. For a Fibonai FCSR
with p bits of additional memory, we let the modied FCSR output for an
initial memory state (b0p−1, . . . , b
0
0) with b
0 =
∑p−1
i=0 b
0
i 2
i
the values y0t =: σ
0
t for
t < n − 1, (bp−10 , . . . , b
0
0, y
0
n−1) for t = n − 1, and (σ
p
t , σ
p−1
t , . . . , σ
0
t ) for t ≥ n
with σt =
∑p
i=0 σ
i
t2
i
and wt = σ
0
t .
Note that a bit wm in the output of the modied FCSR, m ≥ 0, then
orresponds to the i-th omponent bit of some intermediate sum σt with
(i, t) = τ(m) :=


(0,m) if m < n− 1
(m− (n− 1) mod (p+ 1), otherwise
(m− (n− 1) div (p+ 1)) + (n− 1))
.
Lemma 5.25. For a Fibonai FCSR R with p bits of additional memory, an
integer m > 0, and a reading order πm, we an onstrut a πm-OBDD Sm
of width at most 2p+1 that tests for the internal bitstream w ∈ {0, 1}m of the
modied FCSR with m = n − 1 + t(p+ 1) whether the last p + 1 bits fulll the
update relation.
Proof. In order to hek whether σt = (σt−1 div 2) +
∑n
i=1 wt−i · di−1, we an
equivalently test if
σt =
p∑
i=1
σit−1 · 2
i +
n∑
i=1
σ0t−i · di−1 ,
sine wt = σt mod 2 = σ
0
t .
Algorithm 6 desribes a read-one algorithm that heks whether the last
p + 1 bits of a bitstream w ∈ {0, 1}m are onsistent with the values of the
remaining bits in w. Sine the algorithm uses exatly p + 1 bits of additional
memory, Observation 5.14 implies that it an be transformed into an OBDD of
width at most 2p+1, whih implies the laim. 2
Note that aording to Corollary 3.26, we have p ≈ log(d) for a periodi
initial FCSR-state, where d denotes the FCSR's feedbak tap vetor.
In the ase of Galois FCSRs with ai ≤ di at all times, we denote by xi(t)
and ai(t) the value of the register ells xi and ai at time t. We think of the
main register of the Galois FCSR as produing the bitstream
x0(0), x1(0), . . . , xn−1(0), . . . , xi1(t), . . . , xil(t), . . . ,
where ij ∈ {1 ≤ i < n|di = 1}, l = wt(d) − 1, ij < ij′ for j < j′, and
t > 0. Similarly, we view the bitstream produed by the arry register as
ai1(t), . . . , ail(t), . . . for t ≥ 0.
Lemma 5.26. For a Galois FCSR R with ai−1 ≤ di−1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1},
an integer m > 0, and a reading order πm, we an onstrut a πm-OBDD Sm
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Algorithm 6 FibonaiFCSR-Sm(πm, w)
Let (i, t) := τ(m)
if t < n− 1 then
return true// Nothing to hek for initial bits
end if
σ˜ := 0 // Initialize the (p+ 1)-bit auxiliary variable
for j = 0 to m− 1 do
(i′, t′) := τ((πm)
−1(j)) // Determine the σi
′
t′ that orresponds to the ur-
rently read variable wj
if t′ ∈ {t− n, . . . , t− 1} and i′ = 0 then
σ˜ := σ˜ + wj · dt−t′−1
end if
if t′ = t− 1 and i′ ∈ {1, . . . p} then
σ˜ := σ˜ + wj · 2i
′
end if
if t′ = t then
if σ˜i
′
6= σi
′
t′ then
return false
end if
end if
end for
return true
of width at most 2 that tests whether a bit in the bitstream produed by the main
register fullls the orresponding update relations. For a bit in the bitstream
of the arry register, we an perform this onsisteny test in a πm-OBDD of
maximum width 8.
Proof. The denition of Galois FCSRs implies xn−1(t) = x0(t − 1) and for
i ∈ {n − 2, . . . , 0} that xi(t) = xi+1(t − 1) if di = 0 and xi(t) = xi+1(t − 1) ⊕
ai(t−1)⊕x0(t−1) if di = 1. Note that we have xij+1(t−1) = xij+1 (t−(ij+1−ij))
and therefore
xij (t) = xij+1(t− 1)⊕ aij (t− 1)⊕ x0(t− 1)
= xij+1 (t− (ij+1 − ij))⊕ aij (t− 1)⊕ x0(t− 1) .
Aording to Corollary 5.23, we an test these linear onditions in a πm-OBDD
of width at most 2.
Similarly, Corollary 5.23 yields a maximum width of 23 = 8 in the ase of
the arry register, sine bij (t) an be omputed as
aij (t) = xij+1(t− 1)aij (t− 1)⊕ aij (t− 1)x0(t− 1)⊕ x0(t− 1)xij (t− 1)
= xij+1 (t− (ij+1 − ij))aij (t− 1)⊕ aij (t− 1)x0(t− 1)
⊕ x0(t− 1)xij+1(t− (ij+1 − ij)) ,
whih implies the laim. 2
From the bounds on w(Sm) for the dierent types of FSRs, we an now
straightforwardly derive a bound for w(Rm) for an FSR-based keystream gener-
ator. Let K denote an FSR-based keystream generator onsisting of k FSRs
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R0, . . . , Rk−1 with πm-OBDDs S
0
m, . . . , S
k−1
m and w(S
i
m) ≤ 2
pi
for all i ∈
{0, . . . , k − 1}. Moreover, let si denote the fration of ombined bits that Ri
ontributes to the internal bitstream.
Corollary 5.27. There exists a πm-OBDD Rm of width at most 2
|CP(m)|
Pk−1
i=0 pisi
that tests for a potential internal bitstream w ∈ {0, 1}m of an FSR-based keystream
generator whether it is an m-extension of the initial bits.
Proof. The laim follows diretly fromRm =
∧m
i=1 Si and the OBDD-properties
desribed in Setion 5.2. 2
5.5 Appliations
5.5.1 Self-Shrinking Generator
As disussed in Setion 4.2.1, the self-shrinking generator onsists of only one
LFSR and no memory. It produes at mostm keybits from an internal bitstream
w2m, i.e., γ · 2m = m and γ = 0.5.
Lemma 5.28. For all keystreams z ∈ {0, 1}∗, there exist at most
(m/2
|z|
)
2m/2−|z|
internal bitstreams w ∈ {0, 1}m suh that Cm(w) = z.
Proof. We rst observe that due to γ = 0.5, we have |Cm(w)| ≤ 0.5m, i.e., no
internal bitstream of length m an produe more than m2 keystreams bits. We
x a keystream z of length at most m2 and let Zz = {w ∈ {0, 1}
m : Cm(w) = z}.
For eah w ∈ Zz, there exists a set I = {i1, . . . , i|z|} ⊆ {0, . . . ,
m
2 } suh that
(w2ij , w2ij+1) = (1, zj) for j ∈ {1, . . . , |z|}.
Moreover, w must satisfy w2ij = 0 for all ij ∈ {0, . . . ,
m
2 }\I. There are(m/2
|z|
)
possible hoies for I and 2m/2−|z| possible assignments to the unrestrited
variables. Hene,
|Zz| =
(
m/2
|z|
)
2m/2−|z| .
2
Corollary 5.29 (Krause (2002)). The information rate of the self-shrinking
generator is α = 1− log(3)2 ≈ 0.2075.
Proof. Lemma 5.28 implies that for a z ∈ {0, 1}∗,
|{w ∈ {0, 1}m : Cm(w) is prex of z}| =
m/2∑
|z|=0
(
m/2
|z|
)
2m/2−|z|
=
m/2∑
|z|=0
(
m/2
|z|
)
1|z|2m/2−|z|
=(1 + 2)m/2 = 3m/2 .
Hene,
α = −
1
m
Pr
w
[Cm(w) is Prex of z]
= −
1
m
|{w ∈ {0, 1}m : Cm(w) is prex of z}|
2m
= 1−
log(3)
2
≈ 0.2075 ,
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whih onludes the proof. 2
Algorithm 7 tests whether a given internal bitstream w is onsistent with a
keystream prex z. Sine the algorithm is read-one and uses at most ⌊log(m)⌋+
1 bits of additional memory, Observation 5.14 implies that it an be transformed
into a πm-OBDD Qm with w(Qm) ≤ m and |Qm| ≤ m2, where πm denotes the
anonial reading order.
Algorithm 7 SelfShrinkingGenerator-Qm(w, z)
t := 0
u := 0 // auxiliary variable u, u ≤ ⌊m2 ⌋
while t < m− 1 do
if wt = 1 then
if zu 6= wt+1 then
return false
end if
u := u+ 1
end if
t := t+ 2
end while
return true
Altogether, we obtain from Theorem 5.18, Corollary 5.23, and Remark 5.24:
Corollary 5.30 (Krause (2002)). From a prex of length ⌈2.41n⌉ of a keystream
z = Cm(L(x)) produed by a self-shrinking generator of key length n, an ini-
tial state x˜ with Cm(L(x˜)) = z an be omputed in time and with spae in
O(n2 · 20.6563n).
Compared with the attaks mentioned in Setion 4.2.1, the BDD-Attak is
almost as fast as the urrently best short-keystream attak due to Hell and
Johansson (2006), but onsumes exponentially more memory.
5.5.2 Bluetooth Keystream Generator E0
Reall from Setion 4.2.2 that the E0 keystream generator is a regularly loked
(4, 4)-ombiner with 4 LFSRs, a 4-bit memory unit and an internal state size of
128 bits. Therefore, we have α = γ = 14 .
Algorithm 8 tests whether a given internal bitstream w is onsistent with an
observed E0-keystream z, given that the initial memory state is q0. Exploiting
Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2), the algorithm relies on a lookup-table δ′ : {0, . . . , 4}×{0, 1}4
that maps the sum s′t =
∑3
i=0 w
i
t and the urrent memory state qt to the next
memory state qt+1 = δ
′(s′t, qt). Sine the algorithm uses a onstant amount
of additional memory, it an be transformed into a πm-OBDD Qm of onstant
maximum width, as indiated by Observation 5.14. Similarly to the ase of the
Self-Shrinking Generator, πm denotes the anonial reading order.
In summary, Theorem 5.18, Corollary 5.23, and Remark 5.24 imply the
following performane gures for the BDD-based attak on E0.
Corollary 5.31 (Krause (2002)). From a prex of length n of a keystream
z = Cm(L(x)) produed by an E0 keystream generator of key length n, an initial
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Algorithm 8 E0-Qm(q0, w, z)
// w is interpreted as w = w00 , . . . , w
3
0 , . . . , w
0
j , . . . , w
3
j , . . . , w
m−1mod 4
m−1div 4
t := 0
s := 0 // auxiliary variable for the integer sum, s ∈ {0, . . . , 4}
q := q0 // auxiliary variable for the memory state
for t = 0 to ⌊m4 ⌋ − 1 do
s := w0t + w
1
t + w
2
t + w
3
t
if (s mod 2)⊕
⊕3
i=0 c
iq 6= zt then
return false
end if
q := δ′(s, q)
end for
return true
state x˜ with Cm(L(x˜)) = z an be omputed in time and with spae in O(n·20.6n),
i.e., with 276.8 polynomial-time operations for n = 128.
The BDD-Attak slightly improves the attak by Fluhrer and Luks (2001),
whih trades o time and the number of required keystream bits. For the min-
imum number of 132 available keystream bits the attak needs 284 polynomial
time operations.
5.5.3 GSM Keystream Generator A5/1
We note that a bit that serves as input for the keystream funtion f at a par-
tiular time has been onsidered a few lokings earlier by the lok ontrol
mehanism. Based on our observations in Setion 5.4.1, we therefore dupliate
the three registers of A5/1 suh that the keystream bits are omputed from the
rst three registers and the lok ontrol operates on the remaining registers.
However, the keystream generation algorithm of the resulting generator is still
not read-one, sine the bits of unloked registers are reonsidered in subse-
quent iterations. The read-one Algorithm 9 xes this problem by introdu-
ing auxiliary variables for these unhanged values. It an be straightforwardly
heked that this algorithm is equivalent to the original A5/1 algorithm.
Due to the irregular loking of the A5/1 algorithm, the information rate α
is a little less straightforward to ompute, but an be determined as follows.
Lemma 5.32 (Krause (2002), Stegemann (2004)). The information rate
of the modied A5/1 keystream generator is given by
α =
1
2
log u1 ≈ 0.2193 ,
where u1 denotes the positive real root of the polynomial p(u) = u
3 − 3u2 + 8.
Proof. The Independene Assumption has been shown to hold for A5/1 by
Krause (2002) and Stegemann (2004). For an arbitrary keystream z, m ≥ 1,
and a randomly hosen internal bitstream w, |w| = m, let
p(m) := Pr
w
[Cm(w) is prex of z] .
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Algorithm 9 read-one-A5/1(w)
// w is interpreted as w = w00 , . . . , w
5
0 , . . . , w
0
j , . . . , w
5
j , . . . , w
m−1 mod 6
m−1 div 6
i := [0, 0, 0] // urrent read positions
u :=NIL // unhanged index ∈ {0, 1, 2, NIL}
v :=NIL // unhanged ontrol value ∈ {0, 1, NIL}
v′ :=NIL // unhanged output value ∈ {0, 1, NIL}
t := 0
while (true) do
if ∃r ∈ {0, 1, 2}\{u} : 6 · i[r] + r ≥ m then
stop
end if
Read := {0, 1, 2}\{u}
Let r0, . . . , r|Read|−1 the elements of Read in asending order, i.e. rm < rn
for m < n
out[r0] := w
r0
i[r0]
out[r1] := w
r1
i[r1]
if u 6= NIL then // ∃ an unhanged index
out[u] := v′ // opy the unhanged output value
else // all read positions inremented
out[r2] := w
r2
i[r2]
// read the third output value
end if
output zt = out[0]⊕ out[1]⊕ out[2]
if ∃r ∈ {0, 1, 2}\{u} : 6 · i[r] + 3 + r ≥ m then
stop
end if
c[r0] := w
3+r0
i[r0]
c[r1] := w
3+r1
i[r1]
if u 6= NIL then // ∃ an unhanged index
c[u] := v // opy the unhanged ontrol value
else // all read positions inremented
c[r2] := w
3+r2
i[r2]
// read the third ontrol value
end if
controlbit := maj3(c[0], c[1], c[2])
if ∃r ∈ {0, 1, 2} : c[r] 6= controlbit then
// By denition of maj3, ∃ at most one suh r
u := r // set unhanged index
v := controlbit⊕ 1 // set unhanged ontrol value
v′ := out[r] // set unhanged output value
else // all read positions inremented
u := v := v′ := NIL
end if
for l ∈ {0, 1, 2}\{u} do
i[l] := i[l] + 1 // inrement read positions
end for
t := t+ 1
end while
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Moreover, dene for m ≥ 0 and k ≤ m
p(m, k) := Pr
w∈u{0,1}m
[|Cm(w)| = k] .
Sine a keystream bit is omputed either from 4 or 6 internal bits, we have
m
6 ≤ |Cm(w)| ≤
m
4 . Based on Equation (4.3) we an express p(m) as
p(m) = Pr
w
[Cm(w) is prex of z]
=
⌈γm⌉∑
i=0
Pr
w
[|Cm(w)| = i] · Pr
|Cm(w)|=i
[Cm(w) = z0, . . . , zi−1]
=
m
4∑
k=m6
p(m, k) · 2−k .
Furthermore, Lemma 4.5 implies α = − 1m log2(p(m)). Therefore, we now
derive a suitable reurrene relation for p(m) and use this expression to ompute
α.
Let W denote the random variable that stores the number of internal bits
that were used for the omputation of the rst
m
6 keystream bits. Moreover,
let W ′ store the number of keystream bits that were omputed from 6 internal
bits. These denitions imply
W = 6 ·W ′ + 4 · (
m
6
−W ′) .
The number of internal bits that have not been read after the
m
6 keystream bits
have been produed is given by
m−W = m− (6 ·W ′ + 4 · (
m
6
−W ′)) =
1
3
m− 2W ′ .
We obtain the following reurrene relation for p(m).
p(m) =
m
6∑
i=0

2−m6 Pr[W ′ = i] · (
1
3m−2i)/6∑
j=( 13m−2i)/6
2−jp
(
1
3
m− 2i, j
)
=
m
6∑
i=0
2−
m
6 Pr[W ′ = i] · p
(
1
3
m− 2i
)
Sine W ′ is
(
m
6 ,
1
4
)
-binomially distributed (f. Stegemann (2004) for a
proof), we an write Pr[W ′ = i] as
Pr[W ′ = i] =
(m
6
i
)(
1
4
)i (
3
4
)m
6 −i
,
whih implies
p(m) =
m
6∑
i=0
2−
m
6
(m
6
i
)(
1
4
)i (
3
4
)m
6 −i
· p
(
1
3
m− 2i
)
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With p(m) = 2−αm, we obtain a reurrene relation for α:
2−αm =
m
6∑
i=0
2−
m
6
(m
6
i
)(
1
4
)i (
3
4
)m
6 −i
· 2−α(
1
3m−2i)
= 2−(
1
6+
α
3 )m
m
6∑
i=0
(m
6
i
)(
1
4
)i (
3
4
)m
6 −i
· 22αi
Lemma 5.45 implies that this equation is equivalent to
2−αm = 2−(
1
6+
α
3 )m
(
1
4
)m
6
(3 + 22α)
m
6
⇐⇒ 2−6α = 2−(1+2α)
1
4
(3 + 22α)
⇐⇒ 21−4α =
1
4
(3 + 22α)
⇐⇒ 2(22α)−2 −
1
4
(22α)−
3
4
= 0
By substituting u := 22α, i.e., α = 12 log u, we nally obtain
u3 + 3u2 − 8 = 0 . 2
The read-one Algorithm 10 tests for a given internal bitstream w and an
observed keystream z whether z ould have been produed by w. In order to
transform Algorithm 10 into an FBDD, we proeed as follows. We rst onvert
the funtion output-test into an output− FBDD(i, u, v, v′, t). Let out[rj ] denote
the value of the variable w
rj
i[rj ]
for j ∈ {0, 1, 2} and let
vˆ′ :=
{
out[r0]⊕ out[r1]⊕ out[r2] u = NIL
out[r0]⊕ out[r1]⊕ v′ u 6= NIL
.
Then, output− FBDD(i, u, v, v′, t) is a omplete binary tree of depth 2 if u 6=
NIL and a omplete binary tree of depth 1 if u = NIL with
qj =
{
control− FBDD(i, u, v, vˆ′, out, t) if vˆ′ = wt
0− sink otherwise
.
If there exists an r ∈ {0, 1, 2}\{u} suh that 6 · i[r] + r ≥ m, then
output− FBDD(i, u, v, v′, t)
is idential to the 1-sink. Similarly, in order to onvert the funtion control− test
into a
control− FBDD(i, u, v, v′, out, t) ,
let c[rj ] denote the value of w
3+rj
i[rj ]
, set
controlbit :=
{
maj3(c[r0], c[r1], c[r2]) if u = NIL
maj3(c[r0], c[r1], v) if u 6= NIL
,
and dene iˆ, uˆ, vˆ, and vˆ′ as in the funtion control− test.
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control− FBDD(i, u, v, v′, t) is then a omplete binary tree of depth 2 if
u 6= NIL and a omplete binary tree of depth 1 if u = NIL with
qj = output− FBDD(ˆi, uˆ, vˆ, vˆ
′, t+ 1) .
As above, if there exists an r ∈ {0, 1, 2}\{u} suh that 6 · i[r] + 3 + r ≥ m,
then control− FBDD(i, u, v, v′, t) is idential to the 1-sink.
Altogether, the FBDD Qm is given by
output− FBDD([0, 0, 0],NIL,NIL,NIL, 0) .
Sine the sub-FBDDs output− FBDD and control− FBDD have onstant
sizes and there are at most O(m4) dierent sub-FBDDs, the size of Qm satises
|Qm| ∈ O(m4).
Ignoring the urrent position t in the keystream and omitting the test whether
zt = vˆ
′
in the funtion output− test, we an straightforwardly derive from Qm
the orale graph G0m that denes the order in whih the bits of the wj are read
in Qm. It is easy to see that |G0m| ∈ O(m
3).
Algorithm 10 A5/1-Qm(w, z)
// w is interpreted as w = w00 , . . . , w
5
0 , . . . , w
0
j , . . . , w
5
j , . . . , w
m−1 mod 6
m−1 div 6
export w,m, z // global variables
return output-test([0,0,0℄,NIL,NIL,NIL,0)
The denition of A5/1 implies that the keystream funtion reads the bits
produed by a xed LFSR Rj, j ∈ {0, . . . 5}, in anonial order. Hene, the
reading order πjm dened by π
j
m(i) := i div k for i ≡ j mod 6 is onsistent with
G0m in the sense of Denition 5.11. Observation 5.12 then implies that the π
j
m-
OBDD Sm with j = (m − 1) mod 6 onstruted aording to Corollary 5.23
and Remark 5.24 is a G0m-FBDD.
Obviously, at most
m
4 keybits are produed from an internal bitstream of
length m, whih implies γ = 14 .
In summary, we obtain by plugging the omputed values into the statements
of Theorem 5.18:
Corollary 5.33 (Krause (2002)). From a prex of length ⌈1.14n⌉ of a keystream
y = Cm(L(x)) produed by an A5/1 keystream generator of key length n, an ini-
tial state x˜ with Cm(L(x˜)) = y an be omputed in time and with spae in
O(n10 ·20.6403n), i.e, with 20.6403n = 241 polynomial-time operations for n = 64.
We note that sine ⌈1.14n⌉ = 73 and the framelength in GSM is 114 Bits for
eah diretion , we only need the rst frame, i.e., the rst around 4.6 millise-
onds, of a onversation in order to reonstrut the initial state of the keystream
generator.
5.5.4 Trivium
Trivium (see Setion 4.2.4) is a regularly loked keystream generator onsisting
of three interonneted NFSRs R0, R1, R2 of lengths n(0) = 93, n(1) = 84, and
n(2) = 111. The 288-bit initial state of the generator is derived from an 80 bit
66 5.5 Appliations
funtion output-test(i, u, v, v′, t)
// i=urrent read positions
// u=unhanged index ∈ {0, 1, 2, NIL}
// v=unhanged ontrol value ∈ {0, 1, NIL}
// v′=unhanged output value ∈ {0, 1, NIL}
// t=urrent position in the keystream
if ∃r ∈ {0, 1, 2}\{u} : 6 · i[r] + r ≥ m then
return true
end if
Read := {0, 1, 2}\{u}
Let r0, . . . , r|Read|−1 the elements of Read in asending order, i.e. rm < rn
for m < n
out[r0] := w
r0
i[r0]
out[r1] := w
r1
i[r1]
if u 6= NIL then // ∃ an unhanged index
out[u] := v′ // opy the unhanged output value
else // all read positions inremented
out[r2] := w
r2
i[r2]
// read the third output value
end if
vˆ′ := out[0]⊕ out[1]⊕ out[2]
if zt 6= vˆ′ then
return false // keystream inonsistent
end if
return ontrol-test(i, u, v, vˆ′, out, t)
key and an 80 bit IV. The keystream funtion omputes a keystream bit zt by
linearly ombining six bits of the internal state, with eah NFSR ontributing
two bits (f. Setion 4.2.4 for details). In order to mount the BDD-attak on
Trivium, we write the keystream funtion as
zt = g1(s1, s94, s178)⊕ s28 ⊕ s109 ⊕ s223
and proeed as desribed in Setion 5.4.1 by adding an LFSR R3 whih omputes
g1 to the generator. For πm equal to the anonial reading order, we have pi =
max1≤t≤288{|AMpim(f˜
i, t)|}+1 = 2 and si =
1
4 for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} as well as p3 = 1
and s3 =
1
4 , whih implies p =
∑3
i=0 pisi =
7
4 . Sine the modied generator
omputes one keystream bit from four internal bits, we have β(m) = 14m and
α = γ = 14 . Based on Lemma 5.22, we an obviously onstrut a πm-OBDD Qm
with w(Qm) ≤ 2 that performs the onsisteny test for the observed keystream
z.
Observation 5.34. For Trivium we have Prw[Cm(w)is prex of z] = pC(m) =
2−|Cm(w)|, i.e., the Independene Assumption holds.
Proof. Let z˜ = (z˜1, . . . , z˜|z˜|) denote an arbitrary |z˜|-bit keystream. Sine w
(m)
is randomly hosen and uniformly distributed, we have
Pr
w
[z1 = w1 + w28 + w94 + w109 + w178 + w223 = z˜1] =
1
2
.
5.5 Appliations 67
funtion ontrol-test(i, u, v, v′, out, t)
if ∃r ∈ {0, 1, 2}\{u} : 6 · i[r] + 3 + r ≥ m then
return true
end if
Read := {0, 1, 2}\{u}
Let r0, . . . , r|Read|−1 the elements of Read in asending order, i.e. rm < rn
for m < n
c[r0] := w
3+r0
i[r0]
c[r1] := w
3+r1
i[r1]
if u 6= NIL then // ∃ an unhanged index
c[u] := v // opy the unhanged ontrol value
else // all read positions inremented
c[r2] := w
3+r2
i[r2]
// read the third ontrol value
end if
controlbit := maj3(c[0], c[1], c[2])
if ∃r ∈ {0, 1, 2} : c[r] 6= controlbit then
// By denition of maj3, ∃ at most one suh r
uˆ := r // set unhanged index
vˆ := controlbit⊕ 1 // set unhanged ontrol value
vˆ′ := out[r] // set unhanged output value
else // all read positions inremented
uˆ := vˆ := vˆ′ := NIL
end if
for l ∈ {0, 1, 2} do
iˆ[l] := i[l] +
{
1 l 6= u
0 l = u
end for
return output-test(ˆi, uˆ, vˆ, vˆ′, t+ 1)
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Three of the six internal bits utilized in the omputation of a partiular key-
bit will be reused in later steps, but eah step also involves three previously
unonsidered bits. Hene, the laim follows by indution. 2
By plugging α, γ and p into the statement of Theorem 5.18, we obtain:
Theorem 5.35. The seret initial state of the Trivium automaton an be re-
overed from the rst n keystream bits in time and with spae in O
(
n · 20.65625n
)
≈
2189 for n = 288.
Theorem 5.35 shows that the BDD-attak is appliable to Trivium, but its
performane is not ompetitive with reently published attaks requiring only
245 operations as desribed in Setion 4.2.4.
5.5.5 Grain-128
The regularly loked stream ipher Grain-128 (see Setion 4.2.5) has a key size
of 128 bits and an IV size of 96 bits. The design is based on two interonneted
shift registers, an LFSR R0 and an NFSR R1, both of lengths n(0) = n(1) = 128
and a nonlinear keystream funtion. We denote the ontent of the LFSR by
st, st+1, . . . , st+127 and the ontent of the NFSR by bt, bt+1, . . . , bt+127. The
orresponding update funtions and the keystream funtion are given in Se-
tion 4.2.5.
We add to the keystream generator an NFSR R2 whih omputes the keystream
bits zt and have the generator output the values produed by R
2
in eah lok.
More preisely, we an ompute zt as
zt = g1(bt+2, bt+15, bt+36, bt+45, bt+64, bt+73, bt+89, bt+12, st+8, st+13, st+20,
st+60, st+79)⊕ bt+95g2(st+42)⊕ g3(bt+12)bt+95st+95 ,
where g2(st+42) = st+42 and g3(bt+12) = bt+12 and g1 ontains 3 monomials of
degree 2.
Hene, we an ompute one keystream bit from 3 internal bits, whih implies
β(m) = 13m and α = γ =
1
3 . For πm equal to the anonial reading order, it
is p0 = 1, and we have p1 = max0≤i≤117{|AMpim(f˜
1, t + i)|} + 1 = 4, and
p2 = max0≤i≤95{|AMpim(f˜
2, t + i)|} + 1 = 4. Hene, p = 13 +
4
3 +
4
3 = 3.
Obviously, the onsisteny test for an observed keystream an be performed by
a πm-OBDDQm with w(Qm) ≤ 2
3 = 8 aording to Lemma 5.22. Sine new bits
are utilized in the omputation of eah keybit, we an expet the Independene
Assumption to hold.
Hene, the appliation of Theorem 5.18 yields
Theorem 5.36. The seret initial state of the Grain automaton an be reov-
ered from the rst n keystream bits in time and with spae in O
(
n · 20.6n
)
≈ 2154
for n = 256.
Compared to the attaks listed in Setion 4.2.5, although far from the eort
required by exhaustive key searh, Theorem 5.36 is to the best of our knowl-
edge the rst exploitable ryptanalyti result under realisti assumptions be-
sides generi time-memory-data-tradeo attaks as presented by Biryukov and
Shamir (2000).
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5.5.6 The F-FCSR Stream Cipher Family
The F-FCSR stream ipher family in its urrent version onsists of the variants
F-FCSR-H and F-FCSR-16 (see Setion 4.2.6).
F-FCSR-H has key length 80 bits and onsists of a single Galois FCSR M
of length n = 160 and a feedbak tap vetor d of Hamming weight 83. Memory
ells are only present at those 82 positions i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, for whih di = 1.
At eah lok, eight keystream bits bi are reated by taking the XOR-sum of up
to 15 variables of the urrent internal state (f. Setion 4.2.6 for details).
In order to mount the BDD-attak, we split the FCSR into the main register
R0 and the arry register R1. Sine eah keystream bit is omputed as the
sum of up to 15 internal bits, we are in a similar situation as desribed in
Example 5.19 and need additional LFSRs R2, . . . , R9 to ompute the keystream
bits zi, 0 ≤ i < 8. The modied keystream funtion simply returns these
bits in eah lok. With l := wt(d) − 1 we obtain eight keystream bits from
2l + 8 internal bits, hene β(m) = 82l+1m and α = γ =
8
2l+8 =
2
43 . We have
p0 = p1 = l, pi = 1 for i ∈ {2, . . . , 9}, s0 = s1 =
l
2l+8 , and si =
1
2l+8 for
2 ≤ i ≤ 9, whih implies p = 2l
2+1
2l+1 .
Obviously, the onsisteny test for the observed keystream z an be per-
formed by an OBDD Qm with w(Qm) ≤ 2. Sine the omputation of the
keybits involves new internal bits in every lok, we an expet the Indepen-
dene Assumption to hold. Note that we have l additional unknowns from the
initial value of the arry register.
Plugging the omputed values into the statement of Lemma 5.17 implies the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.37. The seret initial state of the F-FCSR-H automaton an be re-
overed from the rst n+l keystream bits in time and with spae in O
(
n · 20.9925(n+l)
)
≈
2241 for n = 160 and l = 82.
The F-FCSR-16 generator has the same struture as F-FCSR-H, but larger
parameters. More preisely, we have key length 128 bits, n = 256 and the
feedbak tap vetor has Hamming weight 131 (i.e., l = 130), where memory ells
are only present at nonzero tap positions as before. Sine F-FCSR-16 produes
16 keystream bits per lok, we onstrut 16 additional LFSRs that produe
these bits. Hene, we an ompute 16 keystream bits from 2l+16 internal bits,
whih implies β(m) = 162l+16m and α = γ =
16
2l+16 =
4
69 . Analogously to the
ase of F-FCSR-H, we obtain p = 2l
2+16
2l+16 . The modied generator satises the
Independene Assumption as before, and we have l = 130 additional unknowns.
We obtain by applying Lemma 5.17:
Theorem 5.38. The seret initial state of the F-FCSR-16 automaton an be re-
overed from the rst n+l keystream bits in time and with spae in O
(
n · 20.94(n+l)
)
≈
2363 for n = 256 and q′ = 8.
Our analysis supports the seurity requirement that the Hamming weight of
c should not be too small, whih Arnault et al. (2006) motivated by ompletely
dierent arguments. Although the BDD-attak is to the best of our knowledge
the rst nontrivial attak on the urrent version of the F-FCSR family, its
eieny is by no means lose to exhaustive key searh.
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One obvious disadvantage of BDD-based attaks is their high memory onsump-
tion, whih is essentially determined by the size of the intermediate BDDs Pm.
One possible approah are divide-and-onquer strategies (DCS) that divide the
searh spae, i.e., the set {0, 1}m of internal bitstreams of length m, into seg-
ments and to apply BDD-based attaks to the segments individually.
We represent a segmentation of {0, 1}m by a funtion θm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}∗
assigning a segment to eah internal bitstream. The number of dierent seg-
ments is then given by |im(θm)|. We denote by θ
ς
m the harateristi funtion
of segment ς ∈ im(θm), i.e.,
θςm : {0, 1}
m → {0, 1}
w 7→
{
1 if θm(w) = ς
0 otherwise
.
Consequently, we denote by Θςm the G
0
m-FBDD representing θ
ς
m, i.e., the G
0
m-
FBDD that aepts exatly those w ∈ {0, 1}m that satisfy θςm(w) = 1. Based
on a segmentation θm, we an perform the BDD-based attak as outlined in
Algorithm 11.
Algorithm 11 ReoverInitialState-DCS
for all ς ∈ im(θm) do
P ς = Qnmin ∧Θ
ς
nmin
for m = nmin + 1 to ⌈α−1n⌉ do
P ς = MIN(P ς ∧Qm ∧ Sm ∧Θςm)
end for
if (P ς)−1 (1) 6= {} then
return the initial state bits ontained in one of the w ∈ (P ς)−1 (1)
end if
end for
In the same way as the original attak desribed in Algorithm 5, the per-
formane of the DCS-based attak fundamentally depends on the size of the
intermediate FBDDs P ςm. Compared to the FBDDs Pm in the original attak,
P ςm satises |(P
ς
m)
−1(1)| ≤ | (Pm)
−1
(1)| due to its onstrution. Hene,
m · | (P ςm)
−1 (1)| ≤ m · | (Pm)
−1 (1)| .
On the other hand, the onstrution of P ςm implies
|G0m| · |Qm| · |Rm| · |Θ
ς
m| ≥ |G
0
m| · |Qm| · |Rm| ,
i.e., one of the two bounds that we have used to estimate |Pm| in the proof
of Lemma 5.17 dereases and the other one inreases. We onlude that in
general, we will only benet from a divide-and-onquer strategy if |Θςm| is small
(preferrably polynomial in m) and |im(θm)|, the number of segments, is not
too large, as we have to apply the attak to eah segment instead of only one.
However, sine a partiular internal bitstream belongs to exatly one segment,
the sets of internal bitstreams mapped to the same segment are disjoint, and
the attaks on the individual segments an be eiently parallelized.
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We now onsider the speial ase of setting onstant the bits at ertain initial
positions in the internal bitstream. If V ⊆ IP(m), |V | ≤ n, denotes the set of
initial positions to be set onstant, we dene the restrition of w ∈ {0, 1}m to
the bits at the positions in V as w|V := (wi1 , . . . , wi|V |) with ij ∈ V , ij < ik for
j < k, and the orresponding segmentation funtion as
θm,V : {0, 1}
m → {0, 1}|V |
w 7→ w|V
.
We all a position j ≥ 1 a V-determined position in w = (w0, . . . , wm−1) if
j ∈ V ∪ {0, . . . ,m− 1} or if the value of wj is determined by the bits wl, l ∈ V .
We note that |im(θm,V )| = 2|V | and that the onstrution of the G0m-FBDD
Θςm,V is trivial, while its size is bounded by |Θ
ς
m,V | ∈ O(|V |). The attak on
an individual segment ς ∈ {0, 1}|V | only needs to regard the bits at the n− |V |
non-onstant initial positions as unknowns, and in the worst ase, there are
no V -determined positions exept for those in V . The DCS-based attak on a
single segment therefore orresponds (in the worst ase) to the original attak
with redued key length. Following the lines of the proof of Lemma 5.17 we
straightforwardly obtain
Theorem 5.39. For an FSR-based keystream generator fullling the require-
ments of Lemma 5.17 and a divide-and-onquer strategy based on setting on-
stant the bits at initial positions j ∈ V , |V | ≤ n, the divide-and-onquer algo-
rithm (Algorithm 11) will onsume time in the order of O
(
2|V |ǫ(n)|Qn||V |2r
∗)
and memory in the order of O
(
ǫ(n)|Qn||V |2
r∗
)
, with r∗ := p(1−α)p+α (n− |V |).
5.6.1 DCS for regularly loked (k, l)-Combiners
Based on Theorem 5.39, we analyze two partiular hoies for V that are appli-
able to regularly loked (k, l)-ombiners, e.g., the E0 keystream generator.
First, we dene V to ontain exatly the positions of the rst s initial bits
of eah FSR. In the worst ase, there are no V -determined positions besides the
positions in V .
For a segment ς ∈ im(θm,V ), a BDD-based searh of the orresponding
segment requires as muh eort as the original BDD-attak on a (k, l)-ombiner
of key length (n−ks). We therefore obtain r∗ = k−1k+1 (n−ks) and the exponential
part of the overall runtime beomes
2ks+
k−1
k+1 (n−ks) = 2
k−1
k+1n+
2k
k+1 s ,
whih is by a fator of 2
2k
k+1 s
worse than in the original attak. On the other
hand, the required memory is redued by a fator of 2
k−1
k+1 ks
.
We note that we only need to onsider the assignments to the positions
in V that are onsistent with z. If the ombination of the rst s initial bits
in eah register determines the values of the rst s keystream bits (E0 has
this property, for instane), Lemma 5.15 implies that it is suient to onsider
around |{0, 1}(1−α)ks| = 2(k−1)s of the |im(θm,V )| = 2
ks
possible segments,
whih makes the runtime derease by a fator of 2s to
2
k−1
k+1n+
k−1
k+1 s .
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Lemma 5.40. For a regularly loked (k, l)-ombiner fullling the requirements
of Lemma 5.17 and the divide-and-onquer strategy of setting onstant the rst
s bits produed by eah FSR, the divide-and-onquer algorithm (Algorithm 11)
will onsume time in the order of O
(
ǫ(n)|Qn| · ks · 2
k−1
k+1 (n+s)+s
)
and memory
in the order of O
(
ǫ(n)|Qn| · ks · 2
k−1
k+1 (n−ks)
)
. If the ombiner always produes
s keystream bits from the registers' rst s initial bits, the runtime dereases by
a fator of 2s.
The E0 keystream generator is a regularly loked (4, 4)-ombiner, whih
implies
Corollary 5.41. For the E0 keystream generator with key length n = 128,
hoosing V to ontain the positions of the rst s initial bits of eah LFSR yields
a runtime of the DCS-based attak of 20.6(128+s) polynomial time operations and
a memory onsumption in the order of 20.6(128−4s).
As a seond example, we hoose as V the set of all initial positions that
belong to the shortest FSR, w.l.o.g. the FSR R0. If we denote by n0 ≤
n
k
the length of R0, {0, 1}n0 is the set of all possible initial states of R0. Sine
every k-th position of an internal bitstream w is V -determined, the attak on a
partiular segment orresponds to the performane of the original BDD-attak
on a (k− 1, l)-ombiner of key length n−n0, hene r∗ =
k−2
k (n−n0). It is easy
to see that for n0 ≤
n
k+1 , we have
|V |+ r∗ = n0 +
k − 2
k
(n− n0) ≤
k − 1
k + 1
n ,
whih means that for suiently small n0, we even obtain a runtime improve-
ment in addition to the signiantly redued spae onsumption.
Lemma 5.42. For a regularly loked (k, l)-ombiner fullling the requirements
of Lemma 5.17, n0 the length of the shortest FSR, and the divide-and-onquer
strategy of setting onstant the shortest FSR, the divide-and-onquer algorithm
(Algorithm 11) will onsume time in the order of O
(
ǫ(n)|Qn| · n0 · 2n0+
k−2
k
(n−n0)
)
and memory in the order of O
(
ǫ(n)|Qn| · n0 · 2
k−2
k
(n−n0)
)
.
In the ase of the E0 keystream generator, we have n0 = 25 ≤ 25.6 =
128
4+1
and obtain
Corollary 5.43. For the E0 keystream generator with key length n = 128,
hoosing V to be the set of all initial positions that belong to the LFSR of
length n0 = 25 (the shortest LFSR) yields a runtime of the DCS-based attak of
225+
1
2103 = 276.5 polynomial-time operations and a memory onsumption in the
order of 251.5.
Compared to the original BDD-attak, we have improved the memory on-
sumption by a fator of about 225 and the runtime by a fator of 20.3.
Shaked and Wool (2006) set onstant the last parts of the LFSRs in E0
(60 bits in total) and thereby lowered the memory requirements to 223 while
inreasing the runtime to the order of 283.
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5.6.2 DCS for the A5/1 Generator
In the following, we ompute the information rate of the A5/1 generator with
respet to a family of hoies for the set V , partiularly those dened by setting
onstant the initial states of one or more LFSRs. As stated in Setion 5.5.3,
in the unmodied denition of the A5/1 generator, eah of the three LFSRs
is divided into two, approximately equally long halfs, a value-half onsisting of
the output ell and the ells between output and lok-ontrol ell and a ontrol
half onsisting of the lok-ontrol ell and the rest of the register. Sine the
value-LFSRs and the ontrol-LFSRs in the modied setting orrespond to the
value-halfs and the ontrol-halfs in the unmodied ase, setting onstant the
initial states of LFSRs or half-LFSRs in the original denition is equivalent to
xing the orresponding LFSRs in the modied ase.
For all natural numbers i ≥ 1, we denote by Zi and Wi the random vari-
ables orresponding to the i-th keystream bit and the number of internal bits
proessed for the prodution of the i-th keystream bit, respetively, taken over
the probability spae of all random internal bitstreams. In all ases, Zi and Wi
will fulll the following onditions.
• For all i > 1, Wi is independent of W1, . . . ,Wi−1, and Zi is independent
of Z1, . . . , Zi−1.
• Pr[Zi = 0] = Pr[Zi = 1] =
1
2 .
• There are natural numbers a > b > c and probabilities p, q and r = 1−p−q
suh that Pr[Wi = a] = p, Pr[Wi = b] = q, and Pr[Wi = c] = r.
We denote the situation that Zi and Wi fulll the above onditions as ase
[(p, a), (q, b), (r, c)]. It an be easily heked that the unrestrited A5/1 gen-
erator orresponds to ase [(1/4, 6), (3/4, 4), (0, 0)]. We will see below that all
generators derived from the A5/1 generator by setting onstant one or more of
the six LFSRs orrespond to [(p, a), (q, b), (r, c)] for some p, q, r, a, b, c. We may
then ompute the information rate α with the help of the following Theorem.
Theorem 5.44. In the ase [(p, a), (q, b), (r, c)], the information rate equals α,
where t = 2α is the unique positive real solution of pta + qtb + rtc − 2 = 0.
Note that for the speial ase [(1, k), 0, 0] the information rate is 1/k.
In order to prove Theorem 5.44, we need the following tehnial result.
Lemma 5.45 (Krause (2002)). All natural numbers N ≥ 1, probabilities p ∈
(0, 1) and real numbers β > 0 satisfy
∑N
i=0
(
N
i
)
pi(1−p)N−i2βi =
(
1− p+ p2β
)N
.
Proof (Theorem 5.44). Sine we an obtain the information rate α from
α = − 1m log2 pC(m) following Assumption 4.4, we now ompute the proba-
bility pC(m) = Prw[Cm(w) is prex of z] for the ases that parts of the LFSRs
are set onstant.
Case [(p, a), (q, b), (r, c)] implies that from all random internal bitstreams of
length m, m divisible by a, at least m/a keystream bits are produed. The
number of internal bits remaining from m internal bits after the prodution of
m/a keystream bits an be omputed as
m− aU − bV − c
(m
a
− U − V
)
=
a− c
a
m− (a− c)U − (b− c)V ,
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where U and V denote the number of keystream bits among the rst m/a
keystream bits for whih a and b internal bits are proessed, respetively. Note
that U is (p,m/a)-binomially distributed and that V , under the ondition that
U = i, is (q/(q + r),m/a− i)-binomially distributed. We obtain the following
relation for pC(m).
pC(m) = 2
−m
a
m
a∑
i=0
m
a
−i∑
j=0
Pr[U = i, V = j]p
(
a− c
a
m− (a− c)i− (b − c)j
)
, i.e.,
2−αm = 2−
m
a
m
a∑
i=0
(m
a
i
)
pi(1− p)
m
a
−i
·
m
a
−i∑
j=0
(m
a − i
j
)(
q
q + r
)j (
r
q + r
)m
a
−i−j
· 2−α(
a−c
a
m−(a−c)i−(b−c)j) ,
whih is equivalent to
2(1−aα+(a−c)α)
m
a =
m
a∑
i=0
(m
a
i
)
pi(1 − p)
m
a
−i · 2(a−c)αi
·
m
a
−i∑
j=0
(m
a − i
j
)(
q
1− p
)j (
r
1− p
)m
a
−i−j
· 2(b−c)αj .
Now, we apply Lemma 5.45 to the inner sum and obtain
2(1−nα)
m
a =
m
a∑
i=0
(m
a
i
)
pi(1− p)
m
a
−i · 2(a−c)αi ·
(
r
1− p
+
q
1− p
2(b−c)α
)m
a
−i
.
Setting s := r1−p +
q
1−p2
(b−c)α
, we get
(
2
s2cα
)m
a
=
m
a∑
i=0
(m
a
i
)
pi(1− p)
m
a
−i · 2((a−c)α−log(s))i
=
(
1− p+ p2(a−c)α−log(s)
)m
a
.
Consequently, we obtain by setting t := 2α
2
stc
= 1− p+ p
ta−c
s
⇔ 2 = (1− p)stc + pta .
s = r1−p +
q
1−p t
b−c
implies 2 = rtc+ qtb+pta, whih in turn implies the laim.2
We now ompute the information rates for restritions of type (v1v2v3|c1c2c3) ∈
{0, 1}6, whih means that those output LFSRs i in the modied version of the
generator for whih vi = 1 and the ontrol LFSRs j for whih cj = 1 are set
onstant. Note that the unrestrited ase orresponds to (000|000). We do not
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onsider the ase of 5 onstant LFSRs, sine the initial state of the remaining
unknown LFSR from a given keystream an be omputed in linear time.
For symmetry reasons, ertain hoies for (v1v2v3|c1c2c3) are equivalent.
First, it is easy to see that for all permutations πm of {1, 2, 3}, restrition
(v1v2v3|c1c2c3) is equivalent to restition (vpim(1), vpim(2)vpim(3)|cpim(1)cpim(2)cpim(3)).
Furthermore, we observe that with respet to restrition (v|c), v, c ∈ {0, 1}3,
the number of internal bits W (u, V, C) proessed for the prodution of the next
keystream bit assuming the urrent values in the ontrol LFSRs are u ∈ {0, 1}3
equals
W (u, v, c) =
∑
i,ci=0
fi(u) +
∑
i,vi=0
fi(u) , (5.3)
where for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} the Boolean funtion fi : {0, 1}3 → {0, 1} is dened to
output 1 on u i the i-th LFSR will be loked w.r.t. u, more preisely
fi(u) = (ui ⊕ u((i+1) mod 3) ⊕ 1) ∨ (ui ⊕ u((i+2) mod 3) ⊕ 1) .
Equation (5.3) implies that for all v, c, u ∈ {0, 1}3 and i ∈ {1, 2, 3},W (u, v, c) =
W (u, v′, c′), where v′, c′ are obtained from v, c by exhanging the i-th ompo-
nent. Hene, restrition (v|c) is equivalent to restrition (v′|c′). It is therefore
suient to analyze the restritions (000|100), (100|100), (100|010), (100|110),
(000|111), (100|111), and (110|110).
We rst onsider the restrition (100|100). If the atual ontent of the output
ells of the two non-onstant ontrol LFSRs is 00 or 11, then four internal bits
will be proessed, otherwise two internal bits will be proessed. Hene, the
orresponding ase is [(1/2, 4), (1/2, 2), 0] and therefore α ≈ 0.3215.
Under restrition (100|010), four internal bits will be proessed if the atual
ontent of the output ell of the onstant ontrol LFSR is b ∈ {0, 1} and the
atual ontent of the two non-onstant ontrol LFSR is bb. If we have bb¯ then
two, and in all remaining ases 3 internal bits will be proessed. Therefore, we
are in the ase [(1/4, 4), (1/2, 3), (1/4, 2)] and obtain α ≈ 0.3271.
Under restrition (110|110), two internal bits will be proessed if the assign-
ment to the output ells of the onstant ontrol LFSRs is 01 or 10 or if all three
output ells of the ontrol LFSRs oinide. If the assignment to the output ells
of the onstant ontrol LFSRs is bb for some b ∈ {0, 1} and the random assign-
ment to the remaining ontrol ell is b¯, then the next keystream bit depends
only on the onstant assignments, and no internal bit will be proessed. Hene,
in ontrast to the above ases, pC(m) and α are not independent of the onstant
LFSRs and the given keystream. Therefore, we ompute only the average in-
formation rate over all possible assignments to the onstant ontrol and output
LFSRs. Aording to the above observation, the probability that two internal
bits are proessed for the next keystream bit is 3/4, and the probability that
0 internal bits are proessed for the next ouput bit is 1/4. In total, we obtain
[(3/4, 4), (1/4, 0), 0] and therefore α ≈ 0.6113.
We an handle the remaining ases with similar arguments.
The information rates for the disussed ases are summarized in Table 5.1.
Lemma 5.46. For the A5/1 keystream generator and the devide-and-onquer
strategy of setting onstant partiular sub-LFSRs as indiated in Table 5.1, the
divide-and-onquer algorithm (Algorithm 11) will onsume time in the order of
O
(
2|V | · n11 · 2r
∗)
and memory in the order of O
(
n11 · 2r
∗)
with r∗ = 1−α1+αn.
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Table 5.1: Information rates α for the restrited A5/1
|V | restrition α r∗ |V |+ r∗
2
3n (100|111) 0.6430 0.2173n 0.8840n
(110|110) 0.6113 0.2412n 0.9079n
1
2n (000|111) 0.4386 0.3902n 0.8902n
(100|110) 0.4261 0.4024n 0.9024n
1
3n (000|110) 0.3271 0.5070n 0.8403n
(100|100) 0.3215 0.5134n 0.8467n
1
6n (000|100) 0.2622 0.5840n 0.7507n
0 (000|000) 0.2193 0.6403n 0.6403n
5.7 Simulations and Experimental Results
In order to provide a fast implementation of the FBDD algorithms, the FBDD-
library developed by Stegemann (2004) based on the publily available OBDD
pakage CUDD (Somenzi, 2001) was extended to support divide-and-onquer
strategies. We used this library for our experiments on a standard Linux PC
with a 2.7 GHz Intel Xeon proessor and 4 GB of RAM. All implementations
were done in C using the g-ompiler.
Sine the runtime of the ryptanalysis fundamentally depends on the maxi-
mum size of the intermediate FBDDs Pm, we investigate how muh experimen-
tally obtained values of |Pm| deviate from the theoretial gures.
We rst onsider the basi BDD-based attak. For the self-shrinking gener-
ator, the E0 generator and the A5/1 generator, we analyzed several thousands
of redued instanes with random primitive feedbak polynomials and random
initial states for various key lengths. For eah onsidered random generator, we
omputed the atual maximum BDD-size of the intermediate results
Pmax(n) = max
1≤m≤⌈α−1n⌉
{|Pm|} ,
the theoretial upper bound
P tmax(n) = max
1≤m≤⌈α−1n⌉
{
ǫ(m) · |Qm| · 2
p(1−α)
p+α n
}
that was obtained in Lemma 5.17, as well as the quotient q(n) = log(Pmax(n))log(P tmax(n))
.
Similarly, we tested for E0 and A5/1 the divide-and-onquer strategy of
setting onstant the shortest LFSR (denoted by strategy s1), and we onsidered
xing the rst s = ⌊n02 ⌋ ≤
n
8 bits of eah of the four LFSRs in E0 (denoted by
strategy s2), with n0 the length of the shortest LFSR. Note that (s1) orresponds
to the ase (100|100) for the A5/1 generator. Sine the q(n)-values did not
notieably derease with inreasing n in all our simulations, we estimate the
attak's performane in dependene of n by multiplying the theoretial gures
by 2q(n). Partiularly, we an obtain onjetures about the attak's performane
on real-life instanes of E0 and A5/1 by replaing n with the atual key lengths.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 shows the results of these omputations along with details
about our experiments. We observe that our results are onsistent with an
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earlier analysis of the basi BDD-based attak on E0 and the self-shrinking
generator whih was onduted by Shleer (2002).
On average, the attak based on DCS (s1) took 87 minutes for E0 with
n = 37 and 54 minutes for A5/1 with n = 30. The longest key lengths that we
were able to takle with the resoures desribed at the beginning of this setion
were n = 46 for E0 and n = 37 for A5/1. These attaks used up almost all of
the available memory and took 60.5 and 25.1 hours to omplete on average.
5.8 Disussion of the BDD-Attak
We observe that when onsidering only the keystream generator (without the
key/IV setup proedure), the BDD-Attak is an eient generi initial state
reovery attak that is faster than exhaustive searh for a broad lass of stream
iphers. This leads straightforwardly to an eient attak for older designs like
E0 and A5/1, whose key length is roughly equal to the internal state size.
From the extended BDD-Attak, e.g. on Trivium, we observe that the BDD
approah may still be applied to reover the initial internal state of a keystream
generator under the following generalizations.
1. Instead of LFSRs, feedbak shift registers with nonlinear update funtions
are used. This is in ontrast to algebrai attaks (to be disussed in the
next hapter), whih fundamentally depend on the linearity of the update
funtion. The only requirement that we have is that the update relation
be balaned.
2. The shift registers inuene eah other via exhanging update bits.
However, sine the adaption of time/memory/data tradeos to stream i-
phers by Biryukov and Shamir (2000), modern designs inorporate keystream
generators whose size is at least twie the key length. Hene, for the BDD-Attak
in its urrent form to yield an atual attak on the whole ipher (inluding the
key/IV setup), we would need
p(1−α)
p+α <
1
2 , whih means α >
1
3 for p = 1. This
will rarely be the ase for pratial designs.
Hene, the generi nature of the BDD-Attak is at the same time its draw-
bak: Currently, we annot make use of any IV-knowledge and we see no way
to eiently take the key/IV setup (usually performing many operations with-
out produing observable output) with our method. Similarly, it seems hard to
Table 5.2: Simulation parameters of the BDD-based attak
generator DCS key length avg no. of
interval q(n) samples
E0 − [19, 37] 0.85 2000
E0 s1 [19, 37] 0.95 2700
E0 s2 [19, 37] 0.9 2700
A5/1 − [15, 30] 0.9 3000
A5/1 s1 [19, 37] 0.77 2400
SSG − [10, 35] 0.8 3300
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Table 5.3: Performane of the BDD-based attak in pratie
generator DCS estimated pratial performane
Time Spae
E0 − 20.51n 265.28 20.51n 265.28
E0 s1 2
0.475(n+n0) 272.68 20.475(n−n0) 248.93
E0 s2 2
0.54n+0.27n0 275.87 20.54n−1.08n0 242.12
A5/1 − 20.5763n 236.88 20.5763n 236.88
A5/1 s1 20.3953n+0.77n0 239.93 20.3953n 225.30
SSG − 20.525n 20.525n
inorporate the speialities in the ipher operations that are heavily exploited
by other, more spei attaks.
It therefore remains as an open question whether the BDD-Approah an be
ombined with other strategies (e.g., orrelation attaks and algebrai attaks
whih are to be onsidered in the next hapter) in order to obtain attaks on
modern designs whose internal state is muh larger than the seret key.
Chapter 6
Other Generi Attaks on
Stream Ciphers
In this setion, we onsider two other prominent generi attaks on stream
iphers  orrelation attaks and algebrai attaks.
A orrelation attak onsists of nding and exploiting linear funtions
L(Xt, . . . , Xt+r−1, zt, . . . , zt+r−1)
whih are biased, i.e., equal to zero with some probability 6= 1/2. Algebrai
attaks, in a way, mark the opposite. Here, non-linear equations of preferably
low degree that are true with probability one are used to desribe the seret
information by a system of equations.
The basi ideas of these attaks have been known for quite a few years.
The rst appearane of orrelation attaks dates bak to the mid-80s (Siegen-
thaler, 1985), while algebrai attaks have been disovered around the year 2003
(Armkneht and Krause, 2003, Courtois, 2003, Courtois and Meier, 2003).
In this thesis, we fous on partiular variants of orrelation attaks and al-
gebrai attaks on LFSR-based ombiners with memory, whih we desribe in
Setions 6.1 and 6.2, respetively. We indiate ways to redue the eieny of
these attaks in Setion 6.3 and apply our ndings in Setion 6.4 to improve the
seurity of the Bluetooth keystream generator E0 by relatively small modia-
tions of the original design.
6.1 Correlation Attaks
6.1.1 The Basi Idea
Inspired by Zenner (2004), we rst desribe the basi ideas behind orrelation
attaks.
Denition 6.1. We dene the bias λ(X) of a binary random variable X as
λ(X) := Pr[X = 0]− Pr[X = 1] = E[(−1)X ]
and the orrelation between two random variables X and Y as λ(X⊕Y ). We all
X unbiased if λ(X) = 0, and we say that X and Y unorrelated if λ(X⊕Y ) = 0.
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For pe(X,Y ) dened as
pe(X,Y ) := Pr[X ⊕ Y = 0] = Pr[X = Y ] ,
we have λ(X ⊕ Y ) = 2pe(X,Y ) − 1, or equivalently pe(X,Y ) =
1
2 +
λ(X⊕Y )
2 .
Note that X and Y are unorrelated if and only if pe(X,Y ) =
1
2 .
We rst onsider the ase of ombination generators without memory on-
sisting of k FSRs R1, . . . , Rk−1 and a keystream funtion C : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}
(see Setion 4.1.1).
The fundamental property that orrelation attaks are based on is that
the keystream (zt)t≥0 and the bitstream (w
j
t )t≥0 produed by FSR R
j
, j ∈
{0, . . . , k − 1} are orrelated, more preisely
Pr[zt ⊕ w
j
t = 0] = Pr[zt = w
j
t ] = pe(zt, w
j
t ) = λ
′ 6=
1
2
for all t . (6.1)
The original orrelation attak proposed by Siegenthaler (1985) then pro-
eeds as follows.
1. Make a guess ω˜j(0) for the initial state ωj(0) of Rj and ompute from
ω˜j(0) the sequene (w˜jt )t≥0.
2. For a suitably hosen n, ompute the sum
D˜ :=
n−1∑
i=0
(w˜ji ⊕ zi)
over the integers.
We now distinguish two ases. If the guess in step (1) was orret, D˜ is (n, λ′)-
binomially distributed with expeted value µ = λ′n and variane σ2 = nλ′(1 −
λ′). On the other hand, if the guess was wrong, (zt ⊕ w˜
j
t )t≥0 behaves like
a random sequene, i.e., D˜ is (n, 12 )-binomially distributed with µ =
n
2 and
σ2 = n4 .
Hene, if we an tell whih distribution D˜ was drawn from, we an dedue
if our guess ω˜j(0) was orret. A straightforward approah is to set a threshold
D′ and to aept ω˜j(0) if D˜ > D′. Otherwise, we assume the guessed initial
state was wrong and we try the next one.
With |Rj| denoting the number of ells in register Rj , this method will
require a number of steps in the order of 2|R
j |
for reovering ωj(0), and about
2
P
i6=j |R
i|
operations for omputing the remaining k−1 initial states, whih adds
up to an overall eort of 2|R
j| + 2
P
i6=j |R
i|
, whereas exhaustive searh on the
whole initial state of the generator would require 2
Pk−1
i=0 |R
i| = 2|R
j | · 2
P
i6=j |R
i|
operations. The number n of required keystream bits to tell apart the two
distributions (with a xed error probability) depends on the value | 12 − λ
′|,
i.e., the absolute distane between λ′ and 12 , and will shrink as this distane
inreases.
This strategy an be straightforwardly extended to orrelations of linear
ombinations of FSR output bits and the keystream implied by
Pr[zt = ⊕
k−1
j=0γjw
j
t ] 6=
1
2
with γj ∈ {0, 1} . (6.2)
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However, we now have to guess the initial states of all Rj with γj = 1 simulta-
neously, whih leads to an overall eort in the order of
2
Pk−1
j=0 γj |R
j | + 2
Pk−1
j=0 (γj⊕1)|R
j | .
It is interesting to note that if indeed zt = ⊕
k−1
j=0γjw
j
t for a lok yle t,
then the update relations of the FSRs (and sums thereof) ontinue to hold if we
replae the term ⊕k−1j=0γjw
j
t by zt. Conversely, if a keystream bit zt satises a
large number of suh relations, it is reasonable to assume that ⊕k−1j=0γjw
j
t = zt
and to assume ⊕k−1j=0γjw
j
t 6= zt if zt satises only few. In this way, we an obtain
a andidate guess for the registers Rj with γj 6= 0, whih an be inrementally
improved in order to obtain the true values. This idea was proposed and for-
malized by Meier and Staelbah as Fast Correlation Attak and has onstantly
been extended and improved sine its original publiation in 1988 (see, e.g., Hell
(2007) as a reent example).
As natural ountermeasure against orrelation attaks, we would try to use
ombination funtions that indue the lowest possible orrelations between the
keystream and the FSR bitstreams.
Denition 6.2. A Boolean funtion g : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} is said to be r-th
order orrelation immune if no linear funtion L depending on up to r < k
input variables exists suh that Pr[L(x) = g(x)] 6= 12 .
However, there exist at least two tradeos that limit the eet of a orrelation
immune ombination funtion on the overall seurity of the generator.
Firstly, Siegenthaler (1984), Xiao and Massey (1988) showed that an inrease
in orrelation immunity leads to a lower linear omplexity and vie versa. Hene,
the output keystream of a highly orrelation immune generator will be eiently
reproduible by an LFSR.
For the seond tradeo, we need the following denition.
Denition 6.3. Let {Li|1 ≤ i ≤ 2k} denote the set of linear funtions in up to
k variables. The orrelation oeient between a Boolean funtion g : {0, 1}k →
{0, 1} and Li is dened as ci = 2 · pi − 1 with pi = Pr[Li(x) = g(x)].
Meier and Staelbah (1989) observed that
2k∑
i=1
c2i = 1 , (6.3)
i.e., if g is not orrelated to any low-weight linear funtion, it is at the same
time even stronger orrelated to linear funtions with larger weight. Hene,
orrelations itself an never be prevented.
Rueppel (1986) showed that LFSR-based ombiners with memory are able
to overome the tradeo between orrelation immunity and linear omplexity,
but it turns out that a tradeo similar to Eq. (6.3) is still possible as soon
as orrelations are regarded that span several onseutive lok yles (Goli¢,
1993, 1996, Lu and Vaudenay, 2005, 2004, Salmasizadeh et al., 1997). This is
the setting that we are going to onsider in the following.
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6.1.2 Analysis of the Speial Case C(xt, qt) = α(xt)⊕ β(qt)
We fous on the speial ase of LFSR-based (k, l)-ombiners with memory whose
keystream funtion C an be written as the sum of two funtions α : {0, 1}k →
{0, 1} and β : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}, i.e.,
C(xt, qt) = α(xt)⊕ β(qt) (6.4)
in the LFSR output bits xt = (x
0
t , . . . , x
k−1
t ) and the memory state qt =
(q0t , . . . , q
l−1
t ) at time t. Moreover, we are going to onsider only biased lin-
ear ombinations of β(qt).
Therefore, we look for oeients γ = (γ0, . . . , γr−1) suh that
λ(γ) :=
(
Pr
[
r−1⊕
i=0
γi · β(qt+i) = 0
]
− Pr
[
r−1⊕
i=0
γi · β(qt+i) = 1
])
6= 0 . (6.5)
Lu and Vaudenay (2005, 2008) showed that the bias λ(γ) is related to the
orrelation of the keystream (zt)t≥0 and the sequene (x
0
t )t≥0 produed by the
shortest LFSR (assume R0 for simpliity) by
Pr
[
w⊕
i=1
(
γ0(x
0
t+vi ⊕ zt+vi)⊕ . . .⊕ γr−1(x
0
t+vi+r−1 ⊕ zt+vi+r−1)
)]
=
1
2
+
(λ(γ))w
2
,
with w and v1, . . . , vw depending on the initial state polynomials of the LFSRs.
Hene, biased linear ombinations of β(qt) imply a vulnerability to a orrelation
attak, and for the attak to be as eient as possible, we are interested in
oeient vetors γ yielding
λ
max
:= max{|λ(γ)|} .
General methods to systematially ompute λ
max
and the orresponding
equations exist (e.g., see Goli¢ (1993)), but sine their resoure onsumption is
exponential in k, l and r, these methods are only feasible for small parameters.
However, our speial ase allows for a losed formula for the bias λ(γ), whih
we are going to derive in the following.
We assume that for eah time t ≥ 1, there is a separate Boolean funtion
βt : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}k → {0, 1} revealing information about qt and xt and dene
F r : {0, 1}l × ({0, 1}k)r → {0, 1}
(q1, x1, . . . , xr) 7→ β1(q1, x1)⊕ . . .⊕ βr(qr, xr) ,
where qt+1 := δ(qt, xt).
Denition 6.4. We dene the bias of a Boolean funtion f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
as
λ(f) := Pr[f(x) = 0]− Pr[f(x) = 1] .
We all f unbiased if λ(f) = 0.
Note that if all inputs x are equally likely, we have λ(f) = 2−n
(
|f−1(0)| − |f−1(1)|
)
.
The value λ(F r), for whih we now derive a matrix-based expression, or-
responds to Eq. (6.5) after setting βt(qt, xt) := β(qt) if γt = 1 and βt :≡ 0
otherwise.
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Denition 6.5. For all states q, q′ ∈ {0, 1}l, let p(q, q′) denote the probability
that state q will hange into q′, i.e., p(q, q′) = 2−k |{x|δ(q, x) = q′}| . Addition-
ally, dene
bt(q, q
′) :=
1
2k
(|{x|βt(q, x) = 0 ∧ δ(q, x) = q
′}|
− |{x|βt(q, x) = 1 ∧ δ(q, x) = q
′}|) .
We all the matrix P = (p(q, q′))q,q′∈{0,1}l the transition matrix of the memory
update funtion δ and the matrix Bt = (bt(q, q
′))q,q′∈{0,1}l the bias matrix of δ
and βt w.r.t. to time t.
Theorem 6.6. For all r ≥ 1,
λ(F r) = 2−l
(
eT
)
◦B1 ◦ · · · ◦Br ◦ e ,
where e denotes the onstant-1 vetor of length 2l and MT denotes the transpose
of matrix M .
In order to prove Theorem 6.6, we rst ollet some observations on om-
puting biases.
• For a given nite set S and funtions f, g : S → R we denote by (f, g) =
1
|S|
∑
s∈S f(s)g(s) a positive denite salar produt on R
S
. Note that eah
Boolean funtion f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} satises λ(f) =
(
(−1)f , 1
)
.
• Consider two disjoint nite sets S and S′, funtions f : S → R and
g : S′ → R, and let h : S × S′ → R be dened by h(s, s′) = f(s)g(s′).
Then
(h, 1) =
1
|S||S′|
∑
s∈S,s′∈S′
f(s)g(s′)
=
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
f(s)
1
|S′|
∑
s′∈S′
g(s′)
= (f, 1)(g, 1) .
This implies that for Boolean funtions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, g : {0, 1}m →
{0, 1}, and h : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}m → {0, 1}, dened by h(s, s′) = f(s)⊕g(s′),
we have λ(h) = λ(f) · λ(g).
Now let us denote by f r : {0, 1}l ×
(
{0, 1}k
)r
→ R the funtion (−1)F
r
.
For all r ≥ 1 and q ∈ {0, 1}l, we dene an additional funtion
f rq : {0, 1}
l ×
(
{0, 1}k
)r
→ {−1, 0, 1} ⊆ R
(q1, x1, . . . , xr) 7→
{
f r(q1, x1, · · · , xr) if δ(qr, xr) = q
0 otherwise
,
with qt+1 = δ(qt, xt) for i ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, and let Γrq = (f
r
q , 1) and Γ
r =
(Γrq)q∈{0,1}l . Then f
r =
∑
q∈{0,1}l f
r
q and λ(F
r) =
∑
q∈{0,1}l Γ
r
q.
Theorem 6.6 is now a straightforward onsequene of the following Lemma.
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Lemma 6.7. For q ∈ {0, 1}l and r ≥ 1, the bias matries Bt from Deni-
tion 6.5 satisfy
(Γr)T = 2−l(eT ) ◦B1 ◦ · · · ◦Br .
Proof. For all q, q′ ∈ {0, 1}l we dene
gq,q′ : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}
x 7→
{
1 if δ(q, x) = q′
0 otherwise
.
Observe that for eah t ≥ 1,
((−1)βt(q,·)gq,q′ , 1) = bt(q, q
′) . (6.6)
We prove the laim by indution on r. Note that, due to Eq. (6.6), for all
q ∈ {0, 1}l
Γ1q = 2
−(k+l)
∑
q1,x1
(−1)β1(q1,x1)gq1,q(x1) = 2
−l
∑
q1
bt(q1, q) .
Consequently, Γ1 = 2−l(eT ) ◦B1. For r > 1, the funtion f rq an be written as
f rq (q1, x1, · · · , xr) =
∑
q′∈{0,1}l
f r−1q′ (q1, x1, · · · , xr−1)(−1)
βr(q
′,xr)gq′,q(xr) .
Hene, by Eq. (6.6), we obtain
Γrq =
∑
q′∈{0,1}l
Γr−1q′ br(q
′, q) and (Γr)T = (Γr−1)T ◦Br . 2
Note that the formula given by Theorem 6.6 an be eiently evaluated and
therefore permits an exhaustive searh for the best orrelations even for large
values of r up to the length of the shortest LFSR.
6.2 Algebrai Attaks
6.2.1 The Basi Idea
Algebrai attaks (Armkneht and Krause, 2003, Courtois, 2003, Courtois and
Meier, 2003) are based on solving systems of equations and were, just like
orrelation attaks, targeted at LFSR-based ombination generators without
memory, in our notation onsisting of k LFSRs R0, . . . , Rk−1 and a nonlinear
keystream funtion C that produes from the LFSR output xt = (x
0
t , . . . , x
k−1
t )
a keystream bit zt = C(xt) in eah lok yle t. At this point, we only de-
sribe the basi ideas behind algebrai attaks and refer the interested reader
to Armkneht (2006) for a thorough treatment of the subjet.
The ore of algebrai attaks is to nd Boolean funtions F : {0, 1}k·r →
{0, 1} of low preferably degree suh that for all loks t,
F (xt, . . . , xt+r−1, zt, . . . , zt+r−1) = 0 . (6.7)
Sine the ombiner's FSRs are LFSRs by assumption, we an express the
bit xjt that LFSR R
j
produes at time t by a linear funtion Ljt in the initial
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state ωj(0) of Rj as xjt = L
j
t (ω
j(0)). Hene, olleting equations of the type of
Eq. (6.7) yields a system of equations in the seret initial states of the LFSRs.
However, sine the keystream funtion is non-linear, solving the system and
thereby reovering the seret initial state is NP-hard in general, so we should
not hope for an eent generally appliable key reovery algorithm based on
this strategy, but we may still be fortunate enough to enounter speial ases
that are suiently easy to solve.
This might espeially be the ase if the number of known keystream bits
and therefore the number of equations inreases. Let R denote the number of
aessible equations and µ the number of ourring monomials. If R ≪ µ, a
promising method is to ompute Groebner bases.
Unfortunately, it seems hard to predit the required time eort, albeit simu-
lations indiate that the neessary amount of time drops with inreasing num-
ber of equations (Armkneht and Ars, 2009, Faugère and Ars, 2003).
In the ase of R ≈ µ, linearization (Courtois et al., 2000) seems to be the
rst hoie. The idea of linearization is to substitute eah ourring monomial
by a new variable and to treat the whole system as a system of linear equations,
making it easily solvable by Gaussian elimination.
For the ase that the number of equations exeeds the number of monomi-
als, one might redue the degree of the equations in a preomputation step.
This idea is known as fast algebrai attaks, whih have been introdued by
Courtois (2003) and further improved by, e.g., Armkneht (2004a), Hawkes and
Rose (2004). However, the attak senario is more restritive as it requires the
attaker to know many suessive keystream bits and Eq. (6.7) to have a speial
struture.
All theses approahes have in ommon that their runtime strongly depends
on the degree d of the inorporated equations. The lower the degree, the faster
the attaks. Hene, a natural ountermeasure against suh attaks is to prevent
the existene of low-degree equations.
6.2.2 Analysis of a restrited Senario
For our analysis, we will onentrate on algebrai attaks where R ≈ µ and µ is
approximately
(
n
d
)
. If ϕ denotes the number of funtions F of degree d fullling
Eq. (6.7) and n denotes the total length of the LFSRs, then the amount of
data is ≈
(
n
d
)
/ϕ, and the required memory and runtime are in O
((
n
d
)2)
and
O
((
n
d
)3)
, respetively. Moreover, we now onsider the ase of (k, l)-ombiners
with memory, i.e., we have an additional l-bit memory, the keystream bits zt
are omputed from the LFSR state xt = (x
0
t , . . . , x
k−1
t ) and the memory state
qt = (q
0
t , . . . , q
l−1
t ) as zt = C(xt, qt), while the memory is updated in eah lok
yle aording to qt+1 = δ(xt, qt).
In order to formalize that an LFSR output vetor (xt, . . . , xr+r−1) ∈ ({0, 1}k)r
may (in onjuntion with a suitable memory state qt) yield a given keystream
piee (zt, . . . , zt+r−1), we use the notion of an extended output funtion in-
trodued by Armkneht (2006) (only that we all it the extended keystream
funtion in order to be more onsistent with the rest of our notation).
Denition 6.8. For the keystream funtion C : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}l → {0, 1} of
a (k, l)-ombiner with memory and an integer r > 0, we dene the extended
86 6.2 Algebrai Attaks
keystream funtion CΨ by
CΨ : {0, 1}l × ({0, 1}k)r → {0, 1}r
(q, x1, . . . , xr) 7→ (z1, . . . , zr)
with qi+1 = δ(xi, qi) for 0 ≤ i < r and zi = C(xi, qi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
With this notion, Armkneht and Krause (2003) adapted the struture of
Eq. (6.7) to the setting of ombiners with memory.
Denition 6.9. For a Z = (z1, . . . , zr) ∈ {0, 1}r, we all a Boolean funtion
FZ : ({0, 1}
k)r → {0, 1} a Z-funtion (with respet to CΨ) if it is not onstant
zero and satises
CΨ(q, x1, . . . , xr) = Z ⇒ FZ(x1, . . . , xr) = 0 (6.8)
for all q ∈ {0, 1}l and all (x1, . . . , xr) ∈ ({0, 1}k)r.
Note that this denition implies that FZ vanishes on all ombinations of LFSR-
inputs over r lok yles and starting states q that yield the keystream piee
Z.
The algebrai attak of Armkneht and Krause (2003) now onsists in om-
puting for eah Z ∈ {0, 1}r a Z-funtion FZ of the lowest possible degree and
to set up the system of equations
F(zt,...,zt+r−1)(xt, . . . , xt+r−1) = 0, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
express the xt in terms of the initial LFSR states and solve the system.
As mentioned earlier, the eieny of the attak fundamentally depends on
the degree of the Z-funtions. Therefore, we want to bound the lowest possible
Z-funtion degree that an our for a given (k, l)-ombiner.
Denition 6.10. For a Z ∈ {0, 1}r, we dene
XZ,Q :=
{
x ∈
(
{0, 1}k
)r
|CΨ(Q, x1, . . . , xr) = Z
}
XZ :=
{
x ∈
(
{0, 1}k
)r
|∃q ∈ {0, 1}l : CΨ(q, x1, . . . , xr) = Z
}
=
⋃
Q∈{0,1}l
XZ,Q
From Eq. (6.8) we dedue that FZ is a Z-funtion if and only if F (x) = 0
for all x ∈ XZ . This leads diretly to the notion of annihilators.
Denition 6.11. We say that a Boolean funtion p : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, p 6≡ 0,
is an annihilator of a subset A ⊆ {0, 1}n if p(x) = 0 for all x ∈ A. We denote
the set of annihilators of A by Ann(A). Furthermore, we dene for A ⊂ {0, 1}n
mindeg(A) := min{deg(f)|f ∈ Ann(A)} .
If A = {0, 1}n, we set mindeg(A) :=∞.
We observe that if we an prove a lower bound for mindeg(XZ) for all Z,
this gives a lower bound for Z-funtion degrees and hene the eort required
by an algebrai attak. In the following, we will propose a onstrution whih
enables us to derive suh a lower bound.
We rst show that under ertain onditions, eah speial lower bound for
mindeg(Xzr,Q) is also a general lower bound for mindeg(X(z1,...,zr)).
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Theorem 6.12. If the keystream funtion C an be expressed as
C(x, q) = α(x) ⊕ β(q) , (6.9)
with α : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} satisfying mindeg
(
α−1(0)
)
= mindeg
(
α−1(1)
)
= d
and β : {0, 1}l → {0, 1} then
mindeg(XZ) ≥ mindeg(XZ,Q) = d
for all r ≥ 1, Z = (z1, . . . , zr) ∈ {0, 1}r, and Q ∈ {0, 1}l.
Proof. Beause of XZ,Q ⊆ XZ , eah annihilator of XZ is also an annihilator
of XZ,Q. This shows the rst inequality.
Moreover, all hoies z ∈ {0, 1} andQ ∈ {0, 1}l satisfyXz,Q = α−1(β(Q)⊕z)
and therefore mindeg(Xz,Q) = d.
Let r ≥ 1, Z = (z1, . . . , zr) ∈ {0, 1}r, q1 ∈ {0, 1}l and f(Y1) ∈ F2[Y1] be an
annihilator of Xz1,q1 . Then f an be seen as an element in F2[Y1, . . . , Yr] whih
annihilates XZ,q1 , too. This shows that mindeg (xZ,q1 ) ≤ mindeg (xz1q1) = d.
We prove now by indution over r that mindeg(XZ,q1) ≥ d for all hoies
of q1 and Z. For r = 1, the laim is ertainly true. Now let r > 1 and the
laim be true for all r′ < r. Fix Z = (z1, . . . , zr) and q1 and f(Y1, . . . , Yr) ∈
Ann(XZ,Q) having the minimal degree mindeg(XQ,Z). Choose an arbitrary
value (x1, . . . , xr) ∈ ({0, 1}k)r and set q2 := δ(x1, q1). Then
f∗(Y2 . . . , Yr) := f(x1, Y2, . . . , Yr)
annihilates X(z2,...,zr),q2 . Hene,
mindeg (xZ,q1 ) = deg(f) ≥ deg(f
∗) ≥ mindeg
(
x(z2,...,zr),q2
)
≥ d ,
where the last inequality is true by assumption. 2
6.3 Countermeasures and Design Priniples
6.3.1 Inreasing the Resistane against Correlation At-
taks
Theorem 6.6 allows to ompute the biases whih are relevant for orrelation
attaks against ombiners with memory with a keystream funtion as in Eq. (6.4)
and to derive orresponding design riteria to immunize them against attaks
that exploit these biases. In partiular, Theorem 6.6 yields two dierent riteria
for δ and βt in order to ahieve that λ(F
r) = 0 for all r ≥ 1.
The rst one assumes the situation that βt is independent of x ∈ {0, 1}k,
i.e., βt(q, x) = βt(q) for all x, whih holds, e.g., for E0.
Denition 6.13. We say that δ is balaned if k = l and |{x|δ(q, x) = q′}| = 1
for all q, q′.
Note that for a balaned δ, p(q, q′) = 2−k for all q, q′.
Theorem 6.14. Let βt either be onstant zero or, at least at one time t, depend
only on q and be balaned. If δ is also balaned, then λ(F r) = 0.
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Proof. If βt ≡ 0, then Bt equals P , the transition matrix of δ. Due to (e
T )·P =
eT , we an assume w.l.o.g. that β1 6≡ 0. Observe that the property of βt being
balaned implies that
∑
q(−1)
β1(q) = 0. Let x(q,q′) := {x|δ(q, x) = q
′}. If βt
depends only on q, then bt(q, q
′) an be rewritten to
bt(q, q
′) =


0 if x(q,q′) = ∅
|x(q,q′)|/2
k
if x(q,q′) 6= ∅ ∧ β(q) = 0
−|x(q,q′)|/2
k
if x(q,q′) 6= ∅ ∧ β(q) = 1


= (−1)βt(q) · p(q, q′) .
Let vT := (eT ) · B1. We show that v is already the all-zero vetor, whih
onludes the proof. Let (vT )q denote the q-th entry of v
T
. We have
(vT )q =
∑
q
(−1)β1(q)p(q, q′) = 2−k ·
∑
q
(−1)β1(q)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= 0 . 2
In the ase that the funtions βt are not independent of x, it is also possible
to entirely avoid orrelations if we put some additional restritions on βt.
Denition 6.15. The funtion β : {0, 1}l×{0, 1}k → {0, 1} is alled q-balaned
if all states q ∈ {0, 1}l satisfy∣∣{x ∈ {0, 1}k| β(q, x) = 0}∣∣ = ∣∣{x ∈ {0, 1}k| β(q, x) = 1}∣∣ .
Lemma 6.16. Let B denote the bias matrix of the state transition funtion
δ : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}l and a q-balaned funtion β : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}. Then B ◦ e = ~0.
Proof. It an be easily heked that for all q ∈ {0, 1}l,
(B ◦ e)q =
∣∣{x ∈ {0, 1}k, β(q, x) = 0}∣∣− ∣∣{x ∈ {0, 1}k, β(q, x) = 1}∣∣
2k
,
whih, by denition, vanishes if β is q-balaned. 2
Theorem 6.17. Let r ≥ 1 and βt be either q-balaned or onstant zero for all
t, 1 ≤ t ≤ r. Then λ(F r) = 0.
Proof. Note that for βt ≡ 0, the bias matrix Bt equals the transition matrix
P . As eah row of P orresponds to a probability distribution over {0, 1}l, we
obtain P ◦ e = e. The rest follows straightforwardly from Theorem 6.6. 2
We want to point out that the previous statements are only true as long
as the orresponding input words xt are independent values in {0, 1}k. In the
ase that LFSRs are used as driving devies, this is only the ase as long as
r is at most the length of the shortest LFSR. This imposes no serious draw-
bak, beause so far, no feasible methods are known to ompute the bias while
onsidering the LFSR-struture.
As we have seen, our results immediately imply two dierent design riteria
to avoid any biased linear ombinations in the expressions β(qt). Atually, they
have even wider appliations. For example, the keystream funtion
f
((
c1, c2, c3, c4
)
,
(
x1, x2, x3, x4
))
= c2 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4
used in E0 is q-balaned. This guarantees that no biased linear ombinations of
the keystream bits zt exist for r ≤ 25, the length of the shortest LFSR.
6.3 Countermeasures and Design Priniples 89
6.3.2 Inreasing the Resistane against Algebrai Attaks
We have seen that the eieny of algebrai drops with inreasing minimum
degree of the Z-funtions. Theorem 6.12 then implies the following strategy.
Choose a keystream funtion C(x, q) = α(x) ⊕ β(q) suh that mindeg
(
α−1(0)
)
and mindeg
(
α−1(1)
)
is the maximum possible value. This will guarantee the
same lower bound for all Z-funtions, as long the values x1, . . . , xr are inde-
pendent elements in {0, 1}k. In the ase that they are the outputs of LFSRs,
this ondition holds if r is no larger than the length of the shortest LFSR (e.g.,
25 in the ase of E0). This restrition is not ritial, sine urrently known
methods (e.g., Armkneht et al. (2006), Didier and Tillih (2006)) are only able
to pratially derive Z-funtions if r is not muh larger than 20.
The value d is equivalently known under the term algebrai immunity, whih
was introdued by Meier et al. (2004) in the ontext of memoryless ombiners,
extended to ombiners with memory by Armkneht (2004b), and examined in
several papers sine then.
Observation 6.18 (Courtois and Meier (2003)). Any Boolean funtion in
n variables has an algebrai immunity of at most ⌈n2 ⌉.
This means that any proposal for a funtion with optimum algebrai immu-
nity ⌈n2 ⌉ an be inorporated in our design.
Proposals on how to onstrut funtions with maximum (or at least high)
algebrai immunity have been made, e.g., by Armkneht and Krause (2006),
Carlet (2008), Dalai et al. (2005). A rather straightforward andidate is the
(generalized) majority-funtion.
Corollary 6.19. Let k ≥ 1. The majority funtion maj : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}
dened by
maj(x) =
{
0 if wt(x) < k/2 or wt(x) = k/2 and x1 = 0
1 otherwise
,
satises mindeg(maj−1(0)) = mindeg(maj−1(1)) = k/2.
A proof an be found in (Braeken and Lano, 2005). The authors pointed out
that maj has a very low nonlinearity, making it a bad hoie for memoryless
ombiners. However, this is no problem in our setting, as long as high biases λ
are avoided (e.g., using the priniples desribed in Setion 6.3.1).
Using our design priniple and a Boolean funtion with optimum algebrai
immunity, it is possible to exlude the existene of Z-funtions having a degree
less than ⌈k/2⌉. In fat, experiments have shown by exhaustive searh that the
atual values ofmindeg are often higher, showing that ⌈k/2⌉ seems to be a rather
oarse estimation. Moreover, one an easily inrease this bound, even without
inreasing the number of LFSRs by using several dierent bits per LFSR and
lok yle. For example, in the ase of E0, one ould use the modied output
and update funtions zt := maj(x2t−1, x2t) and qt+1 := δ(δ(qt, x2t−1), x2t). The
bitrate is halfed, but the existene of Z-funtions of degree less than 4 an be
exluded.
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6.4 Appliation to E0
In this setion, we apply the results from the previous setions to improve the
seurity of the E0 keystream generator. Consequently, we assume that k = l = 4
and that the keystream bit zt is omputed by zt = f(qt, xt) = α(xt) ⊕ β(qt),
with α(xt) = x
0
t ⊕ x
1
t ⊕ x
2
t ⊕ x
3
t and β(qt) = q
1
t . Reall from Setion 4.2.2 that
the state transition funtion of E0 is dened as
δ0(qt, xt) =
(
S1t+1 ⊕ q
0
t ⊕ q
3
t ,S
0
t+1 ⊕ q
1
t ⊕ q
2
t ⊕ q
3
t , q
0
t , q
1
t
)
,
where St+1 = (S1t+1,S
0
t+1) =
⌊
x0t+x
1
t+x
2
t+x
3
t+2·q
0
t+q
1
t
2
⌋
.
Lu and Vaudenay (2005, 2008) proved that λ
max
= 25/256 for r ≤ 25, where
25 is the length of the shortest LFSR. This observation and the exploit of a
synhronization aw led to the urrently best attak on the Bluetooth ipher
(Lu and Vaudenay, 2004). Table 6.1 shows the resoure requirements of this
attak.
The urrently best algebrai attak on E0 in this senario uses Z-funtions
of degree 4 over 4 loks (Armkneht and Krause, 2003). The orresponding
performane data are given in Table 6.2. Courtois (2003) proposed a method to
obtain equations of degree 3, however with the enormous value r ≈ 8.822.188.
It is still an open question whether Z-funtions exist of degree < 4 and r ≪
8.822.188 for E0.
We now try to improve the resistane of E0 to orrelation attaks and alge-
brai attaks of the desribed types by arefully modifying its omponents.
First, using our C-implementation of Theorem 6.6 based on the ATLAS
linear algebra library (Whaley and Petitet, 2005), we omputed the maximum
absolute biases over 25 lok yles (the length of E0's shortest LFSR) for all
16 E0-variants in whih β is dened as β(a1,a2,a3,a4)(qt) = a1 · q
0
t ⊕ a2 · q
1
t ⊕
a3 · q2t ⊕ a4 · q
3
t for a = (a1, a2, a3, a4) ∈ {0, 1}
4
. Note that the original β
orresponds to β(0,1,0,0). As Table 6.3 shows, the minimum absolute bias λ =
0.024414 is obtained for a = (0, 1, 1, 1). We denote the orresponding generator
by E10 . However, with the help of a toolkit developed by Brandeis (2004) that
determines Z-funtions by exhaustive searh, we have omputed Z-funtions
of degree 3 for E10 , whih makes it weaker against algebrai attaks than the
original E0. However, hoosing a = (1, 0, 1, 1), i.e., the a-value with the seond
best minimum absolute bias, yields mindeg = 6. We all the orresponding
generator E20 .
In the next step, we exploit our theory to ompletely avoid biases. Starting
from the original denition of E0, we obtain the generator E
3
0 by replaing the
state transition funtion by δ1, whih we dene as the integer addition modulo
Table 6.1: The resoure onsumption of the fastest orrelation attak
on E0 as presented by Lu and Vaudenay (2004)
λ
max
Frames Data Time Spae
λ m = max( 1λ10 ,
236.59
λ8 ) 24m 36m+ 3 · 2
18 ·min(m, 218) m
25
256 2
34.74 239.32 240.17 234.74
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Table 6.2: The resoure onsumption of an algebrai attak on
E0 with key size n and an equation of degree d
#F Data Time Spae
General ϕ O
((
n
d
)
/ϕ
)
O
((
n
d
)3)
O
((
n
d
)2)
E0: n = 128, d = 4 1 2
23.35 270.04 246.69
24, i.e.,
δ1
(
q0t , . . . , q
3
t , x
0
t , . . . , x
3
t
)
=

 3∑
i=0
q3−it 2
i +
3∑
j=0
x3−jt 2
j


mod 16 .
Sine δ1 is balaned, Theorem 6.14 implies λ = 0. However, we omputed
Z-funtions of degree 3 for E30 .
We therefore replae the funtion α of E30 by the majority funtion desribed
in Corollary 6.19. For the resulting generator E40 , we obtain mindeg = 5.
If we additionally replae the funtion β by the majority funtion, mindeg
even inreases to 6. Note that the λ = 0 property is still preserved by these
modiations. Thus, we obtain a keystream generator E50 with λmax = 0 whose
resistane against algebrai attaks is signiantly inreased ompared to the
original E0.
For all our variants of E0, Table 6.4 lists the minimum degree and the re-
spetive number of Z-funtions over r lok yles. For Example, for E40 , the
minimum degree of Z-funtions over up to 5 lok yles is 5, and there are 40,
264, 896, and 2528 Z-funtions over 2, 3, 4 and 5 lok yles, respetively.
The omputation of the number of Z-funtions over 6 loks for E50 ould not
be ompleted with the resoures at our disposal. Sine in all our experiments,
the minimum degree of the Z-funtions never dereased with inreasing r, we
suspet that mindeg = 6 will also hold for E50 and r = 6.
Note that in all ases, the values of mindeg were atually higher than the
theoretial lower bound ⌈k/2⌉ = 2.
The onstrutions of the onsidered generators and the respetive perfor-
manes of algebrai and orrelation attaks are summarized in Table 6.6 and
illustrated in Figure 6.1.
We note that the generator E20 , whih is just a slight modiation of E0 (we
only made β depend on two more state bits), already yields a similar resistane
against algebrai attaks as E50 and signiantly dereases the vulnerability
against orrelation attaks.
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Table 6.3: Maximum absolute biases and performane
of orrelation attaks for βa-generators
a max (λ) Frames Data Time Spae
(0, 0, 0, 1) 0.097656 234.74 239.32 240.17 234.74
(0, 0, 1, 0) 0.244141 224.16 228.74 237.59 224.16
(0, 0, 1, 1) 0.156250 229.31 233.90 237.74 229.31
(0, 1, 0, 0) 0.097656 234.74 239.32 240.17 234.74
(0, 1, 0, 1) 0.097656 234.74 239.32 240.17 234.74
(0, 1, 1, 0) 0.156250 229.31 233.90 237.74 229.31
(0, 1, 1, 1) 0.024414 253.56 258.15 258.73 253.56
(1, 0, 0, 0) 0.244141 224.16 228.74 237.59 224.16
(1, 0, 0, 1) 0.250000 223.89 228.47 237.59 223.89
(1, 0, 1, 0) 0.097656 234.74 239.32 240.17 234.74
(1, 0, 1, 1) 0.038528 246.98 251.56 252.15 246.98
(1, 1, 0, 0) 0.156250 229.31 233.90 237.74 229.31
(1, 1, 0, 1) 0.156250 229.31 233.90 237.74 229.31
(1, 1, 1, 0) 0.152588 229.58 234.17 237.77 229.58
(1, 1, 1, 1) 0.097656 234.74 239.32 240.17 234.74
Table 6.4: mindeg and number of Z-funtions
for the andidate generators
Cipher E0 E
1
0 E
2
0 E
3
0 E
4
0 E
5
0
mindeg 4 3 6 3 5 6
Cloks Number of equations
r = 2 0 12 0 4 40 12
r = 3 0 48 24 40 264 318
r = 4 16 144 160 144 896 1416
r = 5 64 384 544 416 2528 > 0
r = 6 192 ? > 0 ? ? ?
Table 6.5: Denitions of the andidate generators
δ α
(
x1t , x
2
t , x
3
t , x
4
t
)
β
(
c1t , c
2
t , c
3
t , c
4
t
)
E0 δ0 x
1
t ⊕ x
2
t ⊕ x
3
t ⊕ x
4
t c
2
t
E10 δ0 x
1
t ⊕ x
2
t ⊕ x
3
t ⊕ x
4
t c
2
t ⊕ c
3
t ⊕ c
4
t
E20 δ0 x
1
t ⊕ x
2
t ⊕ x
3
t ⊕ x
4
t c
1
t ⊕ c
3
t ⊕ c
4
t
E30 δ1 x
1
t ⊕ x
2
t ⊕ x
3
t ⊕ x
4
t c
2
t
E40 δ1 maj(x
1
t , x
2
t , x
3
t , x
4
t ) c
2
t
E50 δ1 maj(x
1
t , x
2
t , x
3
t , x
4
t ) maj(c
1
t , c
2
t , c
3
t , c
4
t )
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Table 6.6: Performane of algebrai and orre-
lation attaks on the andidate generators
Algebrai Attak Correlation Attak
mindeg Time λ Time
E0 4 2
70.18 0.097656 240.17
E10 3 2
55.25 0.024414 258.73
E20 6 2
97.22 0.038528 252.15
E30 3 2
55.25 0 n/a
E40 5 2
84.11 0 n/a
E50 6 2
97.22 0 n/a
1 5
0.01
0.05
0.1
E0
E
3
0
E
4
0
E
1
0
E
2
0
λmax
for r ≤ 25
min{deg(FZ)}
for r ≤ 5
Figure 6.1: Comparison of the andidate generators to E0
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Part II
Authentiity with Linear
Protools
Chapter 7
Algorithms for Entity and
Message Authentiation
7.1 Seurity Denitions and Attaker Models
We have seen in the rst part of this thesis that in order for people to all a
partiular system seure, this system should allow for ondential ommunia-
tion, whih is usually ahieved by enrypting the messages that are exhanged
between ommuniation partners.
Let us revisit our two-party ommuniation senario from Setion 2.1. Two
parties, Alie and Bob, ommuniate over a hannel that is aessible to an
adversary. Besides the ondentiality of exhanged messages, it may also be
beneial for Alie to ensure that she is really talking to Bob instead of an
adversary masquerading as Bob, and that a message that laims to ome from
Bob was in fat sent by Bob and has not been modied during the transmission.
These requirements may seem less obvious than message ondentiality at
rst glane, but turn out to be equally, if not even more important in many
pratial systems. Consider, for example, banking transations. It is ertainly
desirable to hinder an adversary observing how muh money a ustomer with-
draws from his aount or to whom he transfers how muh money, but it seems
even more important to prevent an adversary from withdrawing or transferring
money from somebody else's aount.
In the proess of ensuring these properties, Alie has to gain ondene in
the identity of Bob as ommuniation partner or as originator of a message. An
identity is a set of information that distinguishes a spei entity from every
other within a partiular environment, e.g., a given and family name, an e-mail
address, or a URI (Adams, 2005). This implies that the mapping r : A→ I from
an entity set A to an identity spae I should be injetive, i.e., no two entities
a1, a2 ∈ A are mapped to the same identity i ∈ I. Note that the mapping
between entities and identities an also be modeled as a relation R ⊆ A × I
with (a, i) ∈ R if and only if identity i is assoiated to entitiy a. We say that a
has identity i, or that identity i is bound to entity a, and all the tuple (a, i) an
identity binding for a. An identity may also be bound to another identity from
a dierent identity spae, e.g., an international bank aount number (IBAN,
see ISO/IEC (2007)) to an e-mail address.
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7.1.1 Entity Authentiation
Consider a bank ustomer who uses an automated teller mahine (ATM) to
withdraw money from his aount. In the ourse of the transation, the ustomer
is usually required to plug his bank ard into the mahine and to enter his
personal identiation number (PIN). If PIN and bank aount number math
the information that is stored in the bank's database, the ATM is onvined
that the aount number in fat belongs to the person standing in front of the
mahine.
In our more abstrat ommuniation setting, Bob (the laimant or the
prover) laims to have a ertain identity, e.g., a bank aount number. In order
for Alie (the verier) to believe that the presented identity really belongs to
Bob, she will usually require some orroborating evidene of his laim, e.g. a
PIN. The proess of obtaining and verifying this evidene is alled entity au-
thentiation (Adams, 2005), and a partiular algorithm that implements entity
authentiation is alled an entity authentiation sheme or entity authentia-
tion protool. As desribed by Zuherato (2005), the orroborating evidene
(sometimes also termed redentials) is usually omputed based on
• someting knwon, e.g., a password or personal identiation number (PIN),
• something possessed, e.g., physial devies suh as mehanial keys or
smart ards,
• something inherent, e.g., biometri information suh as a ngerprint or
the struture of the iris.
If the verier is onvined by the orroborating evidene, we say that the au-
thentiation was suessful. After a suessful authentiation, the prover is said
to be authentiated. If the prover is in fat who he laims to be, then we all
the prover authenti.
Identiation is often used as a synonym for entity authentiation. However,
some authors dene identiation as the ation of merely laiming an identity
without providing orroborating evidene. We tend to favour the latter deni-
tion, but will avoid the term identiation altogether whenever possible.
7.1.2 Entity Reognition
Entitiy authentiation usually assumes that the identities of the ommuniation
partners are long-term identities that are bound to the entities during a system
setup phase independently of atual ommuniation sessions. This assumption is
reasonable in systems that are rather stati, e.g., a orporate IT infrastruture,
but less suitable for low-end sensor network senarios in whih nodes join and
leave systems dynamially and are limited in their omputing power and storage
apaities. In suh senarios, it is often suient to ensure that an entity
an reognize a ommuniation partner that she has talked to before (entity
reognition, see Hammell et al. (2005)). Shemes that solve this problem usually
an make do with short-term identities that are established dynamially when
the entities start ommuniating for the rst time, as we will see in Setion 7.5.
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7.1.3 Message Authentiation
The way most ATMs work is based on the assumption that one the ustomer is
authentiated, he and not the adversary will be the one talking to the ATM for
the remainder of the ommuniation session. Therefore, a ustomer is usually
asked for orroborating evidene only one per session. On the other hand, in
order to prevent an attaker from taking over the session of a ustomer who has
left the ATM without logging out (thereby breaking the assumption), sessions
are usually aborted after a relatively short period of ustomer inativity.
The ATM assumption translates into our abstrat setting by requiring that
the adversary have no aess to ommuniation hannels that have been estab-
lished between legitimate ommuniation partners. This may be valid in the
ATM senario, but is a lot less reasonable if we onsider an online banking use
ase, in whih a ustomer issues a redit transfer order to his bank over the
internet. In general, we an make no reliable assumptions on the route an in-
ternet message takes to reah its destination, and the probabilities of a message
being read or even modied on the way have to be onsidered non-negligible.
Hene, the banking server should require orroborating evidene of eah reeived
message in fat originating from the laimed sender.
In our abstrat model, Bob (the prover) would attah orroborating evi-
dene of his reatorship to eah message he sends to Alie (the verier). As
with entity authentiation, the proess of obtaining and verifying this orrobo-
rating evidene is alled message authentiation, an algorithm that implements
message authentiation is alled message authentiation algorithm or message
authentiation sheme, and a message for whih the authentiation was su-
essful is alled authentiated. If the message in fat originates from the laimed
sender and was not altered during transmission, we say that the message is
authenti.
In addition to message authentiity, many appliations have additional unique-
ness and timeliness requirements that dupliate or lost messages as well as mes-
sages that are reeived in the wrong order be deteted and handled appropri-
ately. We note that the presene of these properties is implied by some authors'
denitions of authentiity (see, e.g., Menezes et al. (2001)). However, we hoose
to separate uniqueness and timeliness from our authentiity denition sine they
are sometimes overed by transport layers in ommuniation staks rather than
by authentiity shemes in the narrow sense. An example is the widely used
TLS protool (see Dierks and Resorla (2008)), whih relies on TCP to ensure
these properties.
7.1.4 Message Reognition
Similarly to entity reognition (see Setion 7.1.2), message reognition as a
weaker form of message authentiation only requires to ensure that a message
originates from a partiular sender that has been talked to before, and (un-
like most message authentiation shemes) not onsider or hek any long-term
sender identities. Instead, the ommuniating parties generate short-term iden-
tities just before starting the onversation.
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7.1.5 Attaker Models
As in the ase of ondential ommuniation, we relate the seurity of an entity
authentiation sheme to an attaker (or adversary) model. The most prominent
attaker goal in the entity authentiation/reognition setting is to impersonate
an entity, i.e., to onviningly masquerade as somebody else. Attaks that are
targeted at this goal are usually alled impersonation attaks. Another attaker
goal may be to prevent the authentiation of a legitimate prover or message
(denial of servie) by disturbing the authentiation.
The most pessimisti assumption is an ative attaker who has full ontrol
of the ommuniation hannel, as suggested in the Dolev-Yao seurity model
(Dolev and Yao, 1983). More preisely, an ative attaker may
• read all exhanged messages,
• modify exhanged mesages, espeially delay or suppress their delivery or
alter their ontent,
• introdue additional messages into the ommuniation hannel, espeially
replay previously reorded messages.
We note that this model partiularly allows the attaker to
• present a previously reorded legitimate evidene to the verier (replay
attak),
• interleave several authentiation sessions (running in parallel or sequen-
tially) by using information obtained from one session in the ontext of
another,
• disobey the authentiation sheme by sending messages whih the reeiver
does not expet in the urrent protool state.
• at as a man-in-the-middle (MITM), i.e., inteept messages from one om-
muniation partner, possibly modify them, and pass them on to the re-
eiver.
Of speial interest in our analysis is a speial lass of ative attakers, whih
we all detetion attakers.
Denition 7.1. A detetion attaker on an entity authentiation protool is an
ative attaker who is restrited to the following disjoint attak stages.
1. Interat with a legitimate prover in any desired way.
2. Interat with a legitimate verier and try to impersonate the prover.
In the message authentiation/reognition setting, we ommonly assume
that the attaker has ative ontrol over the ommuniation hannel as above,
and is additionally able to fore Bob to send message payload data xi of his
hoie (whih will then be aepted by Alie as authenti). Thereby, his hoies
of the xi may be adaptive, i.e., xi may depend on the information that was
obtained for xi′ for i
′ < i. We dene that he has reahed his goal if he is able to
generate a message with payload x 6= xi for all i that is authentiated by Alie
(existential forgery in a hosen message senario, see, e.g., Luks et al. (2008)).
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Sometimes seurity is evaluated also with respet to passive attakers who
are able to read exhanged messages, but annot inuene the ommuniation
hannel in any way.
In all ases, we follow Kerkhos' priniple (Kerkhos, 1883) also in the
authentiation setting and assume the attaker to know the entire speiation
of the authentiation sheme and all information that the sheme proesses
exept for the data that it expliitly requires to be kept ondential.
7.2 Message Authentiation Codes
Denition 7.2. A Message Authentiation Code (MAC) is a mapping
MAC : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l
(x, k) 7→ m
(7.1)
that omputes for a message x an authentiation ode m under an n-bit key k.
A MAC is ommonly used in our two-party ommuniation senario in the
following way (see Fig. 7.1). Alie and Bob agree on a symmetri key k prior to
the ommuniation. Bob omputes for a message x the value m = MAC(x, k)
and transmits (x,m) = (x,MAC(x, k)) to Alie. Alie omputes for a reeived
message (x′,m′) the value MACverify(x′,m′, k) with
MACverify : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}l × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
(x,m, k) 7→
{
1 if MAC(x, k) = m
0 otherwise
,
and believes the message to ome from Bob if MACverify(x′,m′, k) = 1. Hene,
the value m = MAC(x, k) serves as orroborating evidene of the authentiity
of x.
MAC
x
Public Channel
(x, m) (x′, m′)
Key Source
Bob (Sender) Alice (Receiver)
k k
MACverify
Figure 7.1: Message authentiation with message authentiation odes
A MAC is onsidered seure if it is infeasible to perform an existential forgery
under an adaptive hosen message attak (see Setion 7.1.5), i.e., an attaker
who may obtain MAC(xi, k) under the seret key k for messages xi of his hoie
is not able to produe with a realisti amount of resoures a pair (x,m) with
x 6= xi for all i suh that MACverify(x,m, k) = 1. Obviously, reovering the
seert key k that is used to generate the authentiation ode is suient for an
existential forgery.
Similarly to the ipher systems desribed in Setion 2.1, sine Alie and
Bob both use the same key in the prodution and veriation of m, message
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authentiation odes are said to belong to the set of symmetri authentiation
shemes.
We note that a MAC by itself does not provide assurane of message time-
liness nor uniqueness.
7.2.1 Message Authentiation Codes based on Blok Ci-
phers
The struture of Eq. (7.1) suggests to use blok iphers as building bloks for
message authentiation odes. This idea is implemented, e.g., in the CBC-
MAC (ISO/IEC, 1999), whih is based on the CBC mode of a blok ipher
E : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l (see Setion 2.2). If the CBC mode enryption
of an m-blok message b = (b1, . . . , bm) is given by E
CBC((b1, . . . , bm), k, IV) :=
(c1, . . . , cm), the CBC-MAC value for this message is omputed as
MACCBC((b1, . . . , bm), k) := cm
with (c1, . . . , cm) = E
CBC((b1, . . . , bm), k, 0).
Note that the CBC-MAC is inseure if we allow the messages to have dierent
lenghts, sine we an forge an authenti message by appending arbitrary bloks
to observed authenti messages for whih the CBC-MAC value is known. This
issue is addressed by variants of the CBC-MAC onstrution suh as CMAC
(see, e.g., Preneel (2005) for a disussion).
If a message authentiation ode is built from a blok ipher, this ipher will
dominate the resoure requirements of the MAC. The AES blok ipher (see
Menezes et al. (2001)) is widely used for building message authentiation odes,
and eient implementations, partiularly for resoure-onstraint environments
are ontinously being developed and optimized (Moradi et al., 2011). In addition
to general purpose blok iphers, lightweight blok iphers suh as PRESENT
(Bogdanov et al., 2007) and KATAN/KTANTAN (De Cannière et al., 2009) are
speially targeted at low-end devies.
7.2.2 Message Authentiation Codes based on Crypto-
graphi Hash Funtions
Denition 7.3. A ryptographi hash funtion is a mapping H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}l whih maps an input of arbitrary length to a xed-length output.
Cryptographi hash funtions are usually required to be
• ollision resistant, i.e., it is infeasible for an adversary to nd two inputs
x 6= x′ suh that h(x) = h(x′),
• preimage resistant, i.e., it is infeasible for an adversary to nd for a given
output y ∈ {0, 1}l an input x suh that h(x) = y, and
• 2nd preimage resistant, i.e., it is infeasible for an adversary to nd for a
given input x another input x′ suh that h(x) = h(x′).
We note that ollision resistane implies 2nd preimage resistane. However,
preimage resistane does not imply 2nd preimage resistane, nor does 2nd preim-
age resistane imply preimage resistane. A ryptographi hash funtion that
is both preimage resistant and 2nd preimage resistant is said to be one-way.
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A ollision resistant ryptographi hash funtion H for arbitraty inputs x ∈
{0, 1}∗ may be onstruted from a ollision resistant ompression funtion h :
{0, 1}c × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}c with c < d by expanding x to L bloks of length d
(with the last blok only ontaining the bitlength of x), i.e., x = (M1, . . . ,ML),
and omputing the output as H(x) := HL with
Hi :=
{
C for i = 0
h(Hi−1,Mi) for 0 < i ≤ L
with C ∈ {0, 1}c onstant.
This onstrution is attributed to Merkle and Damgård (Damgård, 1990,
Merkle, 1979, 1990). In partiular, blok iphers may be used as ompression
funtions, e.g., as in the Davies-Meyer sheme (Davies and Prie, 1984) by
omputing the values Hi based on a blok ipher E : {0, 1}l× {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l
with l = c, n = d as
h(Hi−1,Mi) := E(Hi−1,Mi)⊕Hi−1 ,
see, e.g., Blak et al. (2002), Preneel et al. (1994).
Construting a ryptographi hash funtion from a blok ipher may be
partiularly beneial on low-end devies with too little apaity to implement
both a blok ipher and a dediated ryptographi hash funtion.
Potentially the most prominent examples of ryptographi hash funtions are
the MD5 hash funtion (Rivest, 1992) and the SHA hash funtion family (NIST,
2008).
1
Similarly to blok iphers, also dediated lightweight ryptographi hash
funtions exist, see, e.g., Guo et al. (2011).
We omit further details and refer the interested reader to Preneel (1993)
for an introdution to ryptographi hash funtions and to Fleishmann et al.
(2008), Preneel (2009) for information on more reent hash funtion proposals
and their properties.
Cryptographi hash funtions an readily produe a xed-length ngerprint
(or digest) of an arbitrarily long message, but in order to turn a hash funtion
into a message authentiation ode in the sense of Eq. (7.1), it has to be speied
how to handle the seret key that the authentiation relies on. A ommon
approah is the HMAC onstrution (Krawzyk et al., 1997) that derives an l-bit
message authentiation ode from a ryptogrpahi hash funtion H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}l and a key k ∈ {0, 1}n as
MACH : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l
(x, k) 7→ H ((k ⊕ opad)||H (k ⊕ ipad||x))
with publily known onstants opad and ipad.
7.3 Message Authentiation with Digital Signa-
tures
Corroborating evidene of a message's authentiity an also be omputed with
asymmetri ipher systems as dened in Setion 2.4. Therefore, we use the
1
Sine the seurity of these algorithms is inreasingly under question, at the time of writing
of this thesis, a ompetition is being held by the National Institute of Standards and Teh-
nology (NIST) to selet a suessor algorithm for the SHA hash funtion family (see NIST
(2010)), whih is stimulating the development of many new designs and intensive researh in
this eld.
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deryption operation, whih employs the private key, to produe the evidene,
and the enryption operation, whih is based on the publi key, to verify the
evidene. Sine in ontrast to message authentiation odes the evidene is
publiy veriable without the need to establish a ommon seret, an evidene
based on an asymmetri system is usually alled digital signature (see, e.g.,
Vaudenay (2006) for an introdution).
The seurity denition of digital signatures is similar to the denition for
message authentiation odes. A digital signature is onsidered seure if it is
infeasible for an adversary who may obtain signatures for messages xi of his
hoie under the seret signature key to produe a signature for a message
x 6= xi that will be aepted by a legitimate verier. As in the MAC ase,
reovering the signature key is suient for being able to forge signatures for
arbitrary messages.
In order to spend less eort on rather ostly asymmetri operations, the
evidene is typially omputed for a digest of the message (derived with a ryp-
tographi hash funtion) rather than for the message as a whole. But still, as
with ipher systems, message authentiation based on asymmetri digital signa-
ture shemes usually requires substantially more eort than symmetri message
authentiation odes, and this eort has to be onsidered too large in many
low-end devie appliations.
7.4 Challenge-Response based Entity Authenti-
ation
Entity authentiation is usually performed by proving the posession of some
objet (often alled key), either a piee of information like a password or a
PIN, or a physial objet suh as a mehanial key (see also Setion 7.1.1).
2
In our attaker model, presenting the key itself to the prover as orroborating
evidene is not an option in most ases of eletroni ommuniation, sine it
would dislose it also to the attaker and immediately allow for impersonation
attaks. Hene, the orroborating evidene needs to be some information that is
derived from the key, but not the key itself. However, if this derived information
does not hange from one authentiation to another, it is as valuable as the key
that is was derived from beause the attaker ould just replay it to impersonate
the prover.
We see that the orroborating evidene should be some information that is
derived from the objet and is valid only for a short period of time, ideally only
for one authentiation session, suh that the verier an deide whether he is
presented a reent (or fresh) evidene or some outdated information, whih he
would then assume to have been replayed by an attaker.
The most ommon tehniques to implement freshness veriation of a orrob-
orating evidene are timestamps and verier-supplied hallenges. Timestamps
are inluded into the evidene in an agreed way to doument its reation time.
While being rather straightforward to inlude, timestamps require a means for
prover and verier to agree on the urrent time (be it UTC time or some abstrat
2
Stritly speaking, we ould also model physial objets as piees of information by iden-
tifying them with their speiation. However, obtaining this speiation may not always
be feasible, e.g., as in the ase of physial unloneable funtions (PUFs) that are inherently
determined by eletrial or mehanial properties of a devie (see, e.g., Pappu (2001))
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ounter-based time), whih may not always be feasible espeially in low-end de-
vie appliations.
Verier-supplied hallenges are independent of time synhronization, but
require the verier to provide a hallenge (usually a binary string) that the
prover has to inlude in the omputation of the evidene. If the verier keeps
trak of the hallenges he supplies to provers, he an rejet evidenes that
are based on out-dated hallenges. Entity authentiation shemes based on
verier-supplied hallenges are usually alled hallenge-response authentiation
shemes. Whether a hallenge-response sheme is suitable for a partiular
resoure-onstraint appliation primarily depends on the severity of the om-
muniation overhead for transmitting the hallenge to the prover.
We note that we an rather straightforwardly build hallenge-response entity
authentiation shemes from message authentiation shemes by requiring the
prover to provide as orroborating evidene of his identity a message with the
verier-supplied hallenge as payload and orroborating evidene of this mes-
sage's authentiity. Alternatively, an enryption of the hallenge an be used as
orroborating evidene (ISO/IEC, 1993).
7.5 Authentiation Shemes based on Hash Chains
A slightly dierent avour of entity authentiation protools whih has been
proposed by Lamport (1981) is based on a one-way funtion h : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l.
Prover and verier agree on a value n, the prover hooses an arbitrary value
x0, omputes the sequene (xi)1≤i≤n with xi = h(xi−1), and transmits the
value xn to the verier in a tamper-proof, but not neessarily ondential way.
As orroborating evidene in the i-th authentiation session, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the
prover presents the value xn−i (i.e., the preimage of xn−i+1 under h) and is
authentiated if and only if h(xn−i) = xn−i+1.
Sine the sequene (xi) is produed by repeated (hained) appliation of h,
and h is often implemented as a ryptographi hash funtion or its ompression
funtion, this authentiation tehnique is known as hash hain based authenti-
ation.
Due to the onstrution, the number of possible authentiations is limited
to the length of the hash hain, whih, in the absene of auxiliary tehniques,
makes the onstrution slightly less suited for authentiating long-term identi-
ties. Therefore, hash hain based authentiation is more often used for entity
reognition than for entity authentiation. On the other hand, ompared to
digital signatures, the sheme is omputationally muh more eient on typial
low-end devies, and sine the transmission of the hain endpoint xn does not
have to be ondential, it requires less eort than onventional key establish-
ment tehniques in the initialization phase.
Message authentiation shemes an be built based on hash hains, e.g., as
in the Guy Fawkes protool suggested by Anderson et al. (1998). The Jane Doe
protool by Luks et al. (2008) uses the elements of the hash hain as keys for a
message authentiation ode, and the hain elements are suessively dislosed
to the verier suh that he an perform the authentiation. In order to prevent
forgery attaks, are has to be taken not to dislose these values too soon, whih
is ensured by a seond hash hain that is produed on the verier's side and
stepwise dislosed to the prover.
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7.6 Authentiation based on the Hardness of Learn-
ing Problems
A speial ase of lightweight hallenge-response based entity authentiation as
desribed in Setion 7.4 is the following generi strategy:
1. Construt from a lightweight funtion E a basi hallenge-response proto-
ol and redue the seurity of the basi protool against passive attakers
to the hardness of a suitable learning problem.
2. Dene a protool P over E and try to redue the seurity of P against
ative attakers to the seurity of the basi protool against passive at-
takers.
For a funtion E : X × K → Y with suitably hosen input spae X , key
spae K and output spae Y , the basi protool is dened as follows. The
verier (Alie) and the prover (Bob) share a seret key k ∈ K. A basi round
onsists of the following steps.
• Alie and Bob exhange hallenge information. As a speial ase, this step
may only onsist of Alie sending a publily known onstant value (a hello
message) that is just used as a trigger to initiate the ommuniation.
• Based on the hallenges, Bob hooses a random element x ∈ X whih
is distributed aording to a publily known probability distribution PrB
and sends z = E(x, k) as orroborating evidene of his knowledge of k to
Alie.
• Alie veries z based on the hallenges and the ommon seret k.
After r suh rounds and depending on the number of rounds with suessful
veriations, Alie deides whether to authentiate Bob.
In the following, we onsider two entity authentiation protool families of
this type, the HB family and the family of linear (n, k, L) protools.
Chapter 8
The HB Family of
Authentiation Protools
8.1 The HB Protool
The HB protool was proposed by Juels and Weis (2005) as an authentiation
protool that an be exeuted by humans. The use ase that they had in mind
was seurely logging into a terminal in the presene of adversaries eavesdropping
on what the user types into the keyboard.
The verier (Alie) and the prover (Bob) share a ommon seret k ∈ {0, 1}n
and a publi noise parameter η ∈
(
0, 12
)
. A basi round of the HB protool works
as follows. Alie transmits a random hallenge a ∈ {0, 1}n to Bob, who hooses
a value ν ∈ {0, 1}n with Pr[ν = 1] = η and transmits the value z := (a · k) ⊕ ν
as orroborating evidene to Alie, where x ·y ∈ {0, 1} for x, y ∈ {0, 1}n denotes
the inner produt of x and y over GF(2). She aepts z if and only if z is equal
to (a · k). Fig. 8.1 illustrates the basi round of HB.
Note that in the terminology of Setion 7.6, we have K = GF(2)n, X = Y =
GF(2)n×GF(2), y = GF(2), and the basis operation is dened by E((x, ν), k) =
(x, y), where y = x · k ⊕ ν.
The entire protool onsists of r basi rounds, and Alie authentiates Bob
Verifier Prover
Alice Bob
RFID reader RFID tag
a ∈R {0, 1}
n
z = (a · k)⊕ ν
Accept iff
choose
ν ∈ {0, 1},
Pr[ν = 1] = η
z = (a · k)
key k key k
Figure 8.1: Basi round of the HB protool
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if and only if the number of rounds in whih the reeived value z was rejeted
is less than ηr, or equivalently, for A denoting a random (r × n) matrix over
{0, 1} and k written as (n× 1) matrix, Alie authentiates Bob if and only if
|(A ◦ k)⊕ z| < ηr .
Hene, a passive attaker who observes the ommuniation between Alie
and Bob and wants to impersonate Bob is faed with the problem of nding a
k′ ∈ {0, 1}n suh that
|(A ◦ k′)⊕ z| < ηr .
This problem orresponds to the Learning Parity in the Presene of Noise
(LPN) problem, whih is dened as follows.
Denition 8.1 (Learning Parity in the Presene of Noise). Let A be a
random (r×n) matrix , let k be a random n-bit vetor, let η ∈
(
0, 12
)
be a onstant
noise parameter, and let ν be a random r-bit vetor suh that |ν| ≤ ηr. Given
A, η, and z = (A ◦ k)⊕ ν, nd an n-bit vetor k′ suh that |(A ◦ k′)⊕ z)| ≤ ηr.
The LPN problem is well-established in the literature (see, e.g., Hopper and
Blum (2001), Juels and Weis (2005) for an overview). It has been shown to be
NP-hard, but its diulty on random instanes is still an open question. The
best known algorithm to date is due to Blum et al. (2003) and has a running time
of 2O(
n
logn )
, with tighter analyses and implementation improvements proposed
by Fossorier et al. (2006), Levieil and Fouque (2006).
Hopper and Blum (2001), Juels and Weis (2005) showed that the seurity
of the HB protool against passive attakers an be redued to the hardness of
the LPN problem in the sense that a passive attaker who an impersonate the
prover in the HB protool an be used to solve the LPN problem.
However, a detetion attaker Eve (see Denition 7.1) an break the HB
protool and impersonate the prover as follows (Juels and Weis, 2005). Eve
repeatedly sends the same hallenge a to Bob in order to learn the error-free
value of a ·k for the unknown seret k. She repeats this proedure for n linearly
independent values a (e.g., the standard basis {e1, . . . , en} of {0, 1}
n
) and an
then reover k by Gaussian elimination.
8.2 The HB
+
Protool
HB
+
was proposed by Juels and Weis (2005) to strenghen HB against ative
attakers. It introdues an additional message, a prover-supplied blinding fator,
and works as follows.
Verier (Alie) and prover (Bob) share two seret values k1, k2 ∈ {0, 1}n
and a publi noise paramter η ∈
(
0, 12
)
. At the beginning of a basi protool
round, Bob sends a randomly hosen blinding fator b ∈ {0, 1}n to Alie, and
she replies with a hallenge a ∈ {0, 1}n. Bob then omputes his orroborating
evidene as z = (a ·k1)⊕ (b ·k2)⊕ ν with ν ∈ {0, 1} suh that Pr[ν = 1] = η and
transmits z to Alie, who aepts z if and only if z is equal to (a · k1)⊕ (b · k2).
The basi protool round of HB
+
is illustrated in Fig. 8.2.
As in the HB protool, the basi protool round is repeated r times, and
Alie authentiates Bob if and only if the number of basi rounds ending in
rejetion of the evidene is less than ηr.
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Verifier Prover
Alice Bob
RFID reader RFID tag
a ∈R {0, 1}
n
z = (a · k1)⊕ (b · k2)⊕ ν
Accept iff
choose
ν ∈ {0, 1},
Pr[ν = 1] = η
z = (a · k1)⊕ (b · k2)
key k1, k2 key k1, k2
b ∈R {0, 1}
n
Figure 8.2: Basi round of the HB
+
protool
Juels and Weis (2005) were able to show that a detetion attaker (see De-
nition 7.1) on HB
+
an be used to attak the HB protool in a passive attaker
senario, and this attak an in turn be used to solve the LPN problem. Hene,
the hardness of LPN implies the seurity of HB
+
against the ative adversary
that HB is not able to resist.
However, Gilbert et al. (2005) observed that this redution annot be ex-
tended to general ative adversaries, who an also at as man-in-the-middle be-
tween legitimate prover and legitimate verier. More preisely, an HB
+
man-in-
the-middle attaker Eve ould proeed as follows. She hooses a value δ ∈ {0, 1}n
and replaes a verier-supplied hallenge a by a ⊕ δ. Bob will then produe a
orroborating evidene z′ as
z′ = (a · k1)⊕ (δ · k1)⊕ (b · k2)⊕ ν ,
and Eve observes whether Alie aepts z′. If this is the ase, then (δ·k1)⊕ν = 0,
whih implies δ · k1 = 0 with probability 1 − η. Conversely, if Alie rejets z′,
then δ · k1 = 1 with probability 1 − η. Similarly to the attak on HB, Eve
an repeat this proedure for n linearly independent values δ and reover k1.
With this knowledge, Eve an already impersonate Bob by hoosing b = 0. If
she wants to reover also k2, she an hoose an arbitrary b and interat with
a legitimate verier, supply z′ = a · k1 as orroborating evidene and dedue
b · k2 = 0 if and only if the verier aepts z′. Again, repeating these steps for
n linearly independent blinding fators b yields k2.
In the following, we will refer to this attak on HB
+
as Gilbert/Robshaw/Sibert
attak (GRS attak).
8.3 Variants of the HB
+
Protool
After its publiation in 2005, HB
+
has reieved onsiderable attention in the
ryptographi ommunity. Espeially its simpliity, its eieny on the prover's
side, and its provable resistane against passive attaks (albeit relying on the
hardness of LPN) while being vulnerable to the rather simple GRS attak,
motivated a number of follow-up proposals that aim to avoid this shortoming
while preserving as many of the advantages as possible.
However, it turns out that resisting GRS-style attaks  modifying the ver-
ier's hallenge and learning from his reation to the evidene that the prover
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produes from the perturbed input  does not seem to be an easy task. Parti-
ularly Gilbert et al. (2008b) showed that many of the follow-up proposals end
up being less eient than HB
+
while not providing onsiderably more seurity.
In the following, we desribe the most prominent ones of these proposals and
disuss their seurity properties.
8.3.1 The HB
++
Protool
The HB
++
protool was proposed by Bringer et al. (2006) and onsists, just
as HB
+
, of a number of repetitions of a basi protool round. However, at the
beginning of an authentiation session, four serets k1, k
′
1, k2, k
′
2 are derived from
a shared seret master keyK, a prover-supplied blinding fator B ∈ {0, 1}80 and
a verier's hallenge A ∈ {0, 1}80. This is done by applying a publily known
hash funtion to K, A and B. Bringer et al. propose a partiular funtion
h : {0, 1}768×{0, 1}80×{0, 1}80 → {0, 1}320, whih implies a master seret size
of 768 bits and four session keys of size 80 bits eah (see Fig. 8.3).
In a basi protool round, verier (Alie) and prover (Bob) exhange a blind-
ing fator b and a hallenge a as in HB+. Then Bob hooses two noise parameters
ν and ν′ with ν, ν′ ∈ {0, 1} and Pr[ν = 1] = Pr[ν′ = 1] = η. The orroborating
evidene onsists of two omponents (z, z′) with
z = (a · k1)⊕ (b · k2)⊕ ν
z′ = (ROTi(f(a)) · k
′
1)⊕ (ROTi(f(b)) · k
′
2)⊕ ν
′ ,
where ROTi(x) denotes the rotation of x ∈ {0, 1}∗ by i positions to the left, and
f denotes a permutation. Analogously to HB+, Alie heks whether z and z′
satisfy
z = (a · k1)⊕ (b · k2) ,
z′ = (ROTi(f(a)) · k
′
1)⊕ (ROTi(f(b)) · k
′
2) .
Figure 8.4 illustrates a basi protool round of HB
++
.
The basi protool is repeated r times, and Alie authentiates Bob if both
the number of erroneous z evidenes and the number of erroneous z′ evidenes
do not exeed a threshold t.
Bringer et al. (2006) showed that the resistane of HB
++
against passive
attaks an be redued to the hardness of LPN, and that the protool is able to
resist the GRS attak if f is arefully hosen.
Verifier Prover
Alice Bob
RFID reader RFID tag
A ∈R {0, 1}
n
(k1, k
′
1
, k2, k
′
2
)
secret K secret K
B ∈R {0, 1}
n
= h(K, A,B)(k1, k
′
1
, k2, k
′
2
)
= h(K, A,B)
Figure 8.3: Initialization of the HB
++
protool
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Verifier Prover
Alice Bob
RFID reader RFID tag
a ∈R {0, 1}
n
z′ = (ROTi(f(a)) · k
′
1
)
Accept iff
choose
ν, ν′ ∈ {0, 1}
Pr[ν = 1] = η
z = (a · k1) ⊕ (b · k2)
key k1, k
′
1
, k2, k
′
2
key k1, k
′
1
, k2, k
′
2
b ∈R {0, 1}
n
Pr[ν′ = 1] = η
z = a · k1 ⊕ b · k2 ⊕ ν
⊕(ROTi(f(b)) · k
′
2
) ⊕ ν′
z′ = (ROTi(f(a)) · k
′
1
)
⊕(ROTi(f(b)) · k
′
2
) ⊕ ν′
Figure 8.4: Basi round of the HB
++
protool
But still, HB
++
remains vulnerable to a speial extension of the GRS attak.
Gilbert et al. (2008b) disovered that by disturbing the hallenge a in s out of r
rounds of an authentiation session, exploiting the observed veriation result
on the verier's side and the speial struture of h, an adversary an dedue
linear equations in a number of bits of k1. The resulting system an be expressed
as an LPN instane and solved with moderate eort. From the reovered k1,
the session key k′1 an be derived in a similar manner. The knowledge of k1
and k′1 is already suient for impersonating Bob sine the adversay an reuse
blinding fators b from suessful authentiations of Bob along with k1, k
′
1 to
orret z and z′ appropriately.
8.3.2 The HB
∗
Protool
Another variant of HB
+
, the HB
∗
protool, was proposed by Du and Kim
(2007). As in HB
+
, verier (Alie) and prover (Bob) share two seret values k1
and k2. Additionally, there is a shared seret s that is used to ondentially
transmit an auxiliary value γ from Bob to Alie.
At the beginning of a basi protool round, Bob hooses γ ∈ {0, 1} with
Pr[γ = 1] = η′, and ν ∈ {0, 1} with Pr[ν = 1] = η, and transmits a randomly
hosen blinding fator b ∈ {0, 1}n and the enrypted value of γ, whih is om-
puted as w = (b · s) ⊕ γ, to Alie. As in HB+, Alie replies with a hallenge
a ∈ {0, 1}n. Bob then omputes his orroborating evidene as
z =
{
(a · k1)⊕ (b · k2)⊕ ν if γ = 0
(a · k2)⊕ (b · k1)⊕ ν if γ = 1
,
and Alie heks whether (a · k1) ⊕ (b · k2) equals z if (b · s) = w (i.e., γ = 0),
and whether (a · k2) ⊕ (b · k1) equals z if (b · s) 6= w (i.e., γ = 1). Again, Bob
is authentiated if the veriation fails for less than a threshold t out of r basi
protool rounds. The basi protool round of HB
∗
is illustrated in Fig. 8.5.
Du and Kim laim resistane against the GRS attak, but Gilbert et al.
(2008b) observed that although in eah basi round one of the two protool
modes is seretly seleted by the value γ, a modied GRS attak remains appli-
able. This attak is again based on adding a vetor δ to the verier's hallenge
a and exploiting the information that the result of the veriation leaks about
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Verifier Prover
Alice Bob
RFID reader RFID tag
a ∈R {0, 1}
n
z =
{
ak1 ⊕ bk2 ⊕ ν if γ = 0
ak2 ⊕ bk1 ⊕ ν if γ = 1
Accept iff
choose
ν ∈ {0, 1}
Pr[ν = 1] = η
key k1, k2, s key k1, k2, s
b, w = (b · s)⊕ γ
choose
γ ∈ {0, 1}
Pr[γ = 1] = η′
b ∈R {0, 1}
n
z =
{
ak1 ⊕ bk2 if bs = w
ak2 ⊕ bk1 if bs 6= w
Figure 8.5: Basi round of the HB
∗
protool
the serets k1 and k2. A ase distintion shows that the aeptane probabil-
ity of z varies depending on the values of δ · k1 and δ · k2 in suh a way that
the attaker an disriminate between (sets of) the ases. Depending on the
hoies of η and η′, the attaker may either reover k1 as in the GRS attak
and impersonate Bob by sending (b, w) = (0, 0) as rst message, or learn the
two-dimensional vetorial spae < k1, k2 >, whih an similarly be exploited to
impersonate Bob.
8.3.3 The HB-MP Protools
Munilla and Peinado (2007) proposed the HB-MP protool as an HB
+
-variant
that presumably resists the GRS attak. It uses a two-pass basi protool as
follows. Both verier (Alie) and prover (Bob) share a seret (k1, k2). In the i-
th exeution of the basi protool, Alie sends a hallenge a ∈R {0, 1}
m
to Bob,
who hooses a ν ∈R {0, 1}m suh that Pr[νi = 1] = η for all i ∈ [1,m]. Then
he omputes k1 := rotate(k1, (k2)i), where (k2)i denotes the i-th bit of k2 and
rotate(x, y) the rotation of x by y positions. He omputes z := (a · (⌊k1⌋m))⊕ ν
with ⌊k1⌋m denoting the m least signiant bits of k1. Finally, he hooses a
value b that satises (b · (⌊k1⌋m)) = z and transmits b to Alie. Alie aepts
the evidene if and only if b · (⌊k1⌋m) equals a · (⌊k1⌋m) whih is equivalent to
(a⊕ b) · (⌊k1⌋m) = 0 . (8.1)
Figure 8.6 illustrates the basi round of HB-MP.
As with HB
+
, Bob is authentiated if the number of failed basi protool
rounds is less than some threshold t.
Despite the laim in the original proposal, HB-MP is vulnerable to a passive
attak as observed by Gilbert et al. (2008b). Equation (8.1) implies that a basi
protool round is always passed if a and b are equal. Munilla and Peinado re-
ommend immediate rejetion for this ase, but nevertheless suitable evidenes
an be onstruted from an observed r-round authentiation session with ex-
hanged messages (ai, bi), i ∈ [1, r]. In order to impersonate the prover, we
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Verifier Prover
Alice Bob
RFID reader RFID tag
a ∈R {0, 1}
m
Accept iff
choose
ν ∈ {0, 1}m
Pr[νi = 1] = η
b · (⌊k1⌋m) = a · (⌊k1⌋m)
key k1, k2 key k1, k2
x = rotate(k1, (k2)i)
z = (a · (⌊k1⌋m)) ⊕ ν
b with b · (⌊k1⌋m) = z
x = rotate(k1, (k2)i)
Figure 8.6: Basi round of the HB-MP protool
ompute for the verier's hallenge a′i an evidene b
′
i as bi := a
′
i ⊕ ai ⊕ bi. Then
we have b′i 6= a
′
i sine ai 6= bi, and
(ai ⊕ bi) · (⌊k1⌋m) = (a
′
i ⊕ b
′
i) · (⌊k1⌋m) .
Hene, with this strategy we an suessfully impersonate the prover if and only
if the observed authentiation session was suessful.
8.3.4 The HB
#
Protool
In the light of the little resistane of the above desribed HB
+
variants against
GRS-type attaks, Gilbert et al. (2008a) introdued HB
#
as an improvement
of HB
+
that is provably resistant against the GRS attak. It an be seen as a
ompressed version of HB
+
and works as follows.
Verier (Alie) and prover (Bob) share two seret matries K1 and K2. Bob
sends an l2-bit blinding value b ∈R {0, 1}
l2
to Alie, who replies with an l1-bit
hallenge a ∈R {0, 1}l1. Bob then hooses an m-bit vetor ν = (ν1, . . . , νm)
suh that Pr[νi = 1] = η for i ∈ [1,m] and transmits to Alie as orroborating
evidene the value z = aK1 ⊕ bK2 ⊕ ν. Alie aepts an evidene z if and only
if wt(a ·K1 ⊕ b ·K2 ⊕ z) ≤ t for some threshold t (see Fig. 8.7).
In ontrast to HB
+
, an authentiation session based on HB
#
onsists only
of a single round. Hene, the protool is similar to m exeutions of HB+ with
individual serets in eah basi round.
Although provably resistant against the GRS attak and ertain extensions,
HB
#
has been shown by Oua et al. (2008) not to resist general man-in-the-
middle attaks. Partiularly, Oua et al. show how to dedue the Hamming
weight of the error vetor ν in a partiular authentiation session, whih an
in turn be used to set up a system of linear equations to reover K1 and K2.
The attak has resonable suess probabilities for pratial parameter hoies
of HB
#
and is generally appliable also to other members of the HB protool
family.
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Verifier Prover
Alice Bob
RFID reader RFID tag
a ∈R {0, 1}
l1
z = a ·K1 ⊕ b ·K2 ⊕ ν
Accept iff
choose
ν ∈ {0, 1}m
Pr[νi = 1] = η
wt((a ·K1)⊕ (b ·K2)⊕ z) ≤ t
key K1,K2 key K1,K2
b ∈R {0, 1}
l2
Figure 8.7: One round of the HB
#
protool
8.3.5 The Trusted-HB Protool
A generi way to prevent man-in-the-middle attaks on HB
+
-like protools is to
have the prover send a signature of his view of the ommuniation transript at
the end of the authentiation protool. An adversary who is not able to forge
the signature will thereby be prevented from impersonating the prover. Obvi-
ously, the hoie of signature shemes is restrited by the resoure ontraints
of the HB
+
target appliation environment, whih rules out standard message
authentiation shemes (that ould by themselves be used for entity authenti-
ation, see Setion 7.4). The proposal Trusted-HB by Bringer and Chabanne
(2008) tries to solve this trade-o by using a family of universal hash funtions
that are represented by Toeplitz matries, partiularly by a subset of Toeplitz
matries that an be generated by LFSRs.
Denition 8.2. A nite olletion H of hash funtions h : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n is
alled family of universal hash funtions if for eah pair of values x, y ∈ {0, 1}m,
the number of hash funtions h ∈ H for whih h(x) = h(y) is preisely |H|m , i.e.,
for a randomly hosen h ∈ H, Pr[h(x) = h(y)] = 1m for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}
m
.
Denition 8.3. An (n×m) Boolean Toeplitz matrix U ontains a xed value
in eah left-to-right diagonal, i.e., U is a Toeplitz matrix if Ui,j = Ui+k,j+k for
every 0 ≤ i, i+ k < n and 0 ≤ j, j + k < m.
Mansour et al. (1990) showed that a familyH of universal hash funtions an
be onstruted by representing the h ∈ H as Toeplitz matries U and omputing
h(M) as h(M) := U ◦M with M written as (m× 1) matrix.
The idea of Krawzyk (1994), whih is also used in Trusted-HB, was to re-
strit the family of Toeplitz matries to those whose onseutive olumns an
be represented as the onseutive states of an LFSR with irreduible onnetion
polynomial. This restrition trades o redued seurity guarantees and om-
pat matrix representations, whih are espeially useful in resoure-onstrained
environments. The signature for a message M ∈ {0, 1}m is then omputed as
MAC(M) := h(M)⊕ e(i), where e(i) ∈ {0, 1}n denotes the i-th unused one-time
pad, while h and e(i), i ≥ 0, are the seret key shared by prover and verier.
Therefore Trusted-HB onsists of two stages:
1. Prover and verier exeute the standard HB
+
protool.
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2. The prover omputes a signature on the ommuniation transript of the
rst stage based on LFSR-based Toeplitz matries and transmits it to the
verier for veriation.
However, the partiular implementation of step (2) in Trusted-HB turned out
to be awed (Frumkin and Shamir, 2009), partiularly beause it seems hard in
pratie to keep h ondential and provide values e(i) that are suiently lose
to the one-time pad assumption. How the signature an be implemented in a
both a seure and eient way is therefore an open problem to the present day.
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Chapter 9
The (n, k, L) Family of
Authentiation Protools
9.1 Introdution and Overview
As a possible alternative to HB-type protools, another lass of lightweight
authentiation protools (so-alled CKK protools) were introdued by Ciho«
et al. (2008). These protools an be generalized to linear (n, k, L) protools,
in whih the seret key onsists of the speiation of L n-dimensional linear
subspaes V1, . . . , VL of GF(2)
n+k
, while the identiation is performed by ol-
laboratively generating an element v ∈ Vl for a random l ∈ {1, . . . , L}. Ciho«
et al. (2008) suggested the CKK
2
protool, a speial linear (n, k, 2) protool, and
the CKK
σ,L
protool, a speial linear (n, k, L) protool, for pratial appliation.
Compared to HB-type protools, the advantages of (n, k, L) protools and
espeially their improvements (n, k, L)+ and (n, k, L)++ are that fewer bits have
to be ommuniated, omputational eort and memory requirements are lower
on the prover's side (essentially, the prover has to generate random elements
from L dierent n-dimensional subspaes of GF(2)n+k), and that (n, k, L)-type
protools seem to be more resistant against ative attaks. The drawbak is
that we annot prove the seurity of (n, k, L) protools by redution to a well-
established problem like the LPN-problem yet. However, we show that similarly
to HB-type protools, the seurity of (n, k, L)-type protools an be related to
the hardness of a ertain learning problem, the Learning Unions of L linear
subspaes (LULS) problem.
We have experimentally onrmed the orretness and eieny of our at-
taks and algorithms with the omputer algebra system Magma (Bosma et al.,
1997).
9.2 The Linear (n, k, L) Protool
In a linear (n, k, L) protool, verier (Alie) and prover (Bob) share as ommon
seret the speiations of L injetive linear funtions F1, . . . , FL : GF(2)
n −→
GF(2)n+k, i.e., eah Fi orresponds to an n-dimensional subspae Vi ofGF(2)
n+k
.
After reeiving an arbitrary hallenge from Alie, Bob omputes as or-
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roborating evidene an element w = Fl(u) for l ∈R [L] and u ∈R GF(2)
n
.
Alie aepts an evidene w if there is an l ∈ [L] suh that w ∈ Vl, where
[L] := {1, . . . , L} (see Fig. 9.1).
Obviously, this protool is vulnerable to a simple passive attak, sine an
adversary an store a number of proofs and then impersonate Bob by presenting
these proofs to Alie.
Moreover, an ative adversary an suessfully reover the key as follows.
1. Collet a set of messages O = {v1, . . . , vs} sent by Bob, with s large
enough for O to ontain a basis for Vl for all l ∈ [L] with high probability.
2. Construt an s× s-matrix M over {0, 1}, where Mi,j = 1 i Alie aepts
vi ⊕ vj .
Note that if vi and vj belong to the same subspae Vl, Pr[Mi,j = 1] = 1. If
{vi, vj} 6⊆ Vl for all l ∈ [L], then
Pr[Mi,j = 1] = Pr
[
vi ⊕ vj ∈
L⋃
l=1
Vl
]
≤ (L− 2)2−k .
The expeted number of messages needed for onstruting Or an be estimated
based on the following experiment.
Set B := ∅.
repeat
Choose a random v ∈ GF(2)n (w.r.t. the uniform distribution).
V := V ∪ {v}.
until V is a generating system of GF(2)n.
Lemma 9.1 (Goªebiwski et al. (2008)). Consider the experiment of repeat-
edly hoosing a random element v ∈ GF(2)n and adding v to an initially empty
set V until V ontains a generating system of GF(2)n. Let p(n) denote the
probability that the experiment stops after n iterations (i.e., V is a basis of
GF(2)n), and E(n) denote the expeted number of iterations of the experiment.
Then p(n) ≈ 0.2887 and E(n) ≈ n+ 1.6067.
Hene, s ∈ Θ(L · E(n)) = Θ(Ln), i.e., it is possible to eiently ompute
speiations of V1, . . . , VL and to impersonate Bob by replying with w ∈ Vl for
arbitrary l ∈ [L].
Verifier Prover
Alice Bob
RFID reader RFID tag
challenge
choose l ∈R [L],
w = Fl(u)
accept if
∃l ∈ {1, . . . , L}
with w ∈ Vl
u ∈R GF(2)
n
key F1, . . . , FL key F1, . . . , FL
Figure 9.1: Basi round of the (n, k, L) protool
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9.3 The Linear (n, k, L)+ Protool
In order to prevent the desribed attaks on the linear (n, k, L) protool, we
onsider the following ommuniation mode, whih, analogously to the HB
+
protool (see Setion 8.2), denes (n, k, L)+ protools.
Alie starts by sending an a ∈R GF(2)n/2 to Bob. Bob hooses values
b ∈R GF(2)n/2 and l ∈R [L] and sends w = Fl(a, b) to Alie. Alie aepts a
w ∈ GF(2)n+k if there is some l ∈ [L] with w ∈ Vl and the prex of length n/2
of F−1l (w) is equal to a (see Fig. 9.2).
However, (n, k, L)+ protools an be broken by the man-in-the-middle at-
tak outlined in Algorithm 12. In this attak, s is hosen large enough for
{w1, . . . , ws} to ontain a basis of Vl with high probability (see Lemma 9.1).
The attak is repeated until speiations of all V1, . . . , VL have been omputed.
Algorithm 12 (n, k, L)+_MITM-Attak(n, k, L)
Fix a1 6= ~0 in GF(2)n/2.
Send a1 to Bob and reeive w1 ∈ Vl for some unknown l ∈ [L].
for r = 2, . . . , s do
repeat
Interept a from Alie.
Send a′ := a⊕ a1 to Bob and reeive w′.
until Alie aepts w′⊕w1 (whih happens with probability at least 1/L)
Dene ar := a
′
and wr := w
′
.
end for
return {w1, . . . , ws} (whih allows to ompute Vl)
9.4 The Linear (n, k, L)++ Protool
The parameters n, k, L as well as Vl, Fl for l ∈ [L] are dened as above. Let
n = 2N . The (n, k, L)++ protool works similarly to the (n, k, L)+ protool, but
uses an additional publily known invertible funtion f : GF(2)n −→ GF(2)n,
whih we all onnetion funtion.
In a basi protool round, Alie hooses a random a ∈ GF(2)N , a 6= ~0, moves
to inner state a, and sends a to Bob. Bob hooses random values b ∈ GF(2)N
Verifier Prover
Alice Bob
RFID reader RFID tag
a ∈R GF(2)
n/2
choose l ∈R [L],
w = Fl(a, b)
b ∈R GF(2)
n/2
let (a˜, b˜) = F−1l (w)
accept if a˜ = a
if ∃l ∈ {1, . . . , L}
with w ∈ Vl
key F1, . . . , FL key F1, . . . , FL
Figure 9.2: Basi round of the (n, k, L)+ protool
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and l ∈ [L] and sends w = Fl(f(a, b)) bak to Alie. Alie aepts a message
w ∈ GF(2)n in inner state a if w 6= ~0, and ∃l ∈ [L] suh that w ∈ Vl, and
f−1(F−1l (w)) has the form (a, b) for some b ∈ GF(2)
N
. The basi protool
round of (n, k, L)++ is illustrated in Fig. 9.3. Note that hoosing f to be the
identity yields the (n, k, L)+ protool.
For the (n, k, L)++ protool, we onsider a speial type of man-in-the-middle
attak whih we all (x, y)-equality attak. The aim of an (x, y)-equality attaker
Eve is to generate two messages w 6= w′ ∈ GF(2)n+k and to eiently test by
man-in-the-middle aess to the protool whether w and w ⊕ w′ belong to the
same linear subspae Vl for some l ∈ [L]. As desribed above, suh an attak
an be used to eiently ompute speiations of the subspaes V1, . . . , VL.
Eve works in three phases:
1. Send a message y ∈ GF(2)N to Bob and reeive w′ = Fl(f(y, b′)).
2. Observe a hallenge a ∈ GF(2)N sent by Alie.
3. Compute a value x = x(y, w′, a) ∈ GF(2)N , send it to Bob, reeive the
message w = Fr(f(x, b)), and send w ⊕ w′ to Alie.
The suess probability of the attak is equal to the probability that Alie
aepts w ⊕ w′ given that l = r. Note that if f is GF(2)-linear (as in the
(n, k, L)+ protool), setting x = a⊕ y yields an attak with suess probability
one.
We now dene a onnetion funtion whih yields provable seurity against
(x, y)-equality attaks. In the following we identify {0, 1}N with the nite eld
K = F2N and denote by +, · the addition and multipliation in K. We dene a
onnetion funtion f by
f : K ×K → K ×K
(a, b) 7→ (ab, ab3)
. (9.1)
Hene, Alie aepts a message w with F−1l (w) = (u, v) ∈ K
2
in inner state
a ∈ K∗ if (a−1u)3 = a−1v, whih is equivalent to u3 = a2v.
Theorem 9.2. The suess probability of an (x, y)-equality attaker against the
(n, k, L)++ protool with onnetion funtion f dened in Eq. (9.1) is at most
3
2N−1 .
Verifier Prover
Alice Bob
RFID reader RFID tag
a ∈R GF(2)
N
choose l ∈R [L],
w = Fl(f(a, b))
b ∈R GF(2)
N
let (a˜, b˜) = f−1(F−1
l
(w))
accept if a˜ = a
if ∃l ∈ {1, . . . , L}
with w ∈ Vl
key F1, . . . , FL key F1, . . . , FL
Figure 9.3: Basi round of the (n, k, L)++ protool
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Proof. For given y, a ∈ K∗, Eve has to hoose an element x ∈ K∗ suh that
w + w′ = (u, v) ∈ K × K will be aepted by Alie in inner state a, where
w = Fl(x, b) and w
′ = Fl(y, b
′) for some l ∈ [L], and b, b′ ∈ K∗. Note that Eve
has no information about b, b′, and that u = xb+ yb′ and v = xb3 + yb′3.
Consequently, Eve's hoie for the value x has to satisfy
(xb+ yb′)3 = a2(xb3 + yb′3)
⇔ (x+ yc)3 = a2(x+ yc3) with c := b′(b−1)
⇔ P (x, c) = 0,
with P (x, d) for all d ∈ K∗ dened as
P (x, d) := x3 + (yd)x2 + (y2d2 + a2)x + d3(y3 + y2a2) .
Note that there are |K∗| = 2N − 1 dierent polynomials P (x, d) with respet to
the variable x. For all x ∈ K∗ let P (x) := {d|P (x, d) = 0}. Note that P (x, d) is
a polynomial of degree 3 also in the unknown d. This implies that |P (x)| ≤ 3
for all x ∈ K∗ .
Eve has to hoose an x that satises c ∈ P (x). Sine she does not have any
information about c, her suess probability is at most 32N−1 . 2
9.5 Speial Cases of Linear (n, k, L) Protools
The denition of the (n, k, L) protool family was inspired by two earlier pro-
posals, the CKK
2
protool and the CKK
σ,L
(Ciho« et al., 2008) protool, whih
an be seen as restrited (n, k, L) protools.
In our notation, the protool CKK
2
is an (n + k, k, 2) protool with the
additional properties that F1(u, a) = (u, f(u), a) and F2(u, a) = (u, a, f(u))
for all u ∈ GF(2)n and a ∈ GF(2)k, where f denotes a seret linear funtion
f : GF(2)n −→ GF(2)k. The protool CKKσ,L is an (n, k, L) protool with
the restrition Fl(u) = σ
l(u||f(u)) for all l ∈ [L], where σ denotes a seret
permutation σ ∈ Sn+k and f a seret linear funtion f : GF(2)n −→ GF(2)k.
Hene, the seret keys have the form (f, σ). The parameters n = 128 and k = 30
were suggested by Ciho« et al. (2008) for pratial appliations of CKK
2
and
CKK
σ,L
.
Goªebiwski et al. (2008) presented an attak against the CKK
2
protool,
whih annot be applied to general (n, k, L) protools. Its running time is
proportional to
∑k−1
s=0
(
n
s
)
, i.e., of order nΘ(k). As an improvement of this result,
we now desribe a very fast attak against the CKK
2
protool with parameters
(n, k) whose running time is dominated by the eort required for inverting k
(n× n)-matries.
Let f : GF(2)n −→ GF(2)k denote the seret key and reall that
V1 = {(v, f(v), a), v ∈ GF(2)
n, a ∈ GF(2)k} ,
V2 = {(v, a, f(v)), v ∈ GF(2)
n, a ∈ GF(2)k} .
Let the funtions f1, . . . , fk : GF(2)n −→ GF(2) denote the omponent fun-
tions of the seret funtion f , i.e., f(v) = (f1(v), . . . , fk(v)) for all v ∈ GF(2)n.
The attak is based on the simple fat that if an observation (v, a, b) satises
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Algorithm 13 CKK
2
_Attak(n, k)
Let {e1, . . . , en} denote the standard basis of GF(2)n.
for r ∈ [k] do
Consider a set of messages produed by Bob and extrat from it a set
Or = {(vr,1, ar,1, br,1), . . . , (vr,n, ar,n, br,n)} suh that vr,1, . . . , vr,n form a
basis of GF(2)n and ar,i(r) = br,i(r) = f
r(vr,i) for all i ∈ [n].
Derive f r(e1), . . . , f
r(en) from Or.
return f1, . . . , fk
end for
ar = br for some r ∈ [k], whih is true with probability 1/2, then we know that
f r(v) = ar = br. The attak works as desribed in Algorithm 13.
The orretness of the attak follows straightforwardly from the denitions.
Lemma 9.1 implies that the expeted number of messages needed for onstrut-
ing Or is 2 · E(n) ≈ 2n + 3.2134. For the parameter hoies proposed for
pratial appliations, the attak is very eient already on standard PC hard-
ware (Magma V2.15-9 on a 3.4 GHz Intel Pentium IV with 4 GB RAM), see
Table 9.1.
9.6 Seurity of Linear (n, k, L)-type Protools and
the Learning Unions of L Linear Subspaes
Problem
9.6.1 The Searh-for-a-Basis Heuristi
There are several exhaustive searh strategies for omputing speiations of
the seret subspaes V1, . . . , VL.
As an example, we desribe the searh-for-a-basis heuristi, whih tries to
onstrut a set Q of examples whih form a basis of Vl for some l ∈ L. For all
linearly independent sets Q of n examples let p(Q) denote the probability that
an example oming from the orale belongs to the linear span 〈Q〉 of Q. It is
quite obvious that p(Q) is maximal if Q is a basis of Vl for some l ∈ L. If p(Q)
is not too small, we an ompute an approximation p˜(Q) of p(Q) by testing for
w ∈ 〈Q〉 for a suiently large number of examples w. For v ∈ Q and w 6∈ Q
we denote by Q(v, w) the set obtained by replaing v by w in Q.
The idea of the heuristi is to start with an arbitrary linearly independent
set Q of n examples and to try to improve this set by nding v ∈ Q and w 6∈ Q
suh that p˜(Q) < p˜(Q(v, w)). Iterating this proedure at most n times yields a
basis for Vl for some l ∈ [L].
Table 9.1: Performane of the passive attak on CKK
2
(n, k) approx. number of observations approx. attak time
(128, 30) 311 0.3 s
(1024, 256) 2197 179 s
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This kind of heuristi is infeasible if the following ondition is fullled. For a
random linear independent set Q of n examples the probability p(Q) is negligibly
small with probability 1 − ǫ, ǫ negligibly small. The parameters n, k should be
hosen suh that this ondition is guaranteed.
We estimate the probability p(Q) for the ase L = 2. For a linear indepen-
dent set Q of n examples let Q = Q1 ∪ Q2, where Q1 ⊆ V1 and Q2 ⊆ V2 \ V1.
Without loss of generality, let |Q1| = n/2 + s and |Q2| = n/2 − s. The event
w ∈ 〈Q〉 happens i w ∈ V1∩ < Q1 > or w ∈ V2 and w ∈ V2∩ < Q1 >, i.e.,
p(Q) ≤
1
2
(
2s−n/2 + 2−k
)
.
Note that dim(V1 ∩ V2) = n− k for random n-dimensional subspaes V1, V2. If
n, k are hosen suh that 2−k, 2−n/4 and the probability that |v| 6∈ [n/4, 3n/4]
are negligibly small, then the above ondition is fullled (note that the expeted
value of s is 2−kn/2).
The parameters (n, k) should be hosen suh that these attaks beome
infeasible. Moreover, k should be large enough suh that the probability p of
a random v ∈ GF(2)n+k belonging to
⋃L
l=1 Vl is negligibly small. Note that
p < L2−k.
The subspaes V1, . . . , VL should have the property Vi ⊕ Vj = GF(2)
n+k
for
all i 6= j ∈ [L], otherwise the eetive key length would be redued. This implies
n ≥ k.
9.6.2 The Learning Unions of L Linear Subspaes Problem
The Learning Unions of L Linear Subspaes (LULS) Problem refers to the fol-
lowing ommuniation game between a learner and an orale. The orale holds
the speiations of L n-dimensionial linear subspaes V1, . . . , VL of GF(2)
n+k
.
The learner an send requests hello to the orale. If the orale reeives hello, it
hooses randomly and uniformly an l ∈ [L] and v ∈ Vl and sends the (positive)
example v to the learner. The aim of the learner is to ompute speiations
of V1, . . . , VL from a suiently large set v
1, . . . , vs of examples produed by
the orale. Note that this orresponds to a passive key reovery attak against
(n, k, L)-type protools. A possible strategy is the searh-for-a-basis heuristi
desribed in Setion 9.6.1.
An ative adversary who is able to solve the LULS problem eiently an
break the (n, k, L)+ protool. In partiular, knowing speiations of the se-
ret subspaes V1, . . . , VL, he an generate speiations of the subspaes Vl(a)
(i.e., the image of Fl(a, ·)), for arbitrary a ∈ GF(2)n/2 and l ∈ [L] by re-
peatedly sending a to Bob. Then the adversary uses N = n/2 subspaes
Vl(ai), . . . , Vl(aN ) for {a1, . . . , aN} linearly independent to forge a response for
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a hallenge a =
∑N
i=1 αiai by omputing
w =
N∑
i=1
αivi with vi ∈R Vl(ai)
=
N∑
i=1
αiFl(ai, bi)
= Fl(a, b
′) with b =
N∑
i=1
bi .
In the ase of the (n, k, L)++ protool, the adversary annot just return a
random w ∈ Vl(a), but has to make sure that the rst half of f−1(F
−1
l (w))
orresponds to a. How suh a w an be found eiently (possibly based on the
speiations of the subspaes Vl(a)) is a matter of further researh.
In the following, we present and disuss an algebrai learning algorithm for
LULS.
9.6.3 On Solving the LULS Problem
A Learning Algorithm for the LULS Problem
Reall that the LULS problem with parameters n, k, L onsists in omputing
speiations of L seret n-dimensional linear subspaes of GF(2)n+k from pos-
itive examples v produed by an orale whih hooses randomly and uniformly
l ∈ [L] and v ∈ Vl. In this thesis we treat the ase L = 2 and onsider the spe-
ial ase that Vl = {(v, f(v)), v ∈ GF(2)n}, l ∈ {1, 2}, for seret linear funtions
f1, f2 : GF(2)
n −→ GF(2)k. Our algorithm omputes for all i ∈ [k] speia-
tions of the i-th omponent funtions f i1, f
i
2 : GF(2)
n −→ GF(2) separately, i.e.,
it sues to onsider the ase k = 1. The learning algorithm is based on the
following reasoning.
1. Take a set O = {(v1, w1), . . . , (vn, wn)} ⊆ GF(2)n+1 of examples suh that
B = {v1, . . . , vn} forms a basis of GF(2)n. For all i ∈ [n] let xi and yi
denote the variables orresponding to f1(v
i) and f2(v
i), respetively.
2. For b ∈ {0, 1} let Ib = {i ∈ [n], wi = b}.
3. For all i ∈ [n] let ti = xi ⊕ yi, and for all i < j ∈ [n] let ti,j = xiyj ⊕ xjyi.
4. Observe that for all i ∈ [n] the equality (wi⊕ xi)(wi ⊕ yi) = 0 holds. This
implies
xiyi = 0 if i ∈ I0 and xiyi = 1⊕ ti if i ∈ I1 . (9.2)
5. Observe that eah example (v, w) ∈ GF(2)n+1, v 6∈ B satises the follow-
ing: If v =
⊕
i∈I vi, (i.e., I ⊆ [n] denes the unique representation of v
w.r.t. B), then (
w ⊕
⊕
i∈I
xi
)(
w ⊕
⊕
i∈I
yi
)
= 0 . (9.3)
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Observe that Eq. (9.3) an be rewritten as a relation TB(I, w) in the
variables ti and ti,j in the following way. If w = 0 then Eq. (9.3) is
equivalent to
⊕
i∈I xiyi ⊕
⊕
i<j∈I ti,j = 0. Together with Eq. (9.2) this
implies
⊕
i∈I1∩I
(ti ⊕ 1) ⊕
⊕
i<j∈I ti,j = 0 for w = 0. Consequently, for
w = 0 we dene TB(I, w) as⊕
i∈I∩I1
ti ⊕
⊕
i<j∈I
ti,j =
{
0 if |I ∩ I1| is even
1 if |I ∩ I1| is odd
.
If w = 1 then Eq. (9.3) is equivalent to 1 ⊕
⊕
i∈I ti ⊕
⊕
i∈I∩I1
(ti ⊕ 1) ⊕⊕
i<j∈I ti,j = 0. Hene, for w = 1 we dene TB(I, w) as⊕
i∈I∩I0
ti ⊕
⊕
i<j∈I
ti,j =
{
0 if |I ∩ I1| is odd
1 if |I ∩ I1| is even
.
Note that a relation similar to Eq. (9.3) was also exhibited by Blass et al. (2008)
for designing an algebrai attak against Ff protools.
The learning algorithm now proeeds as desribed in Algorithm 14.
Algorithm 14 LULS-solve(O)
Let initially the system LES of linear equations in the 12 (n
2 + n) variables ti
(i ∈ [n]) and ti,j (i < j ∈ [n]) be empty.
repeat
Choose an observation (v, w) ∈ O, v 6∈ B ∪ {~0}, and ompute the unique
subset I ⊆ [n] with v =
⊕
i∈I v
i
.
Enlarge the system LES by the linear equation TB(I, w).
until the system LES has 12 (n
2 + n) linearly independent equations.
Compute by Gaussian elimination the unique solution θ of the system LES.
Compute from θ the unique orret assignments to xi, yi for all i ∈ [n].
The orret assignments to the xi and yi variables (the last step of Al-
gorithm 14) an be omputed from θ = (θi)i∈[n] (θi,j)i<j∈[n] as follows. For
b = 0, 1 let Kb denote the set Kb = {i ∈ [n], θi = b}. We know that for all
i ∈ K0, xi = yi = wi is satised, and for all i ∈ K1 it holds that yi = xi ⊕ 1.
This implies that for all i < j in K1, θi,j satises
θi,j = xi(xj ⊕ 1)⊕ xj(xi ⊕ 1) = xi ⊕ xj .
This yields a system LES∗ of 1/2|K1|(|K1|−1) linear equations in the variables
xi, i ∈ K1, of rank |K1| − 1. Sine it does not matter whih of the two seret
linear subspaes we denote by V1 and whih by V2, we have the freedom to
set xk = 0 for some xed k ∈ K1. The system LES
∗
together with xk = 0
yields a system of full rank and allows to ompute the orret assigment to the
xi-variables by Gaussian elimination.
Analysis and Experimental Results
The reason for the fat that the repeat yle of the algorithm is left after a
nite number of rounds is that the following (2n − (n + 1)) × (n(n + 1)/2)-
matrix M(n) over GF(2) has full row rank (whih is not hard to show). The
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row indies of M(n) are all subsets I ⊆ [n] with |I| ≥ 2, the olumn indies are
[n] ∪ {(i, j), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n}. We have M(n)I,i = 1 i i ∈ I and M(n)I,(i,j) = 1
i {i, j} ⊆ [n].
We do not give here a theoretial analysis of the expeted number of rounds
of the repeat yle. Our experiments show that the algorithm needs only slightly
more than
1
2 (n
2 + n) + n observations to ompute the seret funtions f1 and
f2. Partiularly for n = 128, we need approx. 8390 examples and 4 minutes on
a 3.4 GHz Intel Pentium IV with 4 GB RAM and Magma V2.15-9.
How severe is the restrition that the seret subspaes have the speial form
V = {(v, f(v)), v ∈ GF(2)n} for some surjetive linear mapping f : GF(2)n −→
GF(2)k? Let us onsider the general ase V = {A ◦ v, v ∈ GF(2)n} for an
((n + k) × n) matrix A. V an be written in the speial form i the rst n
rows of A are linearly independent. For randomly hosen A this is true with
probability p(n) ≈ 0.2887 (Lemma 9.1).
We have seen that we an solve the LULS problem with parameters (n, k, 2)
by solving k LULSproblems with parameters (n, 1, 2). For the speial LULS
problem with parameters (n, 1, L), L > 2, we an dene a similar system LES
onsisting of degree-L equations in the variables xli, i ∈ [n], l ∈ [L], indued as
above by equations of the form(
w ⊕
⊕
i∈I
x1i
)
. . .
(
w ⊕
⊕
i∈I
xLi
)
= 0 . (9.4)
The problem is that for L > 2 the equations have several symmetries suh
that the system an not be solved uniquely. A possible way out is to
• hoose an appropriate parameter s < k whih divides k, let k = s · p,
• write vetors w ∈ GF(2)k as vetors w ∈ GF(2s)p, and
• solve the orresponding p LULS problem with parameters (n, 1, L) over
GF(2s).
Hamann (2010) has desribed a learning algorihm based on this idea that
solves the desribed speial ase of the LULS problem in average running time
in the order of knO(L). His analysis supports the onjeture that there is no
faster way to solve an (n, k, L) LULS problem, whih suggests parameter hoies
like (n,L) ∈ {(128, 8), (256, 6)} for pratial appliations.
9.7 Disussion
We have seen that the seret key of CKK
2
protools an be omputed very
quikly from a suiently large set of messages sent by the prover. This kind
of protool should not be used in pratie.
The parameters of (n, k, L)++ protools have to be hosen in suh that solv-
ing the LULS problem with parameters (n2 , k, L) is infeasible. We reommend
to use n = 256, k = 64 and L = 5.
Another interesting question is to searh for simpler nonlinear onnetion
funtions f for whih a seurity proof an be found. In our proposal, the prover
has to perform three multipliations in the nite eld of order 2n/2 in order to
ompute f(a, b).
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Yet another open question is whether the very symmetrially strutured
systems of degree-L equations arising in our LULS algorithm in Setion 9.6.3
an be solved more eiently by more advaned tehniques like the F4- or F5-
algorithm or ube attaks (Dinur and Shamir, 2008, 2009, Faugère, 1999, 2002).
If one ould generate onvining evidene that suh algorithms annot beat our
linearization attak, then (n, k, L)++ protools with the above parameters ould
be seriously onsidered for pratial use.
A problem of (n, k, L) protools is the large key length of L · n · n+ k in the
ase that random mappings F1, . . . , FL are used. It is an important task to look
for seure and eient ways to generate pseudorandom keys. In this ontext,
the (still unbroken) CKK
σ,L
protools look appealing, but we onjeture that
CKK
σ,L
protools an be eently broken. However, promising suggestions for
key length redutions have been made by Gilbert et al. (2008a) and Bringer and
Chabanne (2008) in the ontext of Trusted-HB (see Setion 8.3.5). Adapting
these ideas to (n, k, L) protools would mean
• to onsider speial forms of seret subspaes Vl = {(Al ◦ v), v ∈ GF(2)n},
where Al denotes a seret (n + k) × n Toeplitz matrix (Gilbert et al.,
2008a), and
• to dene the Toeplitz matrix Al to be generated by a seret Linear Feed-
bak Shift Register (Bringer and Chabanne, 2008).
Cheking the feasibility and seurity of these onstrutions should be a mat-
ter of further researh.
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Chapter 10
Conlusion
In this thesis, we have analyzed two of the most prominent seurity requirements
in eletroni ommuniation, ondentiality of messages and authentiity of
entities.
Conerning ondentiality of messages, we have dened and analyzed hardware-
oriented stream iphers and their most important building bloks. We have
desribed three generi attaks on stream iphers, BDD-Attaks, orrelation
attaks and algebrai attaks, and analyzed their impat on pratially used
stream iphers as well as newly proposed designs. In the ase of theE0 keystream
generator from the Bluetooth standard, we have indiated ways to improve its
seurity with respet to the onsidered attaks by areful loal modiations of
the design.
In order to provide entity authentiation for environments in whih only little
omputational resoures are available, e.g. on RFID-tags or mobile telephones,
we dened and investigated lightweight authentiation protools that are based
on randomly hoosing elements from a seret set of vetor spaes. We related
the seurity of these protools to the hardness of a ertain learning problem
and provided a rst omplexity analysis of this problem as a starting point for
further researh.
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